Sub2API v1.0 - AI API 网关（二开初始版本，基于上游 Wei-Shaw/sub2api）

backend/internal/securityaudit/coordinator.go

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type LegacyEngine interface {
+	Check(ctx context.Context, req Request) (*LegacyDecision, error)
+}
+
+type PromptEngine interface {
+	EffectiveMode() Mode
+	Enqueue(ctx context.Context, req Request) error
+	Evaluate(ctx context.Context, req Request) (*PromptDecision, error)
+}
+
+type Coordinator struct {
+	legacy LegacyEngine
+	prompt PromptEngine
+}
+
+func NewCoordinator(legacy LegacyEngine, prompt PromptEngine) *Coordinator {
+	return &Coordinator{legacy: legacy, prompt: prompt}
+}
+
+func (c *Coordinator) Check(ctx context.Context, req Request) Decision {
+	if c == nil {
+		return allowDecision(nil, nil)
+	}
+	mode := ModeOff
+	if c.prompt != nil {
+		mode = c.prompt.EffectiveMode()
+	}
+	switch mode {
+	case ModeAsync:
+		// Enqueue is deliberately best-effort. The implementation owns a bounded
+		// context and copies request memory before it can outlive the Handler.
+		_ = c.prompt.Enqueue(ctx, req.Clone())
+		legacy, _ := c.checkLegacy(ctx, req)
+		return prioritize(legacy, nil)
+	case ModeBlocking:
+		return c.checkBlocking(ctx, req)
+	default:
+		legacy, _ := c.checkLegacy(ctx, req)
+		return prioritize(legacy, nil)
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *Coordinator) checkBlocking(ctx context.Context, req Request) Decision {
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	wg.Add(2)
+	var legacy *LegacyDecision
+	var prompt *PromptDecision
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+		legacy, _ = c.checkLegacy(ctx, req)
+	}()
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+		if c.prompt == nil {
+			prompt = unavailablePromptDecision(ErrorCodeUnavailable)
+			return
+		}
+		result, err := c.prompt.Evaluate(ctx, req.Clone())
+		if err != nil {
+			var guardErr *GuardError
+			if errors.As(err, &guardErr) && guardErr.Code == ErrorCodeInvalidResponse {
+				prompt = unavailablePromptDecision(ErrorCodeInvalidResponse)
+				return
+			}
+			prompt = unavailablePromptDecision(ErrorCodeUnavailable)
+			return
+		}
+		if result == nil {
+			prompt = unavailablePromptDecision(ErrorCodeUnavailable)
+			return
+		}
+		prompt = result
+	}()
+	wg.Wait()
+	return prioritize(legacy, prompt)
+}
+
+func (c *Coordinator) checkLegacy(ctx context.Context, req Request) (*LegacyDecision, error) {
+	if c.legacy == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return c.legacy.Check(ctx, req)
+}
+
+func prioritize(legacy *LegacyDecision, prompt *PromptDecision) Decision {
+	if legacy != nil && legacy.Blocked {
+		status := legacy.StatusCode
+		if status < 400 || status > 599 {
+			status = http.StatusForbidden
+		}
+		code := legacy.ErrorCode
+		if code == "" {
+			code = "content_policy_violation"
+		}
+		return Decision{
+			Kind: DecisionBlock, HTTPStatus: status, ErrorCode: code, ClientMessage: legacy.Message,
+			Legacy: legacy, Prompt: prompt, AllowNextStage: false,
+		}
+	}
+	if prompt == nil {
+		return allowDecision(legacy, nil)
+	}
+	switch prompt.Kind {
+	case DecisionBlock:
+		return Decision{Kind: DecisionBlock, HTTPStatus: http.StatusForbidden, ErrorCode: ErrorCodeBlocked,
+			ClientMessage: "提示词安全审计拒绝了该请求，请调整输入后重试", Legacy: legacy, Prompt: prompt}
+	case DecisionInvalid:
+		return Decision{Kind: DecisionInvalid, HTTPStatus: http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ErrorCode: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse,
+			ClientMessage: "提示词安全审计暂时不可用，请稍后重试", Legacy: legacy, Prompt: prompt}
+	case DecisionUnavailable:
+		return Decision{Kind: DecisionUnavailable, HTTPStatus: http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ErrorCode: ErrorCodeUnavailable,
+			ClientMessage: "提示词安全审计暂时不可用，请稍后重试", Legacy: legacy, Prompt: prompt}
+	case DecisionFlag:
+		return Decision{Kind: DecisionFlag, HTTPStatus: http.StatusOK, Legacy: legacy, Prompt: prompt, AllowNextStage: true}
+	default:
+		return allowDecision(legacy, prompt)
+	}
+}
+
+func allowDecision(legacy *LegacyDecision, prompt *PromptDecision) Decision {
+	return Decision{Kind: DecisionAllow, HTTPStatus: http.StatusOK, Legacy: legacy, Prompt: prompt, AllowNextStage: true}
+}
+
+func unavailablePromptDecision(code string) *PromptDecision {
+	kind := DecisionUnavailable
+	if code == ErrorCodeInvalidResponse {
+		kind = DecisionInvalid
+	}
+	return &PromptDecision{Kind: kind, ErrorCode: code, AllowNextStage: false}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/coordinator_legacy.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+)
+
+type LegacyModerationAdapter struct {
+	service *service.ContentModerationService
+}
+
+func NewLegacyModerationAdapter(svc *service.ContentModerationService) LegacyEngine {
+	return &LegacyModerationAdapter{service: svc}
+}
+
+func (a *LegacyModerationAdapter) Check(ctx context.Context, req Request) (*LegacyDecision, error) {
+	if a == nil || a.service == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	decision, err := a.service.Check(ctx, service.ContentModerationCheckInput{
+		RequestID: req.RequestID, UserID: req.UserID, UserEmail: req.UserEmail,
+		APIKeyID: req.APIKeyID, APIKeyName: req.APIKeyName, GroupID: cloneInt64Ptr(req.GroupID),
+		GroupName: req.GroupName, Endpoint: req.Endpoint, Provider: req.Provider,
+		Model: req.Model, Protocol: req.Protocol, Body: req.Body,
+	})
+	if err != nil || decision == nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &LegacyDecision{
+		Allowed: decision.Allowed, Blocked: decision.Blocked, Flagged: decision.Flagged,
+		Message: decision.Message, StatusCode: decision.StatusCode,
+		ErrorCode: "content_policy_violation", Action: decision.Action,
+	}, nil
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/coordinator_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type fakeLegacyEngine struct {
+	decision *LegacyDecision
+	err      error
+	calls    atomic.Int64
+}
+
+func (f *fakeLegacyEngine) Check(context.Context, Request) (*LegacyDecision, error) {
+	f.calls.Add(1)
+	return f.decision, f.err
+}
+
+type fakePromptEngine struct {
+	mode      Mode
+	decision  *PromptDecision
+	err       error
+	enqueues  atomic.Int64
+	evaluates atomic.Int64
+}
+
+func (f *fakePromptEngine) EffectiveMode() Mode { return f.mode }
+func (f *fakePromptEngine) Enqueue(context.Context, Request) error {
+	f.enqueues.Add(1)
+	return f.err
+}
+func (f *fakePromptEngine) Evaluate(context.Context, Request) (*PromptDecision, error) {
+	f.evaluates.Add(1)
+	return f.decision, f.err
+}
+
+func TestCoordinatorModesAndPriority(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name           string
+		mode           Mode
+		legacy         *LegacyDecision
+		prompt         *PromptDecision
+		promptErr      error
+		wantKind       DecisionKind
+		wantCode       string
+		wantEnqueue    int64
+		wantEvaluation int64
+	}{
+		{name: "off", mode: ModeOff, wantKind: DecisionAllow},
+		{name: "async only enqueues", mode: ModeAsync, wantKind: DecisionAllow, wantEnqueue: 1},
+		{name: "prompt block", mode: ModeBlocking, prompt: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionBlock}, wantKind: DecisionBlock, wantCode: ErrorCodeBlocked, wantEvaluation: 1},
+		{name: "prompt unavailable", mode: ModeBlocking, promptErr: errors.New("down"), wantKind: DecisionUnavailable, wantCode: ErrorCodeUnavailable, wantEvaluation: 1},
+		{name: "legacy wins both block", mode: ModeBlocking,
+			legacy: &LegacyDecision{Blocked: true, StatusCode: http.StatusForbidden, ErrorCode: "content_policy_violation", Message: "legacy"},
+			prompt: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionBlock}, wantKind: DecisionBlock, wantCode: "content_policy_violation", wantEvaluation: 1},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			legacy := &fakeLegacyEngine{decision: tt.legacy}
+			prompt := &fakePromptEngine{mode: tt.mode, decision: tt.prompt, err: tt.promptErr}
+			decision := NewCoordinator(legacy, prompt).Check(context.Background(), Request{Body: []byte(`{}`)})
+			require.Equal(t, tt.wantKind, decision.Kind)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.wantCode, decision.ErrorCode)
+			require.Equal(t, int64(1), legacy.calls.Load())
+			require.Equal(t, tt.wantEnqueue, prompt.enqueues.Load())
+			require.Equal(t, tt.wantEvaluation, prompt.evaluates.Load())
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoordinatorDoesNotMutateRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hello"}]}`)
+	original := append([]byte(nil), body...)
+	prompt := &fakePromptEngine{mode: ModeAsync}
+	decision := NewCoordinator(&fakeLegacyEngine{}, prompt).Check(context.Background(), Request{Body: body})
+	require.True(t, decision.AllowNextStage)
+	require.Equal(t, original, body)
+}
+
+func TestCoordinatorBlockingPriorityCoversBothEngineDecisionMatrix(t *testing.T) {
+	legacyCases := []struct {
+		name     string
+		decision *LegacyDecision
+	}{
+		{name: "allow", decision: &LegacyDecision{Allowed: true, StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Action: "allow"}},
+		{name: "flag", decision: &LegacyDecision{Allowed: true, Flagged: true, StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Action: "flag"}},
+		{name: "block", decision: &LegacyDecision{Blocked: true, StatusCode: http.StatusForbidden, ErrorCode: "legacy_exact_code", Message: "legacy exact message", Action: "block"}},
+	}
+	promptCases := []struct {
+		name     string
+		decision *PromptDecision
+		wantKind DecisionKind
+		wantCode string
+	}{
+		{name: "allow", decision: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionAllow, AllowNextStage: true}, wantKind: DecisionAllow},
+		{name: "flag", decision: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionFlag, AllowNextStage: true}, wantKind: DecisionFlag},
+		{name: "block", decision: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionBlock}, wantKind: DecisionBlock, wantCode: ErrorCodeBlocked},
+		{name: "unavailable", decision: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionUnavailable, ErrorCode: ErrorCodeUnavailable}, wantKind: DecisionUnavailable, wantCode: ErrorCodeUnavailable},
+		{name: "invalid", decision: &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionInvalid, ErrorCode: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}, wantKind: DecisionInvalid, wantCode: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse},
+	}
+
+	for _, legacyCase := range legacyCases {
+		for _, promptCase := range promptCases {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("legacy_%s_prompt_%s", legacyCase.name, promptCase.name), func(t *testing.T) {
+				legacy := &fakeLegacyEngine{decision: legacyCase.decision}
+				prompt := &fakePromptEngine{mode: ModeBlocking, decision: promptCase.decision}
+				decision := NewCoordinator(legacy, prompt).Check(context.Background(), Request{})
+
+				require.Same(t, legacyCase.decision, decision.Legacy)
+				require.Same(t, promptCase.decision, decision.Prompt)
+				require.Equal(t, int64(1), legacy.calls.Load())
+				require.Equal(t, int64(1), prompt.evaluates.Load())
+				if legacyCase.name == "block" {
+					require.Equal(t, DecisionBlock, decision.Kind)
+					require.Equal(t, "legacy_exact_code", decision.ErrorCode)
+					require.Equal(t, "legacy exact message", decision.ClientMessage)
+					require.False(t, decision.AllowNextStage)
+					return
+				}
+				require.Equal(t, promptCase.wantKind, decision.Kind)
+				require.Equal(t, promptCase.wantCode, decision.ErrorCode)
+				require.Equal(t, promptCase.decision.AllowNextStage, decision.AllowNextStage)
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoordinatorPreservesIndependentEngineFactsAndMapsOnlyGatewayOutcome(t *testing.T) {
+	legacyDecision := &LegacyDecision{
+		Allowed: true, Flagged: true, Message: "legacy finding", StatusCode: http.StatusAccepted,
+		ErrorCode: "legacy_observation", Action: "legacy_action",
+	}
+	promptResult := &NormalizedResult{
+		Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock,
+		Categories: []string{"pii"}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"pii": 1},
+	}
+	promptDecision := &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionBlock, Result: promptResult}
+	decision := NewCoordinator(
+		&fakeLegacyEngine{decision: legacyDecision},
+		&fakePromptEngine{mode: ModeBlocking, decision: promptDecision},
+	).Check(context.Background(), Request{})
+
+	require.Same(t, legacyDecision, decision.Legacy)
+	require.Same(t, promptDecision, decision.Prompt)
+	require.Same(t, promptResult, decision.Prompt.Result)
+	require.Equal(t, "legacy finding", decision.Legacy.Message)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"pii"}, decision.Prompt.Result.Categories)
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeBlocked, decision.ErrorCode)
+}
+
+func TestCoordinatorAsyncEnqueueFailuresNeverChangeResponseOrDownstreamDispatch(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, enqueueErr := range []error{ErrQueueFull, ErrQueueAdmissionBusy, errors.New("redis unavailable"), errors.New("publish failed")} {
+		prompt := &fakePromptEngine{mode: ModeAsync, err: enqueueErr}
+		decision := NewCoordinator(&fakeLegacyEngine{decision: &LegacyDecision{Allowed: true}}, prompt).Check(context.Background(), Request{})
+		downstreamDispatches := 0
+		status := http.StatusOK
+		responseBody := "unchanged-upstream-response"
+		if decision.AllowNextStage {
+			downstreamDispatches++
+		} else {
+			status = decision.HTTPStatus
+			responseBody = decision.ClientMessage
+		}
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, status)
+		require.Equal(t, "unchanged-upstream-response", responseBody)
+		require.Equal(t, 1, downstreamDispatches)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), prompt.enqueues.Load())
+		require.Zero(t, prompt.evaluates.Load())
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config.go

@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+)
+
+const (
+	DefaultWorkerCount   = 4
+	MaxWorkerCount       = 32
+	DefaultQueueCapacity = 32768
+	MaxQueueCapacity     = 100000
+	DefaultTimeoutMS     = 3000
+	MinTimeoutMS         = 100
+	MaxTimeoutMS         = 30000
+	DefaultInputLimit    = 4000
+	MinInputLimit        = 128
+	MaxInputLimit        = 100000
+	DefaultPayloadTTL    = 30 * time.Minute
+)
+
+type SecretEncryptor interface {
+	Encrypt(plaintext string) (string, error)
+	Decrypt(ciphertext string) (string, error)
+}
+
+// ConfigStore is the injectable boundary between hot-path prompt auditing and
+// the concrete settings/PostgreSQL/Redis-backed configuration manager.
+type ConfigStore interface {
+	Start(ctx context.Context) error
+	Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error
+	Active() (ActiveConfig, bool)
+	EffectiveMode() Mode
+	// BlockingActivationDegraded is true when storage intent requires blocking
+	// but no usable blocking snapshot is active (cold start or failed reload).
+	// It must stay false when blocking is not intended, even if config is
+	// untrusted—otherwise default-off deployments fail closed for all traffic.
+	BlockingActivationDegraded() bool
+	Public() (PublicConfig, error)
+	Save(ctx context.Context, req UpdateConfigRequest, actorID int64) (PublicConfig, error)
+	RuntimeState() (expected int64, active int64, loadedAt *time.Time, loadError string)
+	Encrypt(value string) (string, error)
+	Decrypt(value string) (string, error)
+}
+
+type StorageEndpoint struct {
+	ID              string `json:"id"`
+	Name            string `json:"name"`
+	Protocol        string `json:"protocol"`
+	BaseURL         string `json:"base_url"`
+	Model           string `json:"model"`
+	TokenCiphertext string `json:"token_ciphertext,omitempty"`
+	TimeoutMS       int    `json:"timeout_ms"`
+	InputLimit      int    `json:"input_limit"`
+	Enabled         bool   `json:"enabled"`
+}
+
+type storageConfig struct {
+	Enabled                bool              `json:"enabled"`
+	BlockingEnabled        bool              `json:"blocking_enabled"`
+	BlockingLatestTurnOnly bool              `json:"blocking_latest_turn_only"`
+	StorePassEvents        bool              `json:"store_pass_events"`
+	Strategy               string            `json:"strategy"`
+	WorkerCount            int               `json:"worker_count"`
+	QueueCapacity          int               `json:"queue_capacity"`
+	Scanners               []string          `json:"scanners"`
+	AllGroups              bool              `json:"all_groups"`
+	GroupIDs               []int64           `json:"group_ids"`
+	Endpoints              []StorageEndpoint `json:"endpoints"`
+	ConfigVersion          int64             `json:"config_version"`
+	UpdatedAt              time.Time         `json:"updated_at"`
+	UpdatedBy              int64             `json:"updated_by"`
+	ChangeSummary          string            `json:"change_summary"`
+}
+
+type ActiveEndpoint struct {
+	ID         string
+	Name       string
+	Protocol   string
+	BaseURL    string
+	Model      string
+	Token      string
+	TimeoutMS  int
+	InputLimit int
+	Enabled    bool
+	// TokenInvalid marks an endpoint whose persisted token ciphertext cannot be
+	// decrypted with the current encryption key (key changed or auto-generated
+	// on restart). The endpoint is kept visible for admins but excluded from
+	// runtime use until the token is re-entered or cleared (issue #4887).
+	TokenInvalid bool
+}
+
+type ActiveConfig struct {
+	RiskControlEnabled     bool
+	Enabled                bool
+	BlockingEnabled        bool
+	BlockingLatestTurnOnly bool
+	StorePassEvents        bool
+	Strategy               string
+	WorkerCount            int
+	QueueCapacity          int
+	Scanners               []string
+	AllGroups              bool
+	GroupIDs               []int64
+	Endpoints              []ActiveEndpoint
+	ConfigVersion          int64
+	UpdatedAt              time.Time
+	UpdatedBy              int64
+	ChangeSummary          string
+}
+
+type PublicEndpoint struct {
+	ID          string `json:"id"`
+	Name        string `json:"name"`
+	Protocol    string `json:"protocol"`
+	BaseURL     string `json:"base_url"`
+	Model       string `json:"model"`
+	TimeoutMS   int    `json:"timeout_ms"`
+	InputLimit  int    `json:"input_limit"`
+	Enabled     bool   `json:"enabled"`
+	HasToken    bool   `json:"has_token"`
+	TokenStatus string `json:"token_status"`
+}
+
+type PublicConfig struct {
+	Enabled                bool             `json:"enabled"`
+	BlockingEnabled        bool             `json:"blocking_enabled"`
+	BlockingLatestTurnOnly bool             `json:"blocking_latest_turn_only"`
+	StorePassEvents        bool             `json:"store_pass_events"`
+	EffectiveMode          Mode             `json:"effective_mode"`
+	Strategy               string           `json:"strategy"`
+	WorkerCount            int              `json:"worker_count"`
+	QueueCapacity          int              `json:"queue_capacity"`
+	Scanners               []string         `json:"scanners"`
+	AllGroups              bool             `json:"all_groups"`
+	GroupIDs               []int64          `json:"group_ids"`
+	Endpoints              []PublicEndpoint `json:"endpoints"`
+	ConfigVersion          int64            `json:"config_version"`
+	UpdatedAt              time.Time        `json:"updated_at"`
+	UpdatedBy              int64            `json:"updated_by"`
+	ChangeSummary          string           `json:"change_summary"`
+}
+
+type UpdateEndpoint struct {
+	ID         string `json:"id" binding:"required"`
+	Name       string `json:"name" binding:"required"`
+	Protocol   string `json:"protocol"`
+	BaseURL    string `json:"base_url" binding:"required"`
+	Model      string `json:"model"`
+	Token      string `json:"token,omitempty"`
+	ClearToken bool   `json:"clear_token"`
+	TimeoutMS  int    `json:"timeout_ms"`
+	InputLimit int    `json:"input_limit"`
+	Enabled    bool   `json:"enabled"`
+}
+
+type UpdateConfigRequest struct {
+	ExpectedConfigVersion  int64            `json:"expected_config_version" binding:"required"`
+	Enabled                bool             `json:"enabled"`
+	BlockingEnabled        bool             `json:"blocking_enabled"`
+	BlockingLatestTurnOnly bool             `json:"blocking_latest_turn_only"`
+	StorePassEvents        bool             `json:"store_pass_events"`
+	Strategy               string           `json:"strategy"`
+	WorkerCount            int              `json:"worker_count"`
+	QueueCapacity          int              `json:"queue_capacity"`
+	Scanners               []string         `json:"scanners"`
+	AllGroups              bool             `json:"all_groups"`
+	GroupIDs               []int64          `json:"group_ids"`
+	Endpoints              []UpdateEndpoint `json:"endpoints"`
+}
+
+func DefaultStorageConfig() storageConfig {
+	return storageConfig{
+		Enabled:                false,
+		BlockingEnabled:        false,
+		BlockingLatestTurnOnly: false,
+		StorePassEvents:        false,
+		Strategy:               "priority",
+		WorkerCount:            DefaultWorkerCount,
+		QueueCapacity:          DefaultQueueCapacity,
+		Scanners:               append([]string(nil), AllScannerIDs...),
+		AllGroups:              true,
+		GroupIDs:               []int64{},
+		Endpoints:              []StorageEndpoint{},
+		ConfigVersion:          1,
+	}
+}
+
+func ParseStorageConfig(raw string) (storageConfig, error) {
+	cfg := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
+		return cfg, nil
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &cfg); err != nil {
+		return storageConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("decode prompt audit config: %w", err)
+	}
+	normalizeStorageConfig(&cfg)
+	if err := validateStorageConfig(cfg); err != nil {
+		return storageConfig{}, err
+	}
+	return cfg, nil
+}
+
+func normalizeStorageConfig(cfg *storageConfig) {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if cfg.ConfigVersion < 1 {
+		cfg.ConfigVersion = 1
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Strategy) == "" {
+		cfg.Strategy = "priority"
+	}
+	if cfg.WorkerCount == 0 {
+		cfg.WorkerCount = DefaultWorkerCount
+	}
+	if cfg.QueueCapacity == 0 {
+		cfg.QueueCapacity = DefaultQueueCapacity
+	}
+	if len(cfg.Scanners) == 0 {
+		cfg.Scanners = append([]string(nil), AllScannerIDs...)
+	}
+	cfg.Scanners = canonicalScannerIDs(cfg.Scanners)
+	cfg.GroupIDs = canonicalInt64s(cfg.GroupIDs)
+	// Preserve an invalid blocking-without-audit combination so validation can
+	// reject it instead of silently changing administrator intent.
+	for i := range cfg.Endpoints {
+		ep := &cfg.Endpoints[i]
+		ep.ID = strings.TrimSpace(ep.ID)
+		ep.Name = strings.TrimSpace(ep.Name)
+		ep.Protocol = strings.TrimSpace(ep.Protocol)
+		if ep.Protocol == "" {
+			ep.Protocol = "openai_compatible"
+		}
+		ep.BaseURL = strings.TrimSpace(ep.BaseURL)
+		ep.Model = strings.TrimSpace(ep.Model)
+		if ep.Model == "" {
+			ep.Model = DefaultGuardModel
+		}
+		if ep.TimeoutMS == 0 {
+			ep.TimeoutMS = DefaultTimeoutMS
+		}
+		if ep.InputLimit == 0 {
+			ep.InputLimit = DefaultInputLimit
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func validateStorageConfig(cfg storageConfig) error {
+	if cfg.BlockingEnabled && !cfg.Enabled {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest(ErrorCodeRequiresEnabled, "开启同步阻止前必须先启用提示词审计")
+	}
+	if cfg.Strategy != "priority" {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_strategy", "提示词审计策略仅支持 priority")
+	}
+	if cfg.WorkerCount < 1 || cfg.WorkerCount > MaxWorkerCount {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_worker_count", "Worker 数量超出允许范围")
+	}
+	if cfg.QueueCapacity < 1 || cfg.QueueCapacity > MaxQueueCapacity {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_queue_capacity", "队列容量超出允许范围")
+	}
+	if !cfg.AllGroups && len(cfg.GroupIDs) == 0 {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_groups_required", "指定分组模式至少需要选择一个分组")
+	}
+	if len(cfg.Scanners) == 0 {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_scanners_required", "至少需要启用一个风险分类")
+	}
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(cfg.Endpoints))
+	enabled := 0
+	for _, ep := range cfg.Endpoints {
+		if ep.ID == "" || ep.Name == "" {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_endpoint", "审计节点 ID 和名称不能为空")
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[ep.ID]; ok {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_duplicate_endpoint", "审计节点 ID 不能重复")
+		}
+		seen[ep.ID] = struct{}{}
+		if ep.Protocol != "openai_compatible" {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_endpoint_protocol", "审计节点仅支持 OpenAI 兼容协议")
+		}
+		if _, err := NormalizeBaseURL(ep.BaseURL); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if ep.TimeoutMS < MinTimeoutMS || ep.TimeoutMS > MaxTimeoutMS {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_timeout", "审计节点超时超出允许范围")
+		}
+		if ep.InputLimit < MinInputLimit || ep.InputLimit > MaxInputLimit {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_input_limit", "审计节点输入上限超出允许范围")
+		}
+		if ep.Enabled {
+			enabled++
+		}
+	}
+	if cfg.Enabled && enabled == 0 {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_endpoint_required", "启用提示词审计前至少需要启用一个审计节点")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validateUpdateConfigRequest(req UpdateConfigRequest) error {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(req.Strategy) != "priority" {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_strategy", "提示词审计策略仅支持 priority")
+	}
+	if req.WorkerCount < 1 || req.WorkerCount > MaxWorkerCount {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_worker_count", "Worker 数量超出允许范围")
+	}
+	if req.QueueCapacity < 1 || req.QueueCapacity > MaxQueueCapacity {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_queue_capacity", "队列容量超出允许范围")
+	}
+	if len(req.Scanners) == 0 {
+		return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_scanners_required", "至少需要启用一个风险分类")
+	}
+	for _, scanner := range req.Scanners {
+		if _, ok := ScannerCatalog[NormalizeCategory(scanner)]; !ok {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_scanner", "提示词审计风险分类无效")
+		}
+	}
+	if !req.AllGroups {
+		if len(req.GroupIDs) == 0 {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_groups_required", "指定分组模式至少需要选择一个分组")
+		}
+		for _, groupID := range req.GroupIDs {
+			if groupID <= 0 {
+				return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_group", "提示词审计分组 ID 无效")
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for _, endpoint := range req.Endpoints {
+		if endpoint.TimeoutMS < MinTimeoutMS || endpoint.TimeoutMS > MaxTimeoutMS {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_timeout", "审计节点超时超出允许范围")
+		}
+		if endpoint.InputLimit < MinInputLimit || endpoint.InputLimit > MaxInputLimit {
+			return infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_input_limit", "审计节点输入上限超出允许范围")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (cfg ActiveConfig) EffectiveMode() Mode {
+	if !cfg.RiskControlEnabled || !cfg.Enabled {
+		return ModeOff
+	}
+	if cfg.BlockingEnabled {
+		return ModeBlocking
+	}
+	return ModeAsync
+}
+
+func (cfg ActiveConfig) IncludesGroup(groupID *int64) bool {
+	if cfg.AllGroups {
+		return true
+	}
+	if groupID == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	i := sort.Search(len(cfg.GroupIDs), func(i int) bool { return cfg.GroupIDs[i] >= *groupID })
+	return i < len(cfg.GroupIDs) && cfg.GroupIDs[i] == *groupID
+}
+
+func (cfg ActiveConfig) EnabledEndpoints() []ActiveEndpoint {
+	result := make([]ActiveEndpoint, 0, len(cfg.Endpoints))
+	for _, ep := range cfg.Endpoints {
+		if ep.Enabled {
+			result = append(result, ep)
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+// InvalidTokenEndpointIDs lists endpoints whose stored token could not be
+// decrypted with the current encryption key.
+func (cfg ActiveConfig) InvalidTokenEndpointIDs() []string {
+	ids := make([]string, 0)
+	for _, ep := range cfg.Endpoints {
+		if ep.TokenInvalid {
+			ids = append(ids, ep.ID)
+		}
+	}
+	return ids
+}
+
+func PublicFromStorage(cfg storageConfig, riskControlEnabled bool, invalidTokenEndpointIDs []string) PublicConfig {
+	invalid := make(map[string]struct{}, len(invalidTokenEndpointIDs))
+	for _, id := range invalidTokenEndpointIDs {
+		invalid[id] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	scanners := append([]string{}, cfg.Scanners...)
+	groupIDs := append([]int64{}, cfg.GroupIDs...)
+	endpoints := make([]PublicEndpoint, 0, len(cfg.Endpoints))
+	for _, ep := range cfg.Endpoints {
+		hasToken := strings.TrimSpace(ep.TokenCiphertext) != ""
+		status := "missing"
+		if hasToken {
+			status = "configured"
+			if _, ok := invalid[ep.ID]; ok {
+				status = "invalid"
+			}
+		}
+		endpoints = append(endpoints, PublicEndpoint{
+			ID: ep.ID, Name: ep.Name, Protocol: ep.Protocol, BaseURL: ep.BaseURL,
+			Model: ep.Model, TimeoutMS: ep.TimeoutMS, InputLimit: ep.InputLimit,
+			Enabled: ep.Enabled, HasToken: hasToken, TokenStatus: status,
+		})
+	}
+	active := ActiveConfig{RiskControlEnabled: riskControlEnabled, Enabled: cfg.Enabled, BlockingEnabled: cfg.BlockingEnabled}
+	return PublicConfig{
+		Enabled: cfg.Enabled, BlockingEnabled: cfg.BlockingEnabled, BlockingLatestTurnOnly: cfg.BlockingLatestTurnOnly, StorePassEvents: cfg.StorePassEvents,
+		EffectiveMode: active.EffectiveMode(), Strategy: cfg.Strategy, WorkerCount: cfg.WorkerCount,
+		QueueCapacity: cfg.QueueCapacity, Scanners: scanners, AllGroups: cfg.AllGroups,
+		GroupIDs: groupIDs, Endpoints: endpoints, ConfigVersion: cfg.ConfigVersion,
+		UpdatedAt: cfg.UpdatedAt, UpdatedBy: cfg.UpdatedBy, ChangeSummary: cfg.ChangeSummary,
+	}
+}
+
+func ActiveFromStorage(cfg storageConfig, riskControlEnabled bool, encryptor SecretEncryptor) (ActiveConfig, error) {
+	active := ActiveConfig{
+		RiskControlEnabled: riskControlEnabled, Enabled: cfg.Enabled, BlockingEnabled: cfg.BlockingEnabled,
+		BlockingLatestTurnOnly: cfg.BlockingLatestTurnOnly,
+		StorePassEvents:        cfg.StorePassEvents, Strategy: cfg.Strategy, WorkerCount: cfg.WorkerCount,
+		QueueCapacity: cfg.QueueCapacity, Scanners: append([]string(nil), cfg.Scanners...), AllGroups: cfg.AllGroups,
+		GroupIDs: append([]int64(nil), cfg.GroupIDs...), ConfigVersion: cfg.ConfigVersion,
+		UpdatedAt: cfg.UpdatedAt, UpdatedBy: cfg.UpdatedBy, ChangeSummary: cfg.ChangeSummary,
+		Endpoints: make([]ActiveEndpoint, 0, len(cfg.Endpoints)),
+	}
+	for _, ep := range cfg.Endpoints {
+		token := ""
+		tokenInvalid := false
+		if ep.TokenCiphertext != "" {
+			if encryptor == nil {
+				return ActiveConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("prompt audit secret encryptor unavailable")
+			}
+			plain, err := encryptor.Decrypt(ep.TokenCiphertext)
+			if err != nil {
+				// An undecryptable token (encryption key changed or regenerated)
+				// must not take the whole config down: admins would otherwise be
+				// locked out of the real config version and unable to recover
+				// (issue #4887). Keep the ciphertext persisted, but exclude the
+				// endpoint from runtime use until the token is re-entered.
+				tokenInvalid = true
+			} else {
+				token = plain
+			}
+		}
+		active.Endpoints = append(active.Endpoints, ActiveEndpoint{
+			ID: ep.ID, Name: ep.Name, Protocol: ep.Protocol, BaseURL: ep.BaseURL, Model: ep.Model,
+			Token: token, TimeoutMS: ep.TimeoutMS, InputLimit: ep.InputLimit,
+			Enabled: ep.Enabled && !tokenInvalid, TokenInvalid: tokenInvalid,
+		})
+	}
+	return active, nil
+}
+
+func changeSummary(cfg storageConfig) string {
+	summary := struct {
+		Enabled                bool   `json:"enabled"`
+		BlockingEnabled        bool   `json:"blocking_enabled"`
+		BlockingLatestTurnOnly bool   `json:"blocking_latest_turn_only"`
+		StorePassEvents        bool   `json:"store_pass_events"`
+		EndpointCount          int    `json:"endpoint_count"`
+		ScannerCount           int    `json:"scanner_count"`
+		AllGroups              bool   `json:"all_groups"`
+		GroupCount             int    `json:"group_count"`
+		GroupHash              string `json:"group_hash"`
+	}{cfg.Enabled, cfg.BlockingEnabled, cfg.BlockingLatestTurnOnly, cfg.StorePassEvents, len(cfg.Endpoints), len(cfg.Scanners), cfg.AllGroups, len(cfg.GroupIDs), ""}
+	rawGroups, _ := json.Marshal(cfg.GroupIDs)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(rawGroups)
+	summary.GroupHash = hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(summary)
+	return string(raw)
+}
+
+func canonicalInt64s(values []int64) []int64 {
+	seen := make(map[int64]struct{}, len(values))
+	result := make([]int64, 0, len(values))
+	for _, value := range values {
+		if value <= 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[value]; ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[value] = struct{}{}
+		result = append(result, value)
+	}
+	sort.Slice(result, func(i, j int) bool { return result[i] < result[j] })
+	return result
+}
+
+func canonicalScannerIDs(values []string) []string {
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(values))
+	for _, value := range values {
+		id := NormalizeCategory(value)
+		if _, ok := ScannerCatalog[id]; ok {
+			seen[id] = struct{}{}
+		}
+	}
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(seen))
+	for _, id := range AllScannerIDs {
+		if _, ok := seen[id]; ok {
+			result = append(result, id)
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/config"
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/repository"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+	"github.com/lib/pq"
+	"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+const promptAuditRedisTestEnv = "PROMPT_AUDIT_TEST_REDIS_ADDR"
+
+type postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository struct{ db *sql.DB }
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (*service.Setting, error) {
+	var value string
+	var updated time.Time
+	err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT value,updated_at FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, key).Scan(&value, &updated)
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return nil, service.ErrSettingNotFound
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &service.Setting{Key: key, Value: value, UpdatedAt: updated}, nil
+}
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) GetValue(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, error) {
+	setting, err := r.Get(ctx, key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return setting.Value, nil
+}
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) Set(ctx context.Context, key, value string) error {
+	_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO settings(key,value,updated_at) VALUES($1,$2,NOW())
+		ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value=EXCLUDED.value,updated_at=EXCLUDED.updated_at`, key, value)
+	return err
+}
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) GetMultiple(ctx context.Context, keys []string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	result := make(map[string]string, len(keys))
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		result[key] = ""
+	}
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT key,value FROM settings WHERE key=ANY($1)`, pq.Array(keys))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var key, value string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&key, &value); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		result[key] = value
+	}
+	return result, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) SetMultiple(ctx context.Context, values map[string]string) error {
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	for key, value := range values {
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO settings(key,value,updated_at) VALUES($1,$2,NOW())
+			ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value=EXCLUDED.value,updated_at=EXCLUDED.updated_at`, key, value); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return tx.Commit()
+}
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) GetAll(ctx context.Context) (map[string]string, error) {
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT key,value FROM settings`)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+	result := map[string]string{}
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var key, value string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&key, &value); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		result[key] = value
+	}
+	return result, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func (r postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
+	_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM settings WHERE key=$1`, key)
+	return err
+}
+
+func promptAuditTestEncryptor(t *testing.T) service.SecretEncryptor {
+	t.Helper()
+	encryptor, err := repository.NewAESEncryptor(&config.Config{Totp: config.TotpConfig{EncryptionKey: strings.Repeat("42", 32)}})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return encryptor
+}
+
+func promptAuditUpdateRequest(version int64, workerCount int, token string) UpdateConfigRequest {
+	return UpdateConfigRequest{
+		ExpectedConfigVersion: version, Enabled: true, BlockingEnabled: false, StorePassEvents: false,
+		Strategy: "priority", WorkerCount: workerCount, QueueCapacity: 64, Scanners: []string{"pii", "jailbreak"},
+		AllGroups: true, Endpoints: []UpdateEndpoint{{
+			ID: "guard-one", Name: "Guard One", Protocol: "openai_compatible",
+			BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:18080", Model: "", Token: token,
+			TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024, Enabled: true,
+		}},
+	}
+}
+
+func waitForConfigVersion(t *testing.T, manager *ConfigManager, version int64, timeout time.Duration) {
+	t.Helper()
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		active, ok := manager.Active()
+		return ok && active.ConfigVersion == version
+	}, timeout, 20*time.Millisecond)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditConfigCASSecretRoundTripInvalidationAndTTL(t *testing.T) {
+	redisAddress := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(promptAuditRedisTestEnv))
+	if redisAddress == "" {
+		t.Skip(promptAuditRedisTestEnv + " is not set")
+	}
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	settingRepo := postgresPromptAuditSettingRepository{db: db}
+	require.NoError(t, settingRepo.Set(context.Background(), SettingKeyRiskControl, "true"))
+	encryptor := promptAuditTestEncryptor(t)
+	redisClient := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: redisAddress})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, redisClient.Close()) })
+	require.NoError(t, redisClient.Ping(context.Background()).Err())
+
+	managerOne := NewConfigManager(db, settingRepo, redisClient, encryptor, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	managerTwo := NewConfigManager(db, settingRepo, redisClient, encryptor, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+	require.NoError(t, managerOne.Start(ctx))
+	require.NoError(t, managerTwo.Start(ctx))
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, managerOne.Shutdown(context.Background()))
+		require.NoError(t, managerTwo.Shutdown(context.Background()))
+	})
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		return redisClient.PubSubNumSub(context.Background(), ConfigInvalidationChannel).Val()[ConfigInvalidationChannel] >= 2
+	}, 2*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond)
+
+	const canary = "GUARD_TOKEN_CANARY_SECRET_4_CONFIG"
+	public, err := managerOne.Save(context.Background(), promptAuditUpdateRequest(1, 1, canary), 101)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), public.ConfigVersion)
+	require.True(t, public.Endpoints[0].HasToken)
+	publicJSON, err := json.Marshal(public)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, string(publicJSON), canary)
+	waitForConfigVersion(t, managerTwo, 2, 2*time.Second)
+
+	raw, err := settingRepo.GetValue(context.Background(), SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, raw, canary)
+	stored, err := ParseStorageConfig(raw)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, stored.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+	plain, err := encryptor.Decrypt(stored.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, canary, plain)
+	require.NotContains(t, stored.ChangeSummary, canary)
+	require.NotContains(t, stored.ChangeSummary, stored.Endpoints[0].BaseURL)
+
+	type saveResult struct {
+		config PublicConfig
+		err    error
+	}
+	start := make(chan struct{})
+	results := make(chan saveResult, 2)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for index, manager := range []*ConfigManager{managerOne, managerTwo} {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(index int, manager *ConfigManager) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			<-start
+			cfg, saveErr := manager.Save(context.Background(), promptAuditUpdateRequest(2, index+2, ""), int64(201+index))
+			results <- saveResult{config: cfg, err: saveErr}
+		}(index, manager)
+	}
+	close(start)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(results)
+	succeeded, conflicted := 0, 0
+	for result := range results {
+		if result.err == nil {
+			succeeded++
+			require.Equal(t, int64(3), result.config.ConfigVersion)
+			continue
+		}
+		conflicted++
+		require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeConfigConflict, infraerrors.Reason(result.err))
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, 1, succeeded)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, conflicted)
+	waitForConfigVersion(t, managerOne, 3, 2*time.Second)
+	waitForConfigVersion(t, managerTwo, 3, 2*time.Second)
+
+	// A manager without Redis subscriptions must still converge through the
+	// bounded five-second refresh loop.
+	ttlManager := NewConfigManager(db, settingRepo, nil, encryptor, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	require.NoError(t, ttlManager.Start(ctx))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, ttlManager.Shutdown(context.Background())) })
+	waitForConfigVersion(t, ttlManager, 3, time.Second)
+	updated, err := managerOne.Save(context.Background(), promptAuditUpdateRequest(3, 5, ""), 301)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(4), updated.ConfigVersion)
+	waitForConfigVersion(t, ttlManager, 4, 7*time.Second)
+
+	// Redis publication failure is observable degradation, not a rollback of a
+	// successfully committed PostgreSQL config.
+	deadRedis := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: "127.0.0.1:1", MaxRetries: 0, DialTimeout: 30 * time.Millisecond, ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Millisecond, WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Millisecond})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = deadRedis.Close() })
+	degraded := NewConfigManager(db, settingRepo, deadRedis, encryptor, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	require.NoError(t, degraded.Reload(context.Background()))
+	degradedSaved, err := degraded.Save(context.Background(), promptAuditUpdateRequest(4, 6, ""), 401)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(5), degradedSaved.ConfigVersion)
+	active, ok := degraded.Active()
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(5), active.ConfigVersion)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/config"
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+	"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
+)
+
+type activeConfigSnapshot struct {
+	storage  storageConfig
+	active   ActiveConfig
+	loadedAt time.Time
+}
+
+type ConfigManager struct {
+	db        *sql.DB
+	settings  service.SettingRepository
+	redis     *redis.Client
+	encryptor SecretEncryptor
+	clock     Clock
+	// encryptionKeyConfigured mirrors cfg.Totp.EncryptionKeyConfigured. With an
+	// auto-generated (per-boot) key, newly saved endpoint tokens would become
+	// undecryptable after the next restart, so Save rejects them (issue #4887).
+	encryptionKeyConfigured bool
+
+	snapshot atomic.Pointer[activeConfigSnapshot]
+	expected atomic.Int64
+	// expectedBlocking records the last storage intent that could be decoded,
+	// independently of whether endpoint credentials or the full config could be
+	// activated. A config version alone cannot distinguish async from blocking.
+	expectedBlocking atomic.Bool
+	// configUntrusted is set when a load/reload fails before a trustworthy
+	// snapshot is installed. Combined with expectedBlocking, EffectiveMode
+	// fails closed so a persisted blocking policy cannot be silently skipped
+	// after startup or invalidation errors. Without blocking intent, untrusted
+	// alone must not force ModeBlocking—Prompt Audit is default-off and must
+	// not take the gateway down for every API request (see issue #4560).
+	configUntrusted atomic.Bool
+
+	stateMu       sync.RWMutex
+	lastLoadError string
+	lastErrorAt   *time.Time
+
+	lifecycleMu sync.Mutex
+	cancel      context.CancelFunc
+	wg          sync.WaitGroup
+}
+
+func NewConfigManager(db *sql.DB, settings service.SettingRepository, redisClient *redis.Client, encryptor service.SecretEncryptor, cfg *config.Config) *ConfigManager {
+	return &ConfigManager{
+		db: db, settings: settings, redis: redisClient, encryptor: encryptor, clock: realClock{},
+		encryptionKeyConfigured: cfg != nil && cfg.Totp.EncryptionKeyConfigured,
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if m == nil {
+		return errors.New("prompt audit config manager unavailable")
+	}
+	m.lifecycleMu.Lock()
+	if m.cancel != nil {
+		m.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+	runCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+	m.cancel = cancel
+	m.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+	loadErr := m.Reload(runCtx)
+	if loadErr != nil {
+		m.markConfigUntrusted()
+	}
+	m.wg.Add(1)
+	go m.refreshLoop(runCtx)
+	if m.redis != nil {
+		m.wg.Add(1)
+		go m.subscribeLoop(runCtx)
+	}
+	return loadErr
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Shutdown(_ context.Context) error {
+	if m == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	m.lifecycleMu.Lock()
+	cancel := m.cancel
+	m.cancel = nil
+	m.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+	if cancel != nil {
+		cancel()
+	}
+	m.wg.Wait()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Reload(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if m == nil || m.settings == nil {
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
+		return errors.New("prompt audit setting repository unavailable")
+	}
+	values, err := m.settings.GetMultiple(ctx, []string{SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig, SettingKeyRiskControl})
+	if err != nil {
+		m.recordLoadError(err)
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
+		return err
+	}
+	m.observeExpectedState(values[SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig], values[SettingKeyRiskControl] == "true")
+	storage, err := ParseStorageConfig(values[SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig])
+	if err != nil {
+		m.recordLoadError(err)
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
+		return err
+	}
+	m.expected.Store(storage.ConfigVersion)
+	m.expectedBlocking.Store(values[SettingKeyRiskControl] == "true" && storage.Enabled && storage.BlockingEnabled)
+	active, err := ActiveFromStorage(storage, values[SettingKeyRiskControl] == "true", m.encryptor)
+	if err != nil {
+		m.recordLoadError(err)
+		// expectedBlocking may already require fail-closed via BlockingActivationDegraded.
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
+		return err
+	}
+	now := m.clock.Now()
+	previous := m.snapshot.Load()
+	m.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{storage: cloneStorageConfig(storage), active: cloneActiveConfig(active), loadedAt: now})
+	m.configUntrusted.Store(false)
+	m.clearLoadError()
+	m.logInvalidTokenEndpoints(previous, active)
+	LogInfo(EventConfigLoaded, map[string]any{
+		"config_version": storage.ConfigVersion, "status": "loaded",
+	})
+	return nil
+}
+
+// logInvalidTokenEndpoints warns once per change (not on every 5s refresh)
+// when stored endpoint tokens cannot be decrypted with the current key.
+func (m *ConfigManager) logInvalidTokenEndpoints(previous *activeConfigSnapshot, active ActiveConfig) {
+	invalid := active.InvalidTokenEndpointIDs()
+	if len(invalid) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if previous != nil {
+		prior := previous.active.InvalidTokenEndpointIDs()
+		if len(prior) == len(invalid) {
+			same := true
+			for i := range invalid {
+				if prior[i] != invalid[i] {
+					same = false
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if same && previous.active.ConfigVersion == active.ConfigVersion {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	LogWarn(EventConfigTokenInvalid, map[string]any{
+		"config_version": active.ConfigVersion, "status": "degraded",
+		"error_code": "endpoint_token_undecryptable", "guard_endpoint_id": strings.Join(invalid, ","),
+	})
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Active() (ActiveConfig, bool) {
+	if m == nil {
+		return ActiveConfig{}, false
+	}
+	snapshot := m.snapshot.Load()
+	if snapshot == nil {
+		return ActiveConfig{}, false
+	}
+	return cloneActiveConfig(snapshot.active), true
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) BlockingActivationDegraded() bool {
+	if m == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Fail closed only when storage intent requires blocking. Untrusted config
+	// without blocking intent must remain ModeOff so administrators can still
+	// operate the gateway and turn Prompt Audit off after a failed reload.
+	if !m.expectedBlocking.Load() {
+		return false
+	}
+	if m.configUntrusted.Load() {
+		return true
+	}
+	active, ok := m.Active()
+	if !ok {
+		return true
+	}
+	// A still-active weaker snapshot after a failed blocking activation must not
+	// keep serving allow decisions under the old off/async mode.
+	return active.EffectiveMode() != ModeBlocking
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) EffectiveMode() Mode {
+	if m != nil && m.BlockingActivationDegraded() {
+		return ModeBlocking
+	}
+	active, ok := m.Active()
+	if !ok {
+		return ModeOff
+	}
+	return active.EffectiveMode()
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) markConfigUntrusted() {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	m.configUntrusted.Store(true)
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot() {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if _, ok := m.Active(); !ok {
+		m.markConfigUntrusted()
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Public() (PublicConfig, error) {
+	if m == nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, infraerrors.ServiceUnavailable(ErrorCodeConfigUnavailable, "提示词审计配置暂不可用")
+	}
+	snapshot := m.snapshot.Load()
+	if snapshot == nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, infraerrors.ServiceUnavailable(ErrorCodeConfigUnavailable, "提示词审计配置暂不可用")
+	}
+	return PublicFromStorage(cloneStorageConfig(snapshot.storage), snapshot.active.RiskControlEnabled, snapshot.active.InvalidTokenEndpointIDs()), nil
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Save(ctx context.Context, req UpdateConfigRequest, actorID int64) (PublicConfig, error) {
+	if m == nil || m.db == nil || m.encryptor == nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, errors.New("prompt audit config persistence unavailable")
+	}
+	if req.ExpectedConfigVersion < 1 {
+		return PublicConfig{}, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_expected_config_version_required", "必须提供有效的配置版本")
+	}
+	tx, err := m.db.BeginTx(ctx, &sql.TxOptions{Isolation: sql.LevelReadCommitted})
+	if err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock($1)`, promptAuditConfigLockKey); err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	current := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	var raw string
+	err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT value FROM settings WHERE key=$1 FOR UPDATE`, SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig).Scan(&raw)
+	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		current, err = ParseStorageConfig(raw)
+		if err != nil {
+			return PublicConfig{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	if current.ConfigVersion != req.ExpectedConfigVersion {
+		return PublicConfig{}, infraerrors.Conflict(ErrorCodeConfigConflict, "提示词审计配置已被其他管理员更新")
+	}
+	next, err := m.buildNextStorage(current, req, actorID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	next.ConfigVersion = current.ConfigVersion + 1
+	next.UpdatedAt = m.clock.Now()
+	next.UpdatedBy = actorID
+	next.ChangeSummary = changeSummary(next)
+	rawNext, err := json.Marshal(next)
+	if err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO settings (key,value,updated_at) VALUES ($1,$2,NOW())
+		ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET value=EXCLUDED.value, updated_at=EXCLUDED.updated_at`,
+		SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig, string(rawNext)); err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	// Install the snapshot with the current global gate, not merely the value
+	// cached when this process last reloaded Prompt Audit configuration.
+	riskControlEnabled := m.currentRiskControlEnabled()
+	if values, getErr := m.settings.GetMultiple(ctx, []string{SettingKeyRiskControl}); getErr == nil {
+		riskControlEnabled = values[SettingKeyRiskControl] == "true"
+	}
+	active, err := ActiveFromStorage(next, riskControlEnabled, m.encryptor)
+	if err != nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, err
+	}
+	m.expected.Store(next.ConfigVersion)
+	m.expectedBlocking.Store(active.RiskControlEnabled && next.Enabled && next.BlockingEnabled)
+	previous := m.snapshot.Load()
+	m.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{storage: cloneStorageConfig(next), active: cloneActiveConfig(active), loadedAt: m.clock.Now()})
+	// A successful admin save installs a trustworthy snapshot; clear any prior
+	// fail-closed degradation so disabling audit actually takes effect.
+	m.configUntrusted.Store(false)
+	m.clearLoadError()
+	m.logInvalidTokenEndpoints(previous, active)
+	LogInfo(EventConfigUpdated, map[string]any{
+		"config_version": next.ConfigVersion, "status": "updated",
+	})
+	if m.redis != nil {
+		if err := m.redis.Publish(ctx, ConfigInvalidationChannel, strconv.FormatInt(next.ConfigVersion, 10)).Err(); err != nil {
+			LogWarn(EventConfigReloadDegraded, map[string]any{
+				"config_version": next.ConfigVersion, "status": "degraded", "error_code": "config_invalidation_publish_failed",
+			})
+		}
+	}
+	return PublicFromStorage(next, active.RiskControlEnabled, active.InvalidTokenEndpointIDs()), nil
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) buildNextStorage(current storageConfig, req UpdateConfigRequest, actorID int64) (storageConfig, error) {
+	if err := validateUpdateConfigRequest(req); err != nil {
+		return storageConfig{}, err
+	}
+	currentByID := make(map[string]StorageEndpoint, len(current.Endpoints))
+	for _, endpoint := range current.Endpoints {
+		currentByID[endpoint.ID] = endpoint
+	}
+	next := storageConfig{
+		Enabled: req.Enabled, BlockingEnabled: req.BlockingEnabled, BlockingLatestTurnOnly: req.BlockingLatestTurnOnly, StorePassEvents: req.StorePassEvents,
+		Strategy: strings.TrimSpace(req.Strategy), WorkerCount: req.WorkerCount,
+		QueueCapacity: req.QueueCapacity, Scanners: append([]string(nil), req.Scanners...),
+		AllGroups: req.AllGroups, GroupIDs: append([]int64(nil), req.GroupIDs...),
+		ConfigVersion: current.ConfigVersion, UpdatedBy: actorID,
+		Endpoints: make([]StorageEndpoint, 0, len(req.Endpoints)),
+	}
+	for _, endpoint := range req.Endpoints {
+		baseURL, err := NormalizeBaseURL(endpoint.BaseURL)
+		if err != nil {
+			return storageConfig{}, err
+		}
+		stored := StorageEndpoint{
+			ID: strings.TrimSpace(endpoint.ID), Name: strings.TrimSpace(endpoint.Name),
+			Protocol: strings.TrimSpace(endpoint.Protocol), BaseURL: baseURL, Model: strings.TrimSpace(endpoint.Model),
+			TimeoutMS: endpoint.TimeoutMS, InputLimit: endpoint.InputLimit, Enabled: endpoint.Enabled,
+		}
+		old, hadOld := currentByID[stored.ID]
+		switch {
+		case endpoint.ClearToken:
+			stored.TokenCiphertext = ""
+		case strings.TrimSpace(endpoint.Token) != "":
+			if !m.encryptionKeyConfigured {
+				return storageConfig{}, infraerrors.BadRequest(ErrorCodeEncryptionKeyRequired,
+					"未配置固定加密密钥，审计节点 Token 将在服务重启后失效。请先设置 TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY 环境变量（64 位十六进制）并重启服务")
+			}
+			ciphertext, err := m.encryptor.Encrypt(strings.TrimSpace(endpoint.Token))
+			if err != nil {
+				return storageConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("encrypt prompt audit endpoint token: %w", err)
+			}
+			stored.TokenCiphertext = ciphertext
+		case hadOld:
+			stored.TokenCiphertext = old.TokenCiphertext
+		}
+		next.Endpoints = append(next.Endpoints, stored)
+	}
+	normalizeStorageConfig(&next)
+	if err := validateStorageConfig(next); err != nil {
+		return storageConfig{}, err
+	}
+	return next, nil
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) RuntimeState() (expected int64, active int64, loadedAt *time.Time, loadError string) {
+	if m == nil {
+		return 1, 0, nil, "config_manager_unavailable"
+	}
+	expected = m.expected.Load()
+	if expected < 1 {
+		expected = 1
+	}
+	if snapshot := m.snapshot.Load(); snapshot != nil {
+		active = snapshot.active.ConfigVersion
+		value := snapshot.loadedAt
+		loadedAt = &value
+	}
+	m.stateMu.RLock()
+	loadError = m.lastLoadError
+	m.stateMu.RUnlock()
+	return
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) Encrypt(value string) (string, error) { return m.encryptor.Encrypt(value) }
+func (m *ConfigManager) Decrypt(value string) (string, error) { return m.encryptor.Decrypt(value) }
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) currentRiskControlEnabled() bool {
+	if snapshot := m.snapshot.Load(); snapshot != nil {
+		return snapshot.active.RiskControlEnabled
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) observeExpectedState(raw string, riskControlEnabled bool) {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
+		m.expected.Store(1)
+		m.expectedBlocking.Store(false)
+		return
+	}
+	var intent struct {
+		Enabled         bool  `json:"enabled"`
+		BlockingEnabled bool  `json:"blocking_enabled"`
+		ConfigVersion   int64 `json:"config_version"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &intent); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if intent.ConfigVersion < 1 {
+		intent.ConfigVersion = 1
+	}
+	m.expected.Store(intent.ConfigVersion)
+	m.expectedBlocking.Store(riskControlEnabled && intent.Enabled && intent.BlockingEnabled)
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) refreshLoop(ctx context.Context) {
+	defer m.wg.Done()
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Second)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			if err := m.Reload(ctx); err != nil {
+				LogWarn(EventConfigReloadDegraded, map[string]any{"status": "degraded", "error_code": "config_ttl_reload_failed"})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) subscribeLoop(ctx context.Context) {
+	defer m.wg.Done()
+	pubsub := m.redis.Subscribe(ctx, ConfigInvalidationChannel)
+	defer func() { _ = pubsub.Close() }()
+	channel := pubsub.Channel()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case message, ok := <-channel:
+			if !ok {
+				return
+			}
+			version, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(message.Payload), 10, 64)
+			if err != nil || version < 1 {
+				continue
+			}
+			m.expected.Store(version)
+			if err := m.Reload(ctx); err != nil {
+				// A newer published version failed to activate. Until reload
+				// succeeds, do not keep serving a potentially stale weaker mode.
+				if active, ok := m.Active(); !ok || active.ConfigVersion < version {
+					m.markConfigUntrusted()
+				}
+				LogWarn(EventConfigReloadDegraded, map[string]any{
+					"config_version": version, "status": "degraded", "error_code": "config_invalidation_reload_failed",
+				})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) recordLoadError(_ error) {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	now := m.clock.Now()
+	m.stateMu.Lock()
+	m.lastLoadError = stableErrorMessage("config_load_failed")
+	m.lastErrorAt = &now
+	m.stateMu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) clearLoadError() {
+	m.stateMu.Lock()
+	m.lastLoadError = ""
+	m.lastErrorAt = nil
+	m.stateMu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func cloneStorageConfig(cfg storageConfig) storageConfig {
+	cfg.Scanners = append([]string(nil), cfg.Scanners...)
+	cfg.GroupIDs = append([]int64(nil), cfg.GroupIDs...)
+	cfg.Endpoints = append([]StorageEndpoint(nil), cfg.Endpoints...)
+	return cfg
+}
+
+func cloneActiveConfig(cfg ActiveConfig) ActiveConfig {
+	cfg.Scanners = append([]string(nil), cfg.Scanners...)
+	cfg.GroupIDs = append([]int64(nil), cfg.GroupIDs...)
+	cfg.Endpoints = append([]ActiveEndpoint(nil), cfg.Endpoints...)
+	return cfg
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/config"
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type prefixEncryptor struct{}
+
+func (prefixEncryptor) Encrypt(value string) (string, error) { return "enc:" + value, nil }
+func (prefixEncryptor) Decrypt(value string) (string, error) {
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(value, "enc:") {
+		return "", errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
+	}
+	return value[4:], nil
+}
+
+// testTotpKeyConfig mirrors a deployment with a fixed TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY so
+// unit tests may persist endpoint tokens.
+func testTotpKeyConfig() *config.Config {
+	return &config.Config{Totp: config.TotpConfig{EncryptionKeyConfigured: true}}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultConfigIsOff(t *testing.T) {
+	storage, err := ParseStorageConfig("")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, storage.Enabled)
+	require.False(t, storage.BlockingLatestTurnOnly)
+	active, err := ActiveFromStorage(storage, true, prefixEncryptor{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, ModeOff, active.EffectiveMode())
+	require.Equal(t, AllScannerIDs, storage.Scanners)
+	publicJSON, err := json.Marshal(PublicFromStorage(storage, true, nil))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, string(publicJSON), `"group_ids":[]`)
+	require.Contains(t, string(publicJSON), `"endpoints":[]`)
+}
+
+func TestBlockingLatestTurnOnlyConfigRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{encryptor: prefixEncryptor{}, encryptionKeyConfigured: true}
+	request := UpdateConfigRequest{
+		ExpectedConfigVersion: 1, Enabled: true, BlockingEnabled: true, BlockingLatestTurnOnly: true,
+		Strategy: "priority", WorkerCount: 1, QueueCapacity: 10, Scanners: []string{"pii"}, AllGroups: true,
+		Endpoints: []UpdateEndpoint{{
+			ID: "guard-1", Name: "Guard", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080",
+			Model: DefaultGuardModel, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1000, Enabled: true,
+		}},
+	}
+	next, err := manager.buildNextStorage(DefaultStorageConfig(), request, 9)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, next.BlockingLatestTurnOnly)
+	require.Contains(t, changeSummary(next), `"blocking_latest_turn_only":true`)
+
+	active, err := ActiveFromStorage(next, true, prefixEncryptor{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, active.BlockingLatestTurnOnly)
+	public := PublicFromStorage(next, true, nil)
+	require.True(t, public.BlockingLatestTurnOnly)
+}
+
+func TestConfigRejectsBlockingWithoutAudit(t *testing.T) {
+	storage := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	storage.BlockingEnabled = true
+	require.Error(t, validateStorageConfig(storage))
+}
+
+func TestPublicConfigNeverMarshalsToken(t *testing.T) {
+	storage := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	storage.Endpoints = []StorageEndpoint{{ID: "one", Name: "One", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080", Model: DefaultGuardModel, TokenCiphertext: "GUARD_TOKEN_CANARY_SECRET", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1000, Enabled: true}}
+	public := PublicFromStorage(storage, true, nil)
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(public)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, string(raw), "GUARD_TOKEN_CANARY_SECRET")
+	require.NotContains(t, string(raw), "ciphertext")
+	require.True(t, public.Endpoints[0].HasToken)
+}
+
+func TestConfigRuntimeLoadErrorIsStableBoundedAndSecretFree(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "CONFIG_LOAD_CANARY_SECRET"
+	manager := &ConfigManager{clock: fixedClock{}}
+	manager.recordLoadError(errors.New("decrypt failed for token " + canary + " Authorization: Bearer " + canary))
+	_, _, _, message := manager.RuntimeState()
+	require.Equal(t, stableErrorMessage("config_load_failed"), message)
+	require.NotContains(t, message, canary)
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, len([]rune(message)), 160)
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerPublicRequiresSuccessfullyLoadedSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("absent persisted setting is legitimate default", func(t *testing.T) {
+		manager := NewConfigManager(nil, staticSettingRepository{values: map[string]string{
+			SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig: "",
+			SettingKeyRiskControl:       "false",
+		}}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+		require.NoError(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()))
+
+		public, err := manager.Public()
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), public.ConfigVersion)
+		require.False(t, public.Enabled)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("unparseable persisted config is unavailable", func(t *testing.T) {
+		const canary = "persisted-token-canary"
+		manager := NewConfigManager(nil, staticSettingRepository{values: map[string]string{
+			// Endpoint without id/name fails validation, so no trustworthy
+			// snapshot can be installed from this raw value.
+			SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig: `{"enabled":true,"config_version":9,"endpoints":[{"token_ciphertext":"` + canary + `"}]}`,
+			SettingKeyRiskControl:       "true",
+		}}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+		require.Error(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()))
+
+		public, err := manager.Public()
+		require.Error(t, err)
+		require.Empty(t, public)
+		require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeConfigUnavailable, infraerrors.Reason(err))
+		require.NotContains(t, err.Error(), canary)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("reload failure preserves last successfully loaded snapshot", func(t *testing.T) {
+		storage := DefaultStorageConfig()
+		storage.ConfigVersion = 4
+		storage.ChangeSummary = "trusted snapshot"
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(storage)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		repository := &switchableSettingRepository{staticSettingRepository: staticSettingRepository{values: map[string]string{
+			SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig: string(raw),
+			SettingKeyRiskControl:       "false",
+		}}}
+		manager := NewConfigManager(nil, repository, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+		require.NoError(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()))
+		repository.loadErr = errors.New("settings unavailable")
+		require.Error(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()))
+
+		public, err := manager.Public()
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(4), public.ConfigVersion)
+		require.Equal(t, "trusted snapshot", public.ChangeSummary)
+	})
+}
+
+// Regression coverage for issue #4887: a persisted config whose endpoint token
+// can no longer be decrypted (encryption key changed or auto-generated per
+// boot) must stay visible and editable for admins instead of falling back to a
+// default v1 config that makes every save fail the CAS version check.
+func TestConfigManagerUndecryptableTokenKeepsConfigVisibleAndRecoverable(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "persisted-token-canary"
+	persisted := `{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":false,"config_version":9,"endpoints":[{"id":"g1","name":"Guard","protocol":"openai_compatible","base_url":"http://127.0.0.1:8080","model":"m","token_ciphertext":"` + canary + `","timeout_ms":1000,"input_limit":1000,"enabled":true}]}`
+	manager := NewConfigManager(nil, staticSettingRepository{values: map[string]string{
+		SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig: persisted,
+		SettingKeyRiskControl:       "true",
+	}}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	require.NoError(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()), "an undecryptable token must not fail the whole config load")
+
+	public, err := manager.Public()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(9), public.ConfigVersion, "admins must see the real persisted version so CAS saves can succeed")
+	require.Len(t, public.Endpoints, 1)
+	require.True(t, public.Endpoints[0].HasToken)
+	require.Equal(t, "invalid", public.Endpoints[0].TokenStatus)
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(public)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, string(raw), canary)
+
+	active, ok := manager.Active()
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.Len(t, active.Endpoints, 1)
+	require.False(t, active.Endpoints[0].Enabled, "an endpoint with an undecryptable token must not be used at runtime")
+	require.True(t, active.Endpoints[0].TokenInvalid)
+	require.Empty(t, active.Endpoints[0].Token)
+	require.Empty(t, active.EnabledEndpoints())
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"g1"}, active.InvalidTokenEndpointIDs())
+
+	expected, activeVersion, _, _ := manager.RuntimeState()
+	require.Equal(t, int64(9), expected)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(9), activeVersion)
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerUndecryptableTokenStillFailsClosedForBlockingIntent(t *testing.T) {
+	persisted := `{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":true,"config_version":9,"endpoints":[{"id":"g1","name":"Guard","protocol":"openai_compatible","base_url":"http://127.0.0.1:8080","model":"m","token_ciphertext":"undecryptable","timeout_ms":1000,"input_limit":1000,"enabled":true}]}`
+	manager := NewConfigManager(nil, staticSettingRepository{values: map[string]string{
+		SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig: persisted,
+		SettingKeyRiskControl:       "true",
+	}}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	require.NoError(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()))
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode())
+
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager, evaluator: NewGuardEvaluator(NewOpenAICompatibleScanner(), nil, nil)}
+	decision, err := service.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
+		Protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+		Body:     []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`),
+	})
+	require.Error(t, err, "blocking intent with no usable endpoint must not let requests pass unaudited")
+	require.Nil(t, decision)
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &guardErr)
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, guardErr.Code)
+}
+
+func TestBuildNextStoragePreserveReplaceAndClearToken(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{encryptor: prefixEncryptor{}, encryptionKeyConfigured: true}
+	current := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	current.Endpoints = []StorageEndpoint{{ID: "one", Name: "One", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080", Model: DefaultGuardModel, TokenCiphertext: "enc:old", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1000}}
+	base := UpdateConfigRequest{ExpectedConfigVersion: 1, Strategy: "priority", WorkerCount: 1, QueueCapacity: 10, Scanners: []string{"PII"}, AllGroups: true,
+		Endpoints: []UpdateEndpoint{{ID: "one", Name: "One", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1000}}}
+	preserved, err := manager.buildNextStorage(current, base, 9)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "enc:old", preserved.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+	replacedReq := base
+	replacedReq.Endpoints = append([]UpdateEndpoint(nil), base.Endpoints...)
+	replacedReq.Endpoints[0].Token = "new"
+	replaced, err := manager.buildNextStorage(current, replacedReq, 9)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "enc:new", replaced.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+	clearedReq := base
+	clearedReq.Endpoints = append([]UpdateEndpoint(nil), base.Endpoints...)
+	clearedReq.Endpoints[0].ClearToken = true
+	cleared, err := manager.buildNextStorage(current, clearedReq, 9)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, cleared.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+}
+
+// Without a fixed encryption key the per-boot auto-generated key would make a
+// freshly saved token undecryptable after the next restart (issue #4887), so
+// saving a new token must be rejected with an actionable error. Preserving or
+// clearing an existing ciphertext stays allowed so admins can still edit or
+// disable the feature.
+func TestBuildNextStorageRejectsNewTokenWithoutConfiguredEncryptionKey(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{encryptor: prefixEncryptor{}, encryptionKeyConfigured: false}
+	current := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	current.Endpoints = []StorageEndpoint{{ID: "one", Name: "One", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080", Model: DefaultGuardModel, TokenCiphertext: "enc:old", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1000}}
+	base := UpdateConfigRequest{ExpectedConfigVersion: 1, Strategy: "priority", WorkerCount: 1, QueueCapacity: 10, Scanners: []string{"PII"}, AllGroups: true,
+		Endpoints: []UpdateEndpoint{{ID: "one", Name: "One", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8080", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1000}}}
+
+	newTokenReq := base
+	newTokenReq.Endpoints = append([]UpdateEndpoint(nil), base.Endpoints...)
+	newTokenReq.Endpoints[0].Token = "fresh-token"
+	_, err := manager.buildNextStorage(current, newTokenReq, 9)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeEncryptionKeyRequired, infraerrors.Reason(err))
+
+	preserved, err := manager.buildNextStorage(current, base, 9)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "enc:old", preserved.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+
+	clearedReq := base
+	clearedReq.Endpoints = append([]UpdateEndpoint(nil), base.Endpoints...)
+	clearedReq.Endpoints[0].ClearToken = true
+	cleared, err := manager.buildNextStorage(current, clearedReq, 9)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, cleared.Endpoints[0].TokenCiphertext)
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveModeTruthTable(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		risk, enabled, blocking bool
+		want                    Mode
+	}{
+		{false, false, false, ModeOff}, {false, true, true, ModeOff}, {true, false, false, ModeOff},
+		{true, true, false, ModeAsync}, {true, true, true, ModeBlocking},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		cfg := ActiveConfig{RiskControlEnabled: tt.risk, Enabled: tt.enabled, BlockingEnabled: tt.blocking}
+		require.Equal(t, tt.want, cfg.EffectiveMode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerColdStartOnlyFailsClosedForExplicitBlockingIntent(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{}
+
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":false,"config_version":42}`, true)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(42), manager.expected.Load())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeOff, manager.EffectiveMode(), "an async config version must not imply blocking")
+	require.False(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":true,"config_version":43}`, false)
+	require.Equal(t, ModeOff, manager.EffectiveMode(), "the global risk-control switch still gates blocking")
+
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":true,"config_version":44}`, true)
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode())
+	require.True(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true`, true)
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode(), "undecodable storage must not erase the last known strict intent")
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerStaleWeakerSnapshotFailsClosedWhenBlockingExpected(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{}
+	async := ActiveConfig{RiskControlEnabled: true, Enabled: true, BlockingEnabled: false, ConfigVersion: 1}
+	manager.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{active: async, storage: DefaultStorageConfig(), loadedAt: fixedClock{}.Now()})
+	manager.expected.Store(2)
+	manager.expectedBlocking.Store(true)
+
+	require.True(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode())
+
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager, evaluator: NewGuardEvaluator(nil, nil, nil)}
+	decision, err := service.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`)})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Nil(t, decision)
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &guardErr)
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, guardErr.Code)
+}
+
+type errorSettingRepository struct{ staticSettingRepository }
+
+func (errorSettingRepository) GetMultiple(context.Context, []string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("settings unavailable")
+}
+
+type switchableSettingRepository struct {
+	staticSettingRepository
+	loadErr error
+}
+
+func (r *switchableSettingRepository) GetMultiple(ctx context.Context, keys []string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	if r.loadErr != nil {
+		return nil, r.loadErr
+	}
+	return r.staticSettingRepository.GetMultiple(ctx, keys)
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerStartupLoadFailureDoesNotBlockWhenBlockingNotIntended(t *testing.T) {
+	// Settings unavailable and no prior blocking intent: stay ModeOff so the
+	// gateway remains usable and admins can still disable/configure Prompt Audit.
+	manager := NewConfigManager(nil, errorSettingRepository{}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	err := manager.Start(context.Background())
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.True(t, manager.configUntrusted.Load())
+	require.False(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeOff, manager.EffectiveMode())
+
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager, evaluator: NewGuardEvaluator(nil, nil, nil)}
+	decision, evalErr := service.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
+		Protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+		Body:     []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`),
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, evalErr)
+	require.NotNil(t, decision)
+	require.Equal(t, DecisionAllow, decision.Kind)
+	require.NoError(t, manager.Shutdown(context.Background()))
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerStartupLoadFailureFailsClosedWhenBlockingIntended(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := NewConfigManager(nil, errorSettingRepository{}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	// Simulate intent observed before a later load failure (e.g. decrypt error).
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":true,"config_version":3}`, true)
+	manager.markConfigUntrusted()
+	require.True(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode())
+
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager, evaluator: NewGuardEvaluator(nil, nil, nil)}
+	decision, err := service.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
+		Protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+		Body:     []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`),
+	})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Nil(t, decision)
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &guardErr)
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, guardErr.Code)
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerUntrustedClearsOnSuccessfulDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	// After a degraded fail-closed period, saving disabled config must restore ModeOff.
+	manager := &ConfigManager{encryptor: prefixEncryptor{}, clock: fixedClock{}}
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":true,"config_version":5}`, true)
+	manager.markConfigUntrusted()
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode())
+
+	// Install a trusted disabled snapshot the same way Save does after commit.
+	disabled := DefaultStorageConfig()
+	disabled.ConfigVersion = 6
+	disabled.Enabled = false
+	disabled.BlockingEnabled = false
+	active, err := ActiveFromStorage(disabled, true, manager.encryptor)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	manager.expected.Store(disabled.ConfigVersion)
+	manager.expectedBlocking.Store(false)
+	manager.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{storage: disabled, active: active, loadedAt: manager.clock.Now()})
+	manager.configUntrusted.Store(false)
+
+	require.False(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeOff, manager.EffectiveMode())
+
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager, evaluator: NewGuardEvaluator(nil, nil, nil)}
+	decision, evalErr := service.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
+		Protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+		Body:     []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`),
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, evalErr)
+	require.Equal(t, DecisionAllow, decision.Kind)
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerUntrustedWithoutBlockingDoesNotForceBlockingMode(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{}
+	manager.observeExpectedState(`{"enabled":true,"blocking_enabled":false,"config_version":2}`, true)
+	manager.markConfigUntrusted()
+	require.False(t, manager.expectedBlocking.Load())
+	require.False(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeOff, manager.EffectiveMode(), "async intent + untrusted must not force blocking unavailable")
+}
+
+func TestParseLegacyConfigDefaultsMissingFieldsWithoutEnablingBlocking(t *testing.T) {
+	storage, err := ParseStorageConfig(`{"enabled":false,"config_version":9}`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, storage.BlockingEnabled)
+	require.Equal(t, "priority", storage.Strategy)
+	require.Equal(t, DefaultWorkerCount, storage.WorkerCount)
+	require.Equal(t, DefaultQueueCapacity, storage.QueueCapacity)
+	require.Equal(t, AllScannerIDs, storage.Scanners)
+	require.True(t, storage.AllGroups)
+}
+
+func TestUpdateConfigStrictBoundsAndKnownValues(t *testing.T) {
+	valid := promptAuditUpdateRequest(1, 1, "")
+	require.NoError(t, validateUpdateConfigRequest(valid))
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		mutate func(*UpdateConfigRequest)
+		reason string
+	}{
+		{name: "strategy", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.Strategy = "round_robin" }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_strategy"},
+		{name: "worker low", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.WorkerCount = 0 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_worker_count"},
+		{name: "worker high", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.WorkerCount = MaxWorkerCount + 1 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_worker_count"},
+		{name: "capacity low", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.QueueCapacity = 0 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_queue_capacity"},
+		{name: "capacity high", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.QueueCapacity = MaxQueueCapacity + 1 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_queue_capacity"},
+		{name: "unknown scanner", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.Scanners = []string{"made_up"} }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_scanner"},
+		{name: "group required", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.AllGroups = false; req.GroupIDs = nil }, reason: "prompt_audit_groups_required"},
+		{name: "group positive", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.AllGroups = false; req.GroupIDs = []int64{0} }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_group"},
+		{name: "timeout low", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.Endpoints[0].TimeoutMS = MinTimeoutMS - 1 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_timeout"},
+		{name: "timeout high", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.Endpoints[0].TimeoutMS = MaxTimeoutMS + 1 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_timeout"},
+		{name: "input low", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.Endpoints[0].InputLimit = MinInputLimit - 1 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_input_limit"},
+		{name: "input high", mutate: func(req *UpdateConfigRequest) { req.Endpoints[0].InputLimit = MaxInputLimit + 1 }, reason: "prompt_audit_invalid_input_limit"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			req := valid
+			req.Scanners = append([]string(nil), valid.Scanners...)
+			req.GroupIDs = append([]int64(nil), valid.GroupIDs...)
+			req.Endpoints = append([]UpdateEndpoint(nil), valid.Endpoints...)
+			tt.mutate(&req)
+			err := validateUpdateConfigRequest(req)
+			require.Error(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.reason, infraerrors.Reason(err))
+		})
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_enqueue.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+type Enqueuer struct {
+	config  ConfigStore
+	repo    JobRepository
+	payload PayloadStore
+	metrics Metrics
+}
+
+func NewEnqueuer(config ConfigStore, repo JobRepository, payload PayloadStore, metrics ...Metrics) *Enqueuer {
+	var metric Metrics
+	if len(metrics) > 0 {
+		metric = metrics[0]
+	}
+	return &Enqueuer{config: config, repo: repo, payload: payload, metrics: metric}
+}
+
+func (e *Enqueuer) Enqueue(ctx context.Context, req Request) error {
+	if e == nil || e.config == nil || e.repo == nil || e.payload == nil {
+		return errors.New("prompt audit enqueuer unavailable")
+	}
+	cfg, ok := e.config.Active()
+	baseFields := requestLogFields(req)
+	if !ok || cfg.EffectiveMode() != ModeAsync {
+		LogInfo(EventEnqueueSkipped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"status": "skipped", "error_code": "mode_not_async"}))
+		return nil
+	}
+	baseFields["config_version"] = cfg.ConfigVersion
+	if !cfg.IncludesGroup(req.GroupID) {
+		LogInfo(EventEnqueueSkipped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"status": "skipped", "error_code": "group_out_of_scope"}))
+		return nil
+	}
+	if len(cfg.EnabledEndpoints()) == 0 {
+		e.recordDropped()
+		LogWarn(EventEnqueueDropped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"status": "dropped", "error_code": "no_enabled_endpoint"}))
+		return nil
+	}
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(req)
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrNoPromptText) {
+		LogInfo(EventEnqueueSkipped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"status": "skipped", "error_code": "no_user_text"}))
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		e.recordDropped()
+		LogWarn(EventEnqueueDropped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"status": "dropped", "error_code": "snapshot_invalid"}))
+		return nil
+	}
+	job, err := e.repo.CreateStagingWithCapacity(ctx, snapshot.Redacted(), cfg.ConfigVersion, 3, cfg.QueueCapacity)
+	if err != nil {
+		code := "database_unavailable"
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrQueueFull) {
+			code = "queue_full"
+		}
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrQueueAdmissionBusy) {
+			code = "queue_admission_busy"
+		}
+		LogWarn(EventEnqueueDropped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"queue_capacity": cfg.QueueCapacity, "status": "dropped", "error_code": code,
+		}))
+		e.recordDropped()
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := e.payload.Set(ctx, job.ID, snapshot.ScanText, DefaultPayloadTTL); err != nil {
+		_ = e.repo.MarkStagingFailed(ctx, job.ID, "payload_store_failed", "payload store unavailable")
+		LogWarn(EventEnqueueDropped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"job_id": job.ID, "status": "dropped", "error_code": "payload_store_failed",
+		}))
+		e.recordDropped()
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := e.repo.PublishQueued(ctx, job.ID); err != nil {
+		_ = e.payload.Delete(ctx, job.ID)
+		_ = e.repo.MarkStagingFailed(ctx, job.ID, "queue_publish_failed", "queue publish failed")
+		LogWarn(EventEnqueueDropped, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"job_id": job.ID, "status": "dropped", "error_code": "queue_publish_failed",
+		}))
+		e.recordDropped()
+		return err
+	}
+	LogInfo(EventJobEnqueued, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+		"job_id":         job.ID,
+		"queue_capacity": cfg.QueueCapacity, "status": "queued",
+	}))
+	if e.metrics != nil {
+		e.metrics.IncEnqueued()
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (e *Enqueuer) recordDropped() {
+	if e != nil && e.metrics != nil {
+		e.metrics.IncDropped()
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_event_repository.go

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/lib/pq"
+)
+
+type EventFilter struct {
+	Decision   string     `json:"decision,omitempty"`
+	RiskLevel  string     `json:"risk_level,omitempty"`
+	Endpoint   string     `json:"endpoint,omitempty"`
+	GroupID    *int64     `json:"group_id,omitempty"`
+	UserID     *int64     `json:"user_id,omitempty"`
+	APIKeyID   *int64     `json:"api_key_id,omitempty"`
+	RequestID  string     `json:"request_id,omitempty"`
+	PromptHash string     `json:"prompt_hash,omitempty"`
+	Keyword    string     `json:"keyword,omitempty"`
+	StartAt    *time.Time `json:"start_at,omitempty"`
+	EndAt      *time.Time `json:"end_at,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type EventPage struct {
+	Items    []*Event `json:"items"`
+	Total    int64    `json:"total"`
+	Page     int      `json:"page"`
+	PageSize int      `json:"page_size"`
+	Pages    int      `json:"pages"`
+}
+
+type DeletePreview struct {
+	MatchedCount      int64       `json:"matched_count"`
+	FilterSummary     EventFilter `json:"filter_summary"`
+	SnapshotMaxID     int64       `json:"snapshot_max_id"`
+	FilterHash        string      `json:"filter_hash"`
+	ConfirmationToken string      `json:"confirmation_token,omitempty"`
+	ExpiresAt         time.Time   `json:"expires_at,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type DeleteResult struct {
+	DeletedEvents int64   `json:"deleted_events"`
+	DeletedJobs   int64   `json:"deleted_jobs"`
+	JobIDs        []int64 `json:"-"`
+}
+
+type EventRepository interface {
+	ListEvents(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, page, pageSize int) (*EventPage, error)
+	GetEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*Event, error)
+	DeleteEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+	DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx context.Context, ids []int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+	PreviewDelete(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter) (*DeletePreview, error)
+	DeleteEventsByFilter(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, snapshotMaxID int64, batchSize int) (*DeleteResult, error)
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) ListEvents(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, page, pageSize int) (*EventPage, error) {
+	if page < 1 {
+		page = 1
+	}
+	if pageSize < 1 {
+		pageSize = 20
+	}
+	if pageSize > 100 {
+		pageSize = 100
+	}
+	where, args := buildEventWhere(filter, 1)
+	var total int64
+	if err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM prompt_audit_events e`+where, args...).Scan(&total); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	queryArgs := append([]any(nil), args...)
+	limitIndex := len(queryArgs) + 1
+	queryArgs = append(queryArgs, pageSize, (page-1)*pageSize)
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT `+eventColumns("e")+` FROM prompt_audit_events e`+where+
+		fmt.Sprintf(` ORDER BY e.created_at DESC, e.id DESC LIMIT $%d OFFSET $%d`, limitIndex, limitIndex+1), queryArgs...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+	items := make([]*Event, 0, pageSize)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		event, err := scanEvent(rows)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		items = append(items, event)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	pages := 0
+	if total > 0 {
+		pages = int((total + int64(pageSize) - 1) / int64(pageSize))
+	}
+	return &EventPage{Items: items, Total: total, Page: page, PageSize: pageSize, Pages: pages}, nil
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) GetEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*Event, error) {
+	event, err := scanEvent(r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT `+eventDetailColumns("e")+` FROM prompt_audit_events e WHERE e.id=$1`, id), true)
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return nil, ErrEventNotFound
+	}
+	return event, err
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) DeleteEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	return r.DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx, []int64{id})
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx context.Context, ids []int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	ids = canonicalInt64s(ids)
+	if len(ids) == 0 {
+		return &DeleteResult{}, nil
+	}
+	if len(ids) > 500 {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit delete batch exceeds 500 events")
+	}
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM prompt_audit_events WHERE id=ANY($1) RETURNING job_id`, pq.Array(ids))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	jobIDs, err := scanReturnedJobIDs(rows)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	deletedJobs, err := deleteOrphanJobs(ctx, tx, jobIDs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &DeleteResult{DeletedEvents: int64(len(jobIDs)), DeletedJobs: deletedJobs, JobIDs: canonicalInt64s(jobIDs)}, nil
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) PreviewDelete(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter) (*DeletePreview, error) {
+	if err := validateDeleteFilter(filter); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, &sql.TxOptions{Isolation: sql.LevelRepeatableRead, ReadOnly: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	where, args := buildEventWhere(filter, 1)
+	var count, maxID int64
+	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*), COALESCE(MAX(e.id),0) FROM prompt_audit_events e`+where, args...).Scan(&count, &maxID); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	canonical := canonicalEventFilter(filter)
+	return &DeletePreview{MatchedCount: count, FilterSummary: canonical, SnapshotMaxID: maxID, FilterHash: FilterHash(canonical, maxID)}, nil
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) DeleteEventsByFilter(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, snapshotMaxID int64, batchSize int) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	if err := validateDeleteFilter(filter); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if snapshotMaxID <= 0 {
+		return &DeleteResult{}, nil
+	}
+	if batchSize < 1 || batchSize > 1000 {
+		batchSize = 200
+	}
+	total := &DeleteResult{}
+	jobSet := map[int64]struct{}{}
+	for {
+		tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		where, args := buildEventWhere(filter, 1)
+		maxIndex := len(args) + 1
+		limitIndex := maxIndex + 1
+		args = append(args, snapshotMaxID, batchSize)
+		rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx, `
+			WITH selected AS (
+				SELECT e.id FROM prompt_audit_events e`+where+
+			fmt.Sprintf(` AND e.id <= $%d ORDER BY e.id LIMIT $%d FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`, maxIndex, limitIndex)+`
+			), deleted AS (
+				DELETE FROM prompt_audit_events e USING selected s WHERE e.id=s.id RETURNING e.job_id
+			) SELECT job_id FROM deleted`, args...)
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = tx.Rollback()
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		jobIDs, err := scanReturnedJobIDs(rows)
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = tx.Rollback()
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		deletedJobs, err := deleteOrphanJobs(ctx, tx, jobIDs)
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = tx.Rollback()
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		total.DeletedEvents += int64(len(jobIDs))
+		total.DeletedJobs += deletedJobs
+		for _, id := range jobIDs {
+			jobSet[id] = struct{}{}
+		}
+		if len(jobIDs) < batchSize {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	for id := range jobSet {
+		total.JobIDs = append(total.JobIDs, id)
+	}
+	total.JobIDs = canonicalInt64s(total.JobIDs)
+	return total, nil
+}
+
+func FilterHash(filter EventFilter, snapshotMaxID int64) string {
+	payload := struct {
+		Filter        EventFilter `json:"filter"`
+		SnapshotMaxID int64       `json:"snapshot_max_id"`
+	}{canonicalEventFilter(filter), snapshotMaxID}
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(raw)
+	return hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
+}
+
+func validateDeleteFilter(filter EventFilter) error {
+	if filter.StartAt == nil || filter.EndAt == nil || !filter.StartAt.Before(*filter.EndAt) {
+		return errors.New("prompt audit filter delete requires a valid explicit time range")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func canonicalEventFilter(filter EventFilter) EventFilter {
+	filter.Decision = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(filter.Decision))
+	filter.RiskLevel = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(filter.RiskLevel))
+	filter.Endpoint = strings.TrimSpace(filter.Endpoint)
+	filter.RequestID = strings.TrimSpace(filter.RequestID)
+	filter.PromptHash = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(filter.PromptHash))
+	filter.Keyword = strings.TrimSpace(filter.Keyword)
+	if filter.StartAt != nil {
+		value := filter.StartAt.UTC()
+		filter.StartAt = &value
+	}
+	if filter.EndAt != nil {
+		value := filter.EndAt.UTC()
+		filter.EndAt = &value
+	}
+	return filter
+}
+
+func buildEventWhere(filter EventFilter, firstIndex int) (string, []any) {
+	filter = canonicalEventFilter(filter)
+	clauses := []string{" WHERE TRUE"}
+	args := make([]any, 0, 12)
+	add := func(clause string, value any) {
+		clauses = append(clauses, fmt.Sprintf(clause, firstIndex+len(args)))
+		args = append(args, value)
+	}
+	if filter.Decision != "" {
+		add(" AND e.decision=$%d", filter.Decision)
+	}
+	if filter.RiskLevel != "" {
+		add(" AND e.risk_level=$%d", filter.RiskLevel)
+	}
+	if filter.Endpoint != "" {
+		add(" AND e.endpoint=$%d", filter.Endpoint)
+	}
+	if filter.GroupID != nil {
+		add(" AND e.group_id=$%d", *filter.GroupID)
+	}
+	if filter.UserID != nil {
+		add(" AND e.user_id=$%d", *filter.UserID)
+	}
+	if filter.APIKeyID != nil {
+		add(" AND e.api_key_id=$%d", *filter.APIKeyID)
+	}
+	if filter.RequestID != "" {
+		add(" AND e.request_id=$%d", filter.RequestID)
+	}
+	if filter.PromptHash != "" {
+		add(" AND e.prompt_hash=$%d", filter.PromptHash)
+	}
+	if filter.Keyword != "" {
+		add(` AND (e.request_id ILIKE $%d OR e.prompt_hash ILIKE $%d OR e.redacted_preview ILIKE $%d
+			OR e.username_snapshot ILIKE $%d OR e.user_email_snapshot ILIKE $%d OR e.api_key_name_snapshot ILIKE $%d)`, "%"+TrimRunes(filter.Keyword, 128)+"%")
+		// The clause has six placeholders but add only supplied one. Rebuild it with one shared placeholder.
+		clauses[len(clauses)-1] = fmt.Sprintf(` AND (e.request_id ILIKE $%[1]d OR e.prompt_hash ILIKE $%[1]d OR e.redacted_preview ILIKE $%[1]d
+			OR e.username_snapshot ILIKE $%[1]d OR e.user_email_snapshot ILIKE $%[1]d OR e.api_key_name_snapshot ILIKE $%[1]d)`, firstIndex+len(args)-1)
+	}
+	if filter.StartAt != nil {
+		add(" AND e.created_at >= $%d", filter.StartAt.UTC())
+	}
+	if filter.EndAt != nil {
+		add(" AND e.created_at <= $%d", filter.EndAt.UTC())
+	}
+	return strings.Join(clauses, ""), args
+}
+
+func eventColumns(alias string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`%[1]s.id,%[1]s.job_id,%[1]s.request_id,%[1]s.user_id,%[1]s.username_snapshot,
+		%[1]s.user_email_snapshot,%[1]s.api_key_id,%[1]s.api_key_name_snapshot,%[1]s.group_id,%[1]s.group_name,
+		%[1]s.provider,%[1]s.endpoint,%[1]s.protocol,%[1]s.model,%[1]s.prompt_hash,%[1]s.redacted_preview,
+		%[1]s.stage,%[1]s.decision,%[1]s.risk_level,%[1]s.action,%[1]s.categories,%[1]s.matched_scanners,
+		%[1]s.scanner_scores,%[1]s.scanner_evidence,%[1]s.scanner_backend,%[1]s.scanner_version,
+		%[1]s.guard_endpoint_id,%[1]s.policy_id,%[1]s.policy_version,%[1]s.config_version,
+		%[1]s.chunk_total,%[1]s.latency_ms,%[1]s.created_at`, alias)
+}
+
+// eventDetailColumns adds the full prompt, which can be large, so it is only
+// loaded for single-event detail reads and never for list pages.
+func eventDetailColumns(alias string) string {
+	return eventColumns(alias) + fmt.Sprintf(",%[1]s.full_prompt", alias)
+}
+
+func scanEvent(row rowScanner, withFullPrompt ...bool) (*Event, error) {
+	event := &Event{}
+	var userID, apiKeyID, groupID sql.NullInt64
+	var categories, matched, scores, evidence []byte
+	dest := []any{&event.ID, &event.JobID, &event.Snapshot.RequestID, &userID,
+		&event.Snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, &event.Snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot, &apiKeyID,
+		&event.Snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot, &groupID, &event.Snapshot.GroupName,
+		&event.Snapshot.Provider, &event.Snapshot.Endpoint, &event.Snapshot.Protocol, &event.Snapshot.Model,
+		&event.Snapshot.PromptHash, &event.Snapshot.RedactedPreview, &event.Snapshot.Stage, &event.Decision,
+		&event.RiskLevel, &event.Action, &categories, &matched, &scores, &evidence, &event.ScannerBackend,
+		&event.ScannerVersion, &event.GuardEndpointID, &event.PolicyID, &event.PolicyVersion,
+		&event.ConfigVersion, &event.ChunkTotal, &event.LatencyMS, &event.CreatedAt}
+	if len(withFullPrompt) > 0 && withFullPrompt[0] {
+		dest = append(dest, &event.Snapshot.FullPrompt)
+	}
+	err := row.Scan(dest...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	event.Snapshot.UserID = nullableInt64Value(userID)
+	event.Snapshot.APIKeyID = nullableInt64Value(apiKeyID)
+	event.Snapshot.GroupID = nullableInt64Ptr(groupID)
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(categories, &event.Categories)
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(matched, &event.MatchedScanners)
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(scores, &event.ScannerScores)
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(evidence, &event.ScannerEvidence)
+	result := NormalizedResult{Decision: event.Decision, RiskLevel: event.RiskLevel, Action: event.Action,
+		Categories: event.Categories, MatchedScanners: event.MatchedScanners, ScannerScores: event.ScannerScores,
+		ScannerEvidence: event.ScannerEvidence}
+	event.IssueSummaries = BuildIssueSummaries(result)
+	return event, nil
+}
+
+func scanReturnedJobIDs(rows *sql.Rows) ([]int64, error) {
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+	result := make([]int64, 0)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var id int64
+		if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		result = append(result, id)
+	}
+	return result, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func deleteOrphanJobs(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, jobIDs []int64) (int64, error) {
+	jobIDs = canonicalInt64s(jobIDs)
+	if len(jobIDs) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM prompt_audit_jobs j
+		WHERE j.id=ANY($1) AND j.status <> 'processing'
+		AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM prompt_audit_events e WHERE e.job_id=j.id)`, pq.Array(jobIDs))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return result.RowsAffected()
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_guard.go

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type GuardEvaluator struct {
+	scanner PromptScanner
+	repo    JobRepository
+	metrics Metrics
+	clock   Clock
+
+	global       chan struct{}
+	perNodeLimit int
+	nodeMu       sync.Mutex
+	nodes        map[string]chan struct{}
+}
+
+func NewGuardEvaluator(scanner PromptScanner, repo JobRepository, metrics Metrics) *GuardEvaluator {
+	return newGuardEvaluator(scanner, repo, metrics, 64, 16)
+}
+
+func newGuardEvaluator(scanner PromptScanner, repo JobRepository, metrics Metrics, globalLimit, perNodeLimit int) *GuardEvaluator {
+	if globalLimit < 1 {
+		globalLimit = 64
+	}
+	if perNodeLimit < 1 {
+		perNodeLimit = 16
+	}
+	return &GuardEvaluator{scanner: scanner, repo: repo, metrics: metrics, clock: realClock{},
+		global: make(chan struct{}, globalLimit), perNodeLimit: perNodeLimit, nodes: map[string]chan struct{}{}}
+}
+
+func (g *GuardEvaluator) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, cfg ActiveConfig, snapshot PromptSnapshot) (*PromptDecision, error) {
+	if g == nil || g.scanner == nil {
+		if g != nil && g.metrics != nil {
+			g.metrics.Observe(DecisionUnavailable, 0)
+		}
+		logGuardFailure(snapshot, cfg, DecisionUnavailable, ErrorCodeUnavailable, "", 0)
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	start := g.clock.Now()
+	baseFields := snapshotLogFields(snapshot)
+	baseFields["config_version"] = cfg.ConfigVersion
+	endpoints := cfg.EnabledEndpoints()
+	if len(endpoints) == 0 {
+		if g.metrics != nil {
+			g.metrics.Observe(DecisionUnavailable, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		}
+		logGuardFailure(snapshot, cfg, DecisionUnavailable, ErrorCodeUnavailable, "", g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	select {
+	case g.global <- struct{}{}:
+		defer func() { <-g.global }()
+	default:
+		if g.metrics != nil {
+			g.metrics.IncBulkheadFull()
+			g.metrics.Observe(DecisionUnavailable, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		}
+		logGuardFailure(snapshot, cfg, DecisionUnavailable, ErrorCodeUnavailable, "", g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	timeout := time.Duration(endpoints[0].TimeoutMS) * time.Millisecond
+	if timeout <= 0 {
+		timeout = DefaultTimeoutMS * time.Millisecond
+	}
+	evalCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
+	defer cancel()
+	inputLimit := minimumInputLimit(endpoints)
+	chunks := SplitRunes(snapshot.ScanText, inputLimit)
+	if len(chunks) == 0 {
+		if g.metrics != nil {
+			g.metrics.Observe(DecisionAllow, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		}
+		return &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionAllow, AllowNextStage: true}, nil
+	}
+	LogInfo(EventEvaluationStarted, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"chunk_total": len(chunks), "status": "started"}))
+	results := make([]*NormalizedResult, 0, len(chunks))
+	for index, chunk := range chunks {
+		chunkStarted := g.clock.Now()
+		LogInfo(EventChunkStarted, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"chunk_index": index + 1, "chunk_total": len(chunks),
+			"chunk_chars": len([]rune(chunk)), "input_chars": snapshot.PromptLength, "input_limit": inputLimit,
+			"status": "started",
+		}))
+		result, err := g.scanChunk(evalCtx, cfg, endpoints, chunk)
+		if err != nil {
+			code := guardErrorCode(err)
+			LogWarn(EventChunkFailed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+				"chunk_index": index + 1, "chunk_total": len(chunks),
+				"chunk_chars": len([]rune(chunk)), "input_chars": snapshot.PromptLength, "input_limit": inputLimit,
+				"latency_ms": g.clock.Now().Sub(chunkStarted).Milliseconds(), "error_code": code, "status": "failed",
+			}))
+			kind := DecisionUnavailable
+			if code == ErrorCodeInvalidResponse {
+				kind = DecisionInvalid
+			}
+			if g.metrics != nil {
+				g.metrics.Observe(kind, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+				var guardErr *GuardError
+				if errors.As(err, &guardErr) && guardErr.Timeout {
+					g.metrics.IncTimeout()
+				}
+			}
+			logGuardFailure(snapshot, cfg, kind, code, "", g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		result.ChunkTotal = len(chunks)
+		results = append(results, result)
+		LogInfo(EventChunkCompleted, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"chunk_index": index + 1, "chunk_total": len(chunks),
+			"chunk_chars": len([]rune(chunk)), "input_chars": snapshot.PromptLength, "input_limit": inputLimit,
+			"guard_endpoint_id": result.GuardEndpointID, "action": result.Action,
+			"latency_ms": g.clock.Now().Sub(chunkStarted).Milliseconds(), "status": "completed",
+		}))
+		if result.Action == ActionBlock {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	aggregated, err := AggregateResults(results, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+	if err != nil {
+		if g.metrics != nil {
+			g.metrics.Observe(DecisionInvalid, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		}
+		logGuardFailure(snapshot, cfg, DecisionInvalid, ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, "", g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Cause: err}
+	}
+	aggregated.ChunkTotal = len(chunks)
+	kind := DecisionAllow
+	if aggregated.Action == ActionWarn {
+		kind = DecisionFlag
+	}
+	if aggregated.Action == ActionBlock {
+		kind = DecisionBlock
+	}
+	decision := &PromptDecision{Kind: kind, Result: aggregated, AllowNextStage: kind == DecisionAllow || kind == DecisionFlag}
+	if kind == DecisionBlock {
+		decision.ErrorCode = ErrorCodeBlocked
+	}
+	if g.metrics != nil {
+		g.metrics.Observe(kind, g.clock.Now().Sub(start))
+	}
+	LogInfo(EventChunksAggregated, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+		"decision":   kind,
+		"risk_level": aggregated.RiskLevel, "action": aggregated.Action, "chunk_total": aggregated.ChunkTotal,
+		"latency_ms": aggregated.LatencyMS, "guard_endpoint_id": aggregated.GuardEndpointID, "stage": snapshot.Stage,
+		"status": "completed",
+	}))
+	if g.repo != nil {
+		if _, recordErr := g.repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, snapshot.Redacted(), cfg.ConfigVersion, aggregated, cfg.StorePassEvents); recordErr != nil {
+			if g.metrics != nil {
+				g.metrics.IncRecordFailed()
+			}
+			LogWarn(EventResultRecordFailed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+				"decision": kind, "error_code": "result_record_failed", "stage": snapshot.Stage,
+				"status": "failed",
+			}))
+		}
+	}
+	if kind == DecisionBlock {
+		LogWarn(EventGuardBlocked, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"guard_endpoint_id": aggregated.GuardEndpointID,
+			"decision":          kind, "risk_level": aggregated.RiskLevel, "action": aggregated.Action, "chunk_total": aggregated.ChunkTotal,
+			"latency_ms": aggregated.LatencyMS, "status": "blocked", "error_code": ErrorCodeBlocked,
+			"stage": snapshot.Stage, "upstream_dispatched": false, "billing_preconsumed": false,
+		}))
+	} else {
+		LogInfo(EventGuardAllowed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+			"decision": kind, "risk_level": aggregated.RiskLevel, "action": aggregated.Action,
+			"guard_endpoint_id": aggregated.GuardEndpointID, "chunk_total": aggregated.ChunkTotal,
+			"latency_ms": aggregated.LatencyMS, "stage": snapshot.Stage, "status": "allowed",
+		}))
+	}
+	return decision, nil
+}
+
+func logGuardFailure(snapshot PromptSnapshot, cfg ActiveConfig, kind DecisionKind, code, guardEndpointID string, latency time.Duration) {
+	fields := snapshotLogFields(snapshot)
+	fields["config_version"] = cfg.ConfigVersion
+	LogWarn(EventGuardFailed, mergeLogFields(fields, map[string]any{
+		"decision": kind, "guard_endpoint_id": guardEndpointID, "latency_ms": latency.Milliseconds(),
+		"status": "failed", "error_code": code, "upstream_dispatched": false, "billing_preconsumed": false,
+	}))
+}
+
+func (g *GuardEvaluator) scanChunk(ctx context.Context, cfg ActiveConfig, endpoints []ActiveEndpoint, chunk string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	var lastErr error
+	for index, endpoint := range endpoints {
+		semaphore := g.nodeSemaphore(endpoint.ID)
+		select {
+		case semaphore <- struct{}{}:
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Timeout: errors.Is(ctx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded), Cause: ctx.Err()}
+		default:
+			if g.metrics != nil {
+				g.metrics.IncBulkheadFull()
+			}
+			lastErr = &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}
+			if index < len(endpoints)-1 && g.metrics != nil {
+				g.metrics.IncFailover()
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		result, err := callPromptScanner(ctx, g.scanner, endpoint, chunk, cfg.Scanners)
+		<-semaphore
+		if err == nil && result != nil {
+			return result, nil
+		}
+		if err == nil {
+			err = &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Retryable: false}
+		}
+		lastErr = err
+		var guardErr *GuardError
+		if !errors.As(err, &guardErr) || !guardErr.Retryable {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if index < len(endpoints)-1 && g.metrics != nil {
+			g.metrics.IncFailover()
+		}
+	}
+	if lastErr == nil {
+		lastErr = &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	return nil, lastErr
+}
+
+func callPromptScanner(ctx context.Context, scanner PromptScanner, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, scanners []string) (result *NormalizedResult, err error) {
+	defer func() {
+		if recover() != nil {
+			result = nil
+			err = &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: false}
+		}
+	}()
+	return scanner.Scan(ctx, endpoint, chunk, scanners)
+}
+
+func (g *GuardEvaluator) nodeSemaphore(id string) chan struct{} {
+	g.nodeMu.Lock()
+	defer g.nodeMu.Unlock()
+	semaphore := g.nodes[id]
+	if semaphore == nil {
+		semaphore = make(chan struct{}, g.perNodeLimit)
+		g.nodes[id] = semaphore
+	}
+	return semaphore
+}
+
+func minimumInputLimit(endpoints []ActiveEndpoint) int {
+	limit := DefaultInputLimit
+	for index, endpoint := range endpoints {
+		value := endpoint.InputLimit
+		if value <= 0 {
+			value = DefaultInputLimit
+		}
+		if index == 0 || value < limit {
+			limit = value
+		}
+	}
+	return limit
+}
+
+func guardErrorCode(err error) string {
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	if errors.As(err, &guardErr) && guardErr.Code != "" {
+		return guardErr.Code
+	}
+	return ErrorCodeUnavailable
+}
+
+func pointerLogID(value *int64) int64 {
+	if value == nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return *value
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type scriptedScanner struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	calls   []string
+	block   <-chan struct{}
+	entered chan<- struct{}
+}
+
+func (s *scriptedScanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, _ string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.calls = append(s.calls, endpoint.ID)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.entered != nil {
+		select {
+		case s.entered <- struct{}{}:
+		default:
+		}
+	}
+	if s.block != nil {
+		select {
+		case <-s.block:
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Timeout: true, Cause: ctx.Err()}
+		}
+	}
+	if endpoint.ID == "bad" {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}
+	}
+	if endpoint.ID == "invalid" {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+	}
+	return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, Safety: "Safe", ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}, GuardEndpointID: endpoint.ID}, nil
+}
+
+func guardConfig(endpoints ...ActiveEndpoint) ActiveConfig {
+	return ActiveConfig{RiskControlEnabled: true, Enabled: true, BlockingEnabled: true, ConfigVersion: 2, Scanners: AllScannerIDs, Endpoints: endpoints}
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorOrderedFailoverAndInvalidTerminal(t *testing.T) {
+	scanner := &scriptedScanner{}
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, metrics, 4, 2)
+	snapshot := PromptSnapshot{RequestID: "r", ScanText: "hello", PromptLength: 5}
+	decision, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(
+		ActiveEndpoint{ID: "bad", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100},
+		ActiveEndpoint{ID: "good", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100},
+	), snapshot)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, DecisionAllow, decision.Kind)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Failovers)
+	_, err = evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(
+		ActiveEndpoint{ID: "invalid", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100},
+		ActiveEndpoint{ID: "good", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100},
+	), snapshot)
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &guardErr)
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, guardErr.Code)
+	snapshotMetrics := metrics.Snapshot()
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), snapshotMetrics.Total)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshotMetrics.Allowed)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshotMetrics.Invalid)
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorGlobalBulkheadIsNonBlocking(t *testing.T) {
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	entered := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+	scanner := &scriptedScanner{block: release, entered: entered}
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, metrics, 1, 1)
+	cfg := guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "good", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 2000, InputLimit: 100})
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), cfg, PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "one", PromptLength: 3})
+		done <- err
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-entered:
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("first evaluation did not enter scanner")
+	}
+	start := time.Now()
+	_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), cfg, PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "two", PromptLength: 3})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Less(t, time.Since(start), 200*time.Millisecond)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().BulkheadFull)
+	close(release)
+	require.NoError(t, <-done)
+	snapshotMetrics := metrics.Snapshot()
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), snapshotMetrics.Total)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshotMetrics.Allowed)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshotMetrics.Unavailable)
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorPerNodeBulkheadIsNonBlocking(t *testing.T) {
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	entered := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+	scanner := &scriptedScanner{block: release, entered: entered}
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, metrics, 2, 1)
+	cfg := guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "same-node", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 2000, InputLimit: 100})
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), cfg, PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "one", PromptLength: 3})
+		done <- err
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-entered:
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("first evaluation did not enter scanner")
+	}
+	started := time.Now()
+	_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), cfg, PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "two", PromptLength: 3})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Less(t, time.Since(started), 200*time.Millisecond)
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, metrics.Snapshot().BulkheadFull, int64(1))
+	close(release)
+	require.NoError(t, <-done)
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorLastChunkFailureNeverAllows(t *testing.T) {
+	call := 0
+	scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		call++
+		if call == 2 {
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Cause: errors.New("down")}
+		}
+		return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}}, nil
+	})
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, metrics, 2, 2)
+	_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 3}), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "abcdef", PromptLength: 6})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorScansLatestUserPromptAsIndependentFirstChunk(t *testing.T) {
+	latest := "请帮我编写一篇黄色小说 名字你来取"
+	history := strings.Repeat("# AGENTS.md instructions 项目安全规则。", 30)
+	seen := make([]string, 0, 4)
+	scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(_ context.Context, _ ActiveEndpoint, prompt string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		seen = append(seen, prompt)
+		return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}}, nil
+	})
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, NewAtomicMetrics(), 2, 2)
+	_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(
+		ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 128},
+	), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: latest + promptAuditPrioritySeparator + history, PromptLength: len([]rune(latest + history))})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Greater(t, len(seen), 1)
+	require.Equal(t, latest, seen[0])
+	require.Equal(t, history, strings.Join(seen[1:], ""))
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorBlockStopsRemainingChunksButReportsPlannedTotal(t *testing.T) {
+	calls := 0
+	scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		calls++
+		return &NormalizedResult{
+			Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock, Safety: "Unsafe",
+			Categories: []string{"jailbreak"}, MatchedScanners: []string{"jailbreak"},
+			ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"jailbreak": 1}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{"jailbreak": "Jailbreak"},
+		}, nil
+	})
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, metrics, 2, 2)
+	decision, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(
+		ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 3},
+	), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "abcdefghi", PromptLength: 9})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, DecisionBlock, decision.Kind)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, calls)
+	require.Equal(t, 3, decision.Result.ChunkTotal)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Blocked)
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorFlagSharedDeadlineFailClosedAndContextCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("flag allows next stage", func(t *testing.T) {
+		metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+		evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventFlag, RiskLevel: RiskMedium, Action: ActionWarn, Safety: "Controversial", Categories: []string{"violent"}, MatchedScanners: []string{"violent"}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"violent": .5}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{"violent": "Violent"}}, nil
+		}), nil, metrics, 2, 2)
+		decision, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100}), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "review", PromptLength: 6})
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, DecisionFlag, decision.Kind)
+		require.True(t, decision.AllowNextStage)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Flagged)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("all failovers share first endpoint deadline", func(t *testing.T) {
+		calls := 0
+		scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(ctx context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, _ string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			calls++
+			if endpoint.ID == "first" {
+				select {
+				case <-time.After(35 * time.Millisecond):
+					return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}
+				case <-ctx.Done():
+					return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Timeout: true, Cause: ctx.Err()}
+				}
+			}
+			<-ctx.Done()
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Timeout: true, Cause: ctx.Err()}
+		})
+		metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+		evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(scanner, nil, metrics, 2, 2)
+		started := time.Now()
+		_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(
+			ActiveEndpoint{ID: "first", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 70, InputLimit: 100},
+			ActiveEndpoint{ID: "second", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 500, InputLimit: 100},
+		), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "deadline", PromptLength: 8})
+		elapsed := time.Since(started)
+		require.Error(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, 2, calls)
+		// The bound only has to prove the failover shared the first endpoint's
+		// 70ms deadline instead of taking the second endpoint's own 500ms one.
+		// An unshared deadline lands at ~535ms, so 350ms still fails loudly
+		// while leaving room for scheduler delay on a busy CI machine. A
+		// tighter bound made this test flaky, not stricter.
+		require.Less(t, elapsed, 350*time.Millisecond)
+		require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 50*time.Millisecond)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Failovers)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Timeouts)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("canceled parent never allows", func(t *testing.T) {
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		cancel()
+		evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(PromptScannerFunc(func(ctx context.Context, _ ActiveEndpoint, _ string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			<-ctx.Done()
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Cause: ctx.Err()}
+		}), nil, NewAtomicMetrics(), 2, 2)
+		decision, err := evaluator.Evaluate(ctx, guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100}), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "cancel", PromptLength: 6})
+		require.Error(t, err)
+		require.Nil(t, decision)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorRecordsExistingResultOnceAndRecordFailureDoesNotChangeDecision(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, recordErr := range []error{nil, errors.New("database unavailable")} {
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{recordBlockingErr: recordErr}
+		metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+		scannerCalls := 0
+		evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			scannerCalls++
+			return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock, Safety: "Unsafe", Categories: []string{"pii"}, MatchedScanners: []string{"pii"}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"pii": 1}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{"pii": "PII"}}, nil
+		}), repo, metrics, 2, 2)
+		decision, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100}), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "raw prompt", RedactedPreview: "raw***", PromptLength: 10})
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, DecisionBlock, decision.Kind)
+		require.Equal(t, 1, scannerCalls)
+		require.Equal(t, 1, repo.recordBlockingCalls)
+		require.Empty(t, repo.recordBlockingSnapshot.ScanText)
+		require.Same(t, decision.Result, repo.recordBlockingResult)
+		if recordErr != nil {
+			require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().RecordFailed)
+		} else {
+			require.Zero(t, metrics.Snapshot().RecordFailed)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGuardEvaluatorNilResultAndScannerPanicBecomeStableFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		scan PromptScannerFunc
+		code string
+	}{
+		{name: "nil result", scan: func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) { return nil, nil }, code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse},
+		{name: "panic", scan: func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			panic("raw prompt canary")
+		}, code: ErrorCodeUnavailable},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(tt.scan, nil, NewAtomicMetrics(), 2, 2)
+			_, err := evaluator.Evaluate(context.Background(), guardConfig(ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 100}), PromptSnapshot{ScanText: "input", PromptLength: 5})
+			var guardErr *GuardError
+			require.ErrorAs(t, err, &guardErr)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.code, guardErr.Code)
+			require.NotContains(t, err.Error(), "canary")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+type PromptScannerFunc func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error)
+
+func (f PromptScannerFunc) Scan(ctx context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, scanners []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	return f(ctx, endpoint, chunk, scanners)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/response"
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/server/middleware"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+type PromptAdminService interface {
+	GetConfig() (PublicConfig, error)
+	SaveConfig(context.Context, UpdateConfigRequest, int64) (PublicConfig, error)
+	Probe(context.Context, ProbeRequest) ProbeResult
+	Runtime(context.Context) RuntimeSnapshot
+	ListEvents(context.Context, EventFilter, int, int) (*EventPage, error)
+	GetEvent(context.Context, int64) (*Event, error)
+	DeleteEvent(context.Context, int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+	DeleteEventsByIDs(context.Context, []int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+	PreviewDelete(context.Context, EventFilter, int64) (*DeletePreview, error)
+	DeleteByFilter(context.Context, DeleteByFilterRequest, int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+}
+
+type PromptAdminHandler struct{ service PromptAdminService }
+
+func NewPromptAdminHandler(service PromptAdminService) *PromptAdminHandler {
+	return &PromptAdminHandler{service: service}
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) GetConfig(c *gin.Context) {
+	config, err := h.service.GetConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	response.Success(c, config)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) UpdateConfig(c *gin.Context) {
+	var request UpdateConfigRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&request); err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_invalid_config_request", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_config_request", "提示词审计配置请求无效"))
+		return
+	}
+	config, err := h.service.SaveConfig(c.Request.Context(), request, adminID(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", infraerrors.Reason(err), configAuditFields(request, nil))
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setPromptAdminAudit(c, "success", "", configAuditFields(request, &config))
+	response.Success(c, config)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) ProbeEndpoint(c *gin.Context) {
+	var request ProbeRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&request); err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_invalid_probe_request", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_probe_request", "审计节点探测请求无效"))
+		return
+	}
+	result := h.service.Probe(c.Request.Context(), request)
+	status := "failed"
+	if result.OK {
+		status = "success"
+	}
+	setPromptAdminAudit(c, status, result.ErrorCode, map[string]any{
+		"guard_endpoint_id": request.Endpoint.ID, "http_status": result.HTTPStatus,
+		"latency_ms": result.LatencyMS, "token_applied": result.TokenApplied, "retryable": result.Retryable,
+	})
+	response.Success(c, result)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) GetRuntime(c *gin.Context) {
+	response.Success(c, h.service.Runtime(c.Request.Context()))
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) ListEvents(c *gin.Context) {
+	page, err := positiveIntQuery(c, "page", 1, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	pageSize, err := positiveIntQuery(c, "page_size", 20, 100)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	filter, err := eventFilterFromQuery(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	result, err := h.service.ListEvents(c.Request.Context(), filter, page, pageSize)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	response.Success(c, result)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) GetEvent(c *gin.Context) {
+	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(c.Param("id"), 10, 64)
+	if err != nil || id <= 0 {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_event_id", "事件 ID 无效"))
+		return
+	}
+	event, err := h.service.GetEvent(c.Request.Context(), id)
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrEventNotFound) {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.NotFound("prompt_audit_event_not_found", "提示词审计事件不存在"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	response.Success(c, event)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) DeleteEvent(c *gin.Context) {
+	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(c.Param("id"), 10, 64)
+	if err != nil || id <= 0 {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_invalid_event_id", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_event_id", "事件 ID 无效"))
+		return
+	}
+	result, err := h.service.DeleteEvent(c.Request.Context(), id)
+	if err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", infraerrors.Reason(err), map[string]any{"event_id": id})
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setPromptAdminAudit(c, "success", "", deleteAuditFields(result, map[string]any{"event_id": id}))
+	LogWarn(EventEventDeleted, map[string]any{"user_id": adminID(c), "event_id": id, "status": "deleted"})
+	response.Success(c, result)
+}
+
+type batchDeleteRequest struct {
+	IDs []int64 `json:"ids" binding:"required"`
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) BatchDelete(c *gin.Context) {
+	var request batchDeleteRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&request); err != nil || len(request.IDs) == 0 || len(request.IDs) > 500 {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_invalid_delete_batch", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_delete_batch", "批量删除必须包含 1-500 个事件 ID"))
+		return
+	}
+	for _, id := range request.IDs {
+		if id <= 0 {
+			setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_invalid_event_id", map[string]any{"requested_count": len(request.IDs)})
+			response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_event_id", "事件 ID 无效"))
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	result, err := h.service.DeleteEventsByIDs(c.Request.Context(), request.IDs)
+	if err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", infraerrors.Reason(err), map[string]any{"requested_count": len(request.IDs)})
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setPromptAdminAudit(c, "success", "", deleteAuditFields(result, map[string]any{"requested_count": len(request.IDs)}))
+	LogWarn(EventEventsDeleted, map[string]any{"user_id": adminID(c), "status": "deleted"})
+	response.Success(c, result)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) DeletePreview(c *gin.Context) {
+	var filter EventFilter
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&filter); err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_delete_preview_invalid", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_delete_preview_invalid", "删除预览筛选无效"))
+		return
+	}
+	preview, err := h.service.PreviewDelete(c.Request.Context(), filter, adminID(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_delete_preview_invalid", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_delete_preview_invalid", "删除预览筛选无效"))
+		return
+	}
+	setPromptAdminAudit(c, "success", "", map[string]any{
+		"matched_count": preview.MatchedCount, "snapshot_max_id": preview.SnapshotMaxID, "filter_hash": preview.FilterHash,
+	})
+	response.Success(c, preview)
+}
+
+func (h *PromptAdminHandler) DeleteByFilter(c *gin.Context) {
+	var request DeleteByFilterRequest
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&request); err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_delete_confirmation_invalid", nil)
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_delete_confirmation_invalid", "删除确认无效或已过期"))
+		return
+	}
+	result, err := h.service.DeleteByFilter(c.Request.Context(), request, adminID(c))
+	if err != nil {
+		setPromptAdminAudit(c, "failed", "prompt_audit_delete_confirmation_invalid", map[string]any{
+			"snapshot_max_id": request.SnapshotMaxID, "filter_hash": request.FilterHash, "confirm": request.Confirm,
+		})
+		response.ErrorFrom(c, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_delete_confirmation_invalid", "删除确认无效或已过期"))
+		return
+	}
+	setPromptAdminAudit(c, "success", "", deleteAuditFields(result, map[string]any{
+		"snapshot_max_id": request.SnapshotMaxID, "filter_hash": request.FilterHash, "confirm": request.Confirm,
+	}))
+	response.Success(c, result)
+}
+
+func setPromptAdminAudit(c *gin.Context, result, errorCode string, fields map[string]any) {
+	details := make(map[string]any, len(fields)+2)
+	details["result"] = result
+	if strings.TrimSpace(errorCode) != "" {
+		details["error_code"] = errorCode
+	}
+	for key, value := range fields {
+		details[key] = value
+	}
+	middleware.SetAuditExtra(c, details)
+}
+
+func configAuditFields(request UpdateConfigRequest, saved *PublicConfig) map[string]any {
+	version := request.ExpectedConfigVersion
+	if saved != nil {
+		version = saved.ConfigVersion
+	}
+	return map[string]any{
+		"enabled": request.Enabled, "blocking_enabled": request.BlockingEnabled,
+		"blocking_latest_turn_only": request.BlockingLatestTurnOnly,
+		"config_version":            version, "endpoint_count": len(request.Endpoints),
+		"scanner_count": len(request.Scanners), "all_groups": request.AllGroups,
+		"group_count": len(request.GroupIDs),
+	}
+}
+
+func deleteAuditFields(result *DeleteResult, base map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	fields := make(map[string]any, len(base)+2)
+	for key, value := range base {
+		fields[key] = value
+	}
+	if result != nil {
+		fields["deleted_events"] = result.DeletedEvents
+		fields["deleted_jobs"] = result.DeletedJobs
+	}
+	return fields
+}
+
+func adminID(c *gin.Context) int64 {
+	subject, ok := middleware.GetAuthSubjectFromContext(c)
+	if !ok {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return subject.UserID
+}
+
+func eventFilterFromQuery(c *gin.Context) (EventFilter, error) {
+	groupID, err := optionalPositiveInt64Query(c, "group_id")
+	if err != nil {
+		return EventFilter{}, err
+	}
+	userID, err := optionalPositiveInt64Query(c, "user_id")
+	if err != nil {
+		return EventFilter{}, err
+	}
+	apiKeyID, err := optionalPositiveInt64Query(c, "api_key_id")
+	if err != nil {
+		return EventFilter{}, err
+	}
+	filter := EventFilter{
+		Decision: c.Query("decision"), RiskLevel: c.Query("risk_level"), Endpoint: c.Query("endpoint"),
+		GroupID: groupID, UserID: userID, APIKeyID: apiKeyID, RequestID: c.Query("request_id"),
+		PromptHash: c.Query("prompt_hash"), Keyword: c.Query("keyword"),
+	}
+	if value := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("start_at")); value != "" {
+		filter.StartAt = parseTimeQuery(value)
+		if filter.StartAt == nil {
+			return EventFilter{}, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_time", "开始时间无效")
+		}
+	}
+	if value := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("end_at")); value != "" {
+		filter.EndAt = parseTimeQuery(value)
+		if filter.EndAt == nil {
+			return EventFilter{}, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_time", "结束时间无效")
+		}
+	}
+	return filter, nil
+}
+
+func optionalPositiveInt64Query(c *gin.Context, key string) (*int64, error) {
+	value := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query(key))
+	if value == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil || parsed <= 0 {
+		return nil, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_filter_id", "事件筛选 ID 无效")
+	}
+	return &parsed, nil
+}
+
+func positiveIntQuery(c *gin.Context, key string, defaultValue, maxValue int) (int, error) {
+	value := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query(key))
+	if value == "" {
+		return defaultValue, nil
+	}
+	parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
+	if err != nil || parsed <= 0 || (maxValue > 0 && parsed > maxValue) {
+		return 0, infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_pagination", "分页参数无效")
+	}
+	return parsed, nil
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_handler_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+	servermiddleware "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/server/middleware"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type fakePromptAdminService struct {
+	config       PublicConfig
+	save         func(context.Context, UpdateConfigRequest, int64) (PublicConfig, error)
+	probe        func(context.Context, ProbeRequest) ProbeResult
+	runtime      RuntimeSnapshot
+	list         func(context.Context, EventFilter, int, int) (*EventPage, error)
+	get          func(context.Context, int64) (*Event, error)
+	deleteOne    func(context.Context, int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+	deleteIDs    func(context.Context, []int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+	preview      func(context.Context, EventFilter, int64) (*DeletePreview, error)
+	deleteFilter func(context.Context, DeleteByFilterRequest, int64) (*DeleteResult, error)
+}
+
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) GetConfig() (PublicConfig, error) {
+	return s.config, nil
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) SaveConfig(ctx context.Context, req UpdateConfigRequest, actorID int64) (PublicConfig, error) {
+	if s.save == nil {
+		return PublicConfig{}, errors.New("unexpected SaveConfig call")
+	}
+	return s.save(ctx, req, actorID)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) Probe(ctx context.Context, req ProbeRequest) ProbeResult {
+	if s.probe == nil {
+		return ProbeResult{}
+	}
+	return s.probe(ctx, req)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) Runtime(context.Context) RuntimeSnapshot { return s.runtime }
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) ListEvents(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, page, pageSize int) (*EventPage, error) {
+	if s.list == nil {
+		return &EventPage{}, nil
+	}
+	return s.list(ctx, filter, page, pageSize)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) GetEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*Event, error) {
+	if s.get == nil {
+		return nil, ErrEventNotFound
+	}
+	return s.get(ctx, id)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) DeleteEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	if s.deleteOne == nil {
+		return &DeleteResult{}, nil
+	}
+	return s.deleteOne(ctx, id)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx context.Context, ids []int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	if s.deleteIDs == nil {
+		return &DeleteResult{}, nil
+	}
+	return s.deleteIDs(ctx, ids)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) PreviewDelete(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, actorID int64) (*DeletePreview, error) {
+	if s.preview == nil {
+		return &DeletePreview{}, nil
+	}
+	return s.preview(ctx, filter, actorID)
+}
+func (s *fakePromptAdminService) DeleteByFilter(ctx context.Context, req DeleteByFilterRequest, actorID int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	if s.deleteFilter == nil {
+		return &DeleteResult{}, nil
+	}
+	return s.deleteFilter(ctx, req, actorID)
+}
+
+func promptAdminRouter(service PromptAdminService) *gin.Engine {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
+		c.Set(string(servermiddleware.ContextKeyUser), servermiddleware.AuthSubject{UserID: 42})
+		c.Set(string(servermiddleware.ContextKeyUserRole), "admin")
+		c.Next()
+	})
+	handler := NewPromptAdminHandler(service)
+	group := router.Group("/admin/prompt-audit")
+	group.GET("/config", handler.GetConfig)
+	group.PUT("/config", handler.UpdateConfig)
+	group.POST("/endpoints/probe", handler.ProbeEndpoint)
+	group.GET("/runtime", handler.GetRuntime)
+	group.GET("/events", handler.ListEvents)
+	group.GET("/events/:id", handler.GetEvent)
+	group.DELETE("/events/:id", handler.DeleteEvent)
+	group.POST("/events/batch-delete", handler.BatchDelete)
+	group.POST("/events/delete-preview", handler.DeletePreview)
+	group.POST("/events/delete-by-filter", handler.DeleteByFilter)
+	return router
+}
+
+func promptAdminRequest(t *testing.T, router http.Handler, method, path string, body any) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	var reader *bytes.Reader
+	if body == nil {
+		reader = bytes.NewReader(nil)
+	} else {
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(body)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		reader = bytes.NewReader(raw)
+	}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, reader)
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	router.ServeHTTP(recorder, req)
+	return recorder
+}
+
+func TestPromptAdminConfigRequiresVersionMapsConflictAndNeverEchoesToken(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "prompt-admin-token-canary"
+
+	t.Run("missing expected version", func(t *testing.T) {
+		router := promptAdminRouter(&fakePromptAdminService{})
+		response := promptAdminRequest(t, router, http.MethodPut, "/admin/prompt-audit/config", map[string]any{})
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, response.Code)
+		require.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), "prompt_audit_invalid_config_request")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("CAS conflict", func(t *testing.T) {
+		service := &fakePromptAdminService{save: func(context.Context, UpdateConfigRequest, int64) (PublicConfig, error) {
+			return PublicConfig{}, infraerrors.Conflict(ErrorCodeConfigConflict, "配置已被更新")
+		}}
+		response := promptAdminRequest(t, promptAdminRouter(service), http.MethodPut, "/admin/prompt-audit/config", validHandlerUpdateRequest(canary))
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, response.Code)
+		require.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), ErrorCodeConfigConflict)
+		require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), canary)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("success public DTO", func(t *testing.T) {
+		service := &fakePromptAdminService{save: func(_ context.Context, req UpdateConfigRequest, actorID int64) (PublicConfig, error) {
+			require.Equal(t, int64(42), actorID)
+			require.Equal(t, canary, req.Endpoints[0].Token)
+			return PublicConfig{ConfigVersion: 8, Endpoints: []PublicEndpoint{{ID: "guard-1", HasToken: true, TokenStatus: "configured"}}}, nil
+		}}
+		response := promptAdminRequest(t, promptAdminRouter(service), http.MethodPut, "/admin/prompt-audit/config", validHandlerUpdateRequest(canary))
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, response.Code)
+		body := response.Body.String()
+		require.NotContains(t, body, canary)
+		require.NotContains(t, body, "token_ciphertext")
+		require.NotContains(t, body, `"token":`)
+		require.Contains(t, body, `"has_token":true`)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestPromptAdminGetConfigReturnsSecretFreeUnavailableError(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "persisted-config-secret-canary"
+	repository := &switchableSettingRepository{loadErr: errors.New("failed to load token " + canary)}
+	manager := NewConfigManager(nil, repository, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	require.Error(t, manager.Reload(context.Background()))
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager}
+
+	response := promptAdminRequest(t, promptAdminRouter(service), http.MethodGet, "/admin/prompt-audit/config", nil)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, response.Code)
+	require.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), ErrorCodeConfigUnavailable)
+	require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), canary)
+	require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), `"config_version"`)
+	require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), `"token"`)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAdminProbeSupportsTemporaryOrSavedTokenWithoutEcho(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "probe-token-canary"
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name         string
+		token        string
+		tokenApplied bool
+	}{
+		{name: "temporary token", token: canary, tokenApplied: true},
+		{name: "saved token", token: "", tokenApplied: true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			service := &fakePromptAdminService{probe: func(_ context.Context, req ProbeRequest) ProbeResult {
+				require.Equal(t, tc.token, req.Endpoint.Token)
+				return ProbeResult{OK: true, Status: "healthy", Message: "ok", TokenApplied: tc.tokenApplied}
+			}}
+			endpoint := validHandlerUpdateRequest(tc.token).Endpoints[0]
+			response := promptAdminRequest(t, promptAdminRouter(service), http.MethodPost, "/admin/prompt-audit/endpoints/probe", ProbeRequest{Endpoint: endpoint})
+			require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, response.Code)
+			require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), canary)
+			require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), `"token":`)
+			require.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), `"token_applied":true`)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPromptAdminRejectsInvalidEventIDsTimesAndPagination(t *testing.T) {
+	router := promptAdminRouter(&fakePromptAdminService{})
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		method string
+		path   string
+		body   any
+		reason string
+	}{
+		{http.MethodGet, "/admin/prompt-audit/events/not-a-number", nil, "prompt_audit_invalid_event_id"},
+		{http.MethodDelete, "/admin/prompt-audit/events/-1", nil, "prompt_audit_invalid_event_id"},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/admin/prompt-audit/events?group_id=bad", nil, "prompt_audit_invalid_filter_id"},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/admin/prompt-audit/events?start_at=not-time", nil, "prompt_audit_invalid_time"},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/admin/prompt-audit/events?page=0", nil, "prompt_audit_invalid_pagination"},
+		{http.MethodPost, "/admin/prompt-audit/events/batch-delete", map[string]any{"ids": []int64{1, -2}}, "prompt_audit_invalid_event_id"},
+	} {
+		response := promptAdminRequest(t, router, tc.method, tc.path, tc.body)
+		require.Equalf(t, http.StatusBadRequest, response.Code, "%s %s", tc.method, tc.path)
+		require.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), tc.reason)
+	}
+}
+
+func validHandlerUpdateRequest(token string) UpdateConfigRequest {
+	return UpdateConfigRequest{
+		ExpectedConfigVersion: 7,
+		Strategy:              "priority",
+		WorkerCount:           1,
+		QueueCapacity:         10,
+		Scanners:              []string{"pii"},
+		AllGroups:             true,
+		Endpoints: []UpdateEndpoint{{
+			ID: "guard-1", Name: "Guard One", Protocol: "openai_compatible",
+			BaseURL: "http://127.0.0.1:18080", Model: DefaultGuardModel, Token: token,
+			TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024, Enabled: true,
+		}},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPromptAdminDeleteConfirmationErrorsStayGeneric(t *testing.T) {
+	service := &fakePromptAdminService{deleteFilter: func(context.Context, DeleteByFilterRequest, int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+		return nil, errors.New("sensitive-token-or-filter-detail")
+	}}
+	response := promptAdminRequest(t, promptAdminRouter(service), http.MethodPost, "/admin/prompt-audit/events/delete-by-filter", DeleteByFilterRequest{
+		SnapshotMaxID: 3, FilterHash: strings.Repeat("a", 64), ConfirmationToken: "secret-confirmation", Confirm: true,
+	})
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, response.Code)
+	require.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), "prompt_audit_delete_confirmation_invalid")
+	require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), "sensitive-token")
+	require.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), "secret-confirmation")
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_issue_summary.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+)
+
+func BuildIssueSummaries(result NormalizedResult) []IssueSummary {
+	resultCategories := result.Categories
+	if len(resultCategories) == 0 {
+		resultCategories = result.MatchedScanners
+	}
+	summaries := make([]IssueSummary, 0, len(resultCategories)+len(result.UnknownCategories))
+	for _, category := range resultCategories {
+		definition, ok := ScannerCatalog[category]
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		evidence := RedactPreview(result.ScannerEvidence[category], 160)
+		if evidence == "" {
+			evidence = definition.Label
+		}
+		digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(evidence))
+		summaries = append(summaries, IssueSummary{
+			Category: category, ScannerID: category, Title: definition.LabelZH,
+			Description: definition.Description, Severity: string(result.RiskLevel),
+			SeverityLabel: riskLabelZH(result.RiskLevel), Action: string(result.Action),
+			ActionLabel: actionLabelZH(result.Action), Code: "prompt_audit_" + category,
+			Score: result.ScannerScores[category], Evidence: evidence,
+			EvidenceHash: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]),
+		})
+	}
+	for _, category := range result.UnknownCategories {
+		evidence := "unknown_unsafe"
+		digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(evidence + ":" + category))
+		summaries = append(summaries, IssueSummary{
+			Category: category, ScannerID: "unknown_unsafe", Title: "未知高风险分类",
+			Description: "审计节点返回了未知但不可忽略的高风险分类", Severity: string(RiskCritical),
+			SeverityLabel: riskLabelZH(RiskCritical), Action: string(ActionBlock),
+			ActionLabel: actionLabelZH(ActionBlock), Code: "prompt_audit_unknown_unsafe",
+			Score: 1, Evidence: evidence, EvidenceHash: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]),
+		})
+	}
+	return summaries
+}
+
+func riskLabelZH(risk RiskLevel) string {
+	switch risk {
+	case RiskCritical:
+		return "严重"
+	case RiskHigh:
+		return "高"
+	case RiskMedium:
+		return "中"
+	default:
+		return "低"
+	}
+}
+
+func actionLabelZH(action Action) string {
+	switch action {
+	case ActionBlock:
+		return "阻止"
+	case ActionWarn:
+		return "警告"
+	default:
+		return "允许"
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_logging.go

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+const (
+	EventConfigUpdated        = "prompt_audit.config_updated"
+	EventConfigLoaded         = "prompt_guard.config_loaded"
+	EventConfigReloadDegraded = "prompt_guard.config_reload_degraded"
+	EventConfigTokenInvalid   = "prompt_guard.config_token_invalid"
+	EventProbeStarted         = "prompt_audit.endpoint_probe_started"
+	EventProbeFinished        = "prompt_audit.endpoint_probe_finished"
+	EventProbeFailed          = "prompt_audit.endpoint_probe_failed"
+	EventJobEnqueued          = "prompt_audit.job_enqueued"
+	EventEnqueueSkipped       = "prompt_audit.enqueue_skipped"
+	EventEnqueueDropped       = "prompt_audit.enqueue_dropped"
+	EventAuditStarted         = "prompt_audit.started"
+	EventProcessingReclaimed  = "prompt_audit.processing_reclaimed"
+	EventProcessed            = "prompt_audit.processed"
+	EventProcessFailed        = "prompt_audit.process_failed"
+	EventFindingRecorded      = "prompt_audit.finding_recorded"
+	EventChunkStarted         = "prompt_audit.scan_chunk_started"
+	EventChunkCompleted       = "prompt_audit.scan_chunk_completed"
+	EventChunkFailed          = "prompt_audit.scan_chunk_failed"
+	EventChunksAggregated     = "prompt_audit.scan_chunks_aggregated"
+	EventEvaluationStarted    = "prompt_guard.evaluation_started"
+	EventGuardAllowed         = "prompt_guard.allowed"
+	EventGuardBlocked         = "prompt_guard.blocked"
+	EventGuardFailed          = "prompt_guard.failed"
+	EventResultRecordFailed   = "prompt_guard.result_record_failed"
+	EventEventDeleted         = "prompt_audit.event_deleted"
+	EventEventsDeleted        = "prompt_audit.events_deleted"
+	EventDeletePreviewed      = "prompt_audit.events_delete_previewed"
+	EventEventsFilterDeleted  = "prompt_audit.events_filter_deleted"
+)
+
+var knownLogEvents = map[string]struct{}{
+	EventConfigUpdated: {}, EventConfigLoaded: {}, EventConfigReloadDegraded: {}, EventConfigTokenInvalid: {},
+	EventProbeStarted: {}, EventProbeFinished: {}, EventProbeFailed: {},
+	EventJobEnqueued: {}, EventEnqueueSkipped: {}, EventEnqueueDropped: {},
+	EventAuditStarted: {}, EventProcessingReclaimed: {}, EventProcessed: {}, EventProcessFailed: {}, EventFindingRecorded: {},
+	EventChunkStarted: {}, EventChunkCompleted: {}, EventChunkFailed: {}, EventChunksAggregated: {},
+	EventEvaluationStarted: {}, EventGuardAllowed: {}, EventGuardBlocked: {}, EventGuardFailed: {}, EventResultRecordFailed: {},
+	EventEventDeleted: {}, EventEventsDeleted: {}, EventDeletePreviewed: {}, EventEventsFilterDeleted: {},
+}
+
+var allowedLogFields = map[string]struct{}{
+	"request_id": {}, "user_id": {}, "api_key_id": {}, "group_id": {}, "provider": {},
+	"protocol": {}, "endpoint": {}, "model": {}, "job_id": {}, "event_id": {},
+	"config_version": {}, "guard_endpoint_id": {}, "decision": {}, "risk_level": {},
+	"action": {}, "chunk_index": {}, "chunk_total": {}, "chunk_chars": {}, "input_chars": {},
+	"input_limit": {}, "latency_ms": {}, "status": {}, "error_code": {}, "error_kind": {},
+	"queue_length": {}, "queue_capacity": {}, "stage": {}, "upstream_dispatched": {},
+	"billing_preconsumed": {}, "worker_id": {}, "reclaimed_total": {}, "attempts": {},
+	"max_attempts": {}, "claim_version": {}, "http_status": {}, "retryable": {},
+}
+
+func LogInfo(event string, fields map[string]any) {
+	if _, ok := knownLogEvents[event]; !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	slog.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo, event, safeAttrs(fields)...)
+}
+func LogWarn(event string, fields map[string]any) {
+	if _, ok := knownLogEvents[event]; !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	slog.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelWarn, event, safeAttrs(fields)...)
+}
+func LogError(event string, fields map[string]any) {
+	if _, ok := knownLogEvents[event]; !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	slog.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelError, event, safeAttrs(fields)...)
+}
+
+func safeAttrs(fields map[string]any) []slog.Attr {
+	attrs := make([]slog.Attr, 0, len(fields))
+	for key, value := range fields {
+		key = strings.TrimSpace(key)
+		if _, allowed := allowedLogFields[key]; !allowed {
+			continue
+		}
+		if text, ok := value.(string); ok {
+			if key == "error_kind" || key == "error_code" {
+				value = stableErrorCode(text)
+			} else {
+				value = TrimRunes(strings.TrimSpace(text), 256)
+			}
+		}
+		attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any(key, value))
+	}
+	return attrs
+}
+
+func mergeLogFields(base map[string]any, extra map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	result := make(map[string]any, len(base)+len(extra))
+	for key, value := range base {
+		result[key] = value
+	}
+	for key, value := range extra {
+		result[key] = value
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func requestLogFields(req Request) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"request_id": req.RequestID, "user_id": req.UserID, "api_key_id": req.APIKeyID,
+		"group_id": pointerLogID(req.GroupID), "provider": req.Provider, "protocol": req.Protocol,
+		"endpoint": req.Endpoint, "model": req.Model, "stage": req.Stage,
+	}
+}
+
+func snapshotLogFields(snapshot PromptSnapshot) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"request_id": snapshot.RequestID, "user_id": snapshot.UserID, "api_key_id": snapshot.APIKeyID,
+		"group_id": pointerLogID(snapshot.GroupID), "provider": snapshot.Provider, "protocol": snapshot.Protocol,
+		"endpoint": snapshot.Endpoint, "model": snapshot.Model, "stage": snapshot.Stage,
+	}
+}
+
+func jobLogFields(job *Job) map[string]any {
+	if job == nil {
+		return map[string]any{}
+	}
+	fields := snapshotLogFields(job.Snapshot)
+	fields["job_id"] = job.ID
+	fields["config_version"] = job.ConfigVersion
+	fields["claim_version"] = job.ClaimVersion
+	return fields
+}
+
+func stableErrorCode(code string) string {
+	code = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(code))
+	if code == "" {
+		return "unknown_error"
+	}
+	for _, char := range code {
+		if (char >= 'a' && char <= 'z') || (char >= '0' && char <= '9') || char == '_' || char == '-' || char == '.' {
+			continue
+		}
+		return "redacted_error"
+	}
+	return TrimRunes(code, 64)
+}
+
+func stableErrorMessage(code string) string {
+	switch stableErrorCode(code) {
+	case ErrorCodeBlocked:
+		return "Prompt Guard blocked the request"
+	case ErrorCodeUnavailable, "payload_store_unavailable", "payload_missing":
+		return "Prompt Audit dependency is unavailable"
+	case ErrorCodeInvalidResponse:
+		return "Prompt Guard returned an invalid response"
+	case "queue_full", "queue_admission_busy":
+		return "Prompt Audit queue is unavailable"
+	case "worker_panic":
+		return "Prompt Audit worker failed"
+	case "config_load_failed", "config_ttl_reload_failed", "config_invalidation_reload_failed":
+		return "Prompt Audit configuration could not be loaded"
+	default:
+		return "Prompt Audit operation failed"
+	}
+}
+
+func sanitizeStoredError(code string) (string, string) {
+	stableCode := stableErrorCode(code)
+	return stableCode, TrimRunes(stableErrorMessage(stableCode), 160)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_logging_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"log/slog"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestPromptAuditLogAllowlistAndErrorsDoNotLeakCanarySecrets(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "PROMPT_AUDIT_CANARY_SECRET_DO_NOT_PERSIST"
+	var output bytes.Buffer
+	previous := slog.Default()
+	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&output, nil)))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(previous) })
+
+	LogWarn(EventConfigReloadDegraded, map[string]any{
+		"status":     "degraded",
+		"error_code": "config_reload_failed",
+		"error_kind": "Authorization: Bearer " + canary,
+		"token":      canary,
+		"body":       canary,
+		"base_url":   "https://guard.example.test/path?api_key=" + canary,
+		"raw_prompt": "prompt " + canary,
+	})
+	require.NotContains(t, output.String(), canary)
+	require.NotContains(t, output.String(), "api_key=")
+	require.Contains(t, output.String(), EventConfigReloadDegraded)
+
+	beforeUnknown := output.Len()
+	LogWarn("prompt_audit.typo_event", map[string]any{"status": "failed"})
+	require.Equal(t, beforeUnknown, output.Len(), "events outside the stable dictionary must not be emitted")
+	require.Len(t, knownLogEvents, 28)
+
+	_, err := NormalizeBaseURL("https://guard.example.test/path?token=" + canary)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, err.Error(), canary)
+}
+
+func TestPromptGuardFailureLogUsesCompleteAllowlistedContextAndNoSideEffects(t *testing.T) {
+	var output bytes.Buffer
+	previous := slog.Default()
+	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&output, nil)))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(previous) })
+	groupID := int64(9)
+	snapshot := PromptSnapshot{
+		RequestID: "req-1", UserID: 2, APIKeyID: 3, GroupID: &groupID,
+		Provider: "openai", Protocol: "openai_chat", Endpoint: "/v1/chat/completions",
+		Model: "gpt-test", Stage: "http",
+	}
+	logGuardFailure(snapshot, ActiveConfig{ConfigVersion: 7}, DecisionUnavailable, ErrorCodeUnavailable, "guard-1", 25*time.Millisecond)
+
+	var entry map[string]any
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(output.Bytes(), &entry))
+	for key := range snapshotLogFields(snapshot) {
+		require.Contains(t, entry, key)
+	}
+	require.EqualValues(t, 7, entry["config_version"])
+	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, entry["error_code"])
+	require.Equal(t, false, entry["upstream_dispatched"])
+	require.Equal(t, false, entry["billing_preconsumed"])
+	require.EqualValues(t, 25, entry["latency_ms"])
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_metrics.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"sort"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const latencySampleCapacity = 2048
+
+type AtomicMetrics struct {
+	total        atomic.Int64
+	allowed      atomic.Int64
+	flagged      atomic.Int64
+	blocked      atomic.Int64
+	unavailable  atomic.Int64
+	invalid      atomic.Int64
+	timeouts     atomic.Int64
+	failovers    atomic.Int64
+	bulkheadFull atomic.Int64
+	recordFailed atomic.Int64
+	latencyTotal atomic.Int64
+	latencyMax   atomic.Int64
+	enqueued     atomic.Int64
+	dropped      atomic.Int64
+	latencyMu    sync.RWMutex
+	latencies    []int64
+	latencyNext  int
+}
+
+func NewAtomicMetrics() *AtomicMetrics { return &AtomicMetrics{} }
+
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) Snapshot() GuardMetricsSnapshot {
+	if m == nil {
+		return GuardMetricsSnapshot{}
+	}
+	snapshot := GuardMetricsSnapshot{
+		Total: m.total.Load(), Allowed: m.allowed.Load(), Flagged: m.flagged.Load(),
+		Blocked: m.blocked.Load(), Unavailable: m.unavailable.Load(), Invalid: m.invalid.Load(),
+		Timeouts: m.timeouts.Load(), Failovers: m.failovers.Load(), BulkheadFull: m.bulkheadFull.Load(),
+		RecordFailed: m.recordFailed.Load(), LatencyCount: m.total.Load(), LatencyMaxMS: m.latencyMax.Load(),
+	}
+	if snapshot.LatencyCount > 0 {
+		snapshot.LatencyAvgMS = m.latencyTotal.Load() / snapshot.LatencyCount
+	}
+	m.latencyMu.RLock()
+	samples := append([]int64(nil), m.latencies...)
+	m.latencyMu.RUnlock()
+	if len(samples) > 0 {
+		sort.Slice(samples, func(i, j int) bool { return samples[i] < samples[j] })
+		snapshot.LatencyP50MS = percentile(samples, 0.50)
+		snapshot.LatencyP95MS = percentile(samples, 0.95)
+		snapshot.LatencyP99MS = percentile(samples, 0.99)
+	}
+	return snapshot
+}
+
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) AuditSnapshot() AuditMetricsSnapshot {
+	if m == nil {
+		return AuditMetricsSnapshot{}
+	}
+	return AuditMetricsSnapshot{Enqueued: m.enqueued.Load(), Dropped: m.dropped.Load()}
+}
+
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) Observe(kind DecisionKind, latency time.Duration) {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	m.total.Add(1)
+	latencyMS := latency.Milliseconds()
+	if latencyMS < 0 {
+		latencyMS = 0
+	}
+	m.latencyTotal.Add(latencyMS)
+	for current := m.latencyMax.Load(); latencyMS > current && !m.latencyMax.CompareAndSwap(current, latencyMS); current = m.latencyMax.Load() {
+	}
+	m.latencyMu.Lock()
+	if len(m.latencies) < latencySampleCapacity {
+		m.latencies = append(m.latencies, latencyMS)
+	} else {
+		m.latencies[m.latencyNext] = latencyMS
+		m.latencyNext = (m.latencyNext + 1) % latencySampleCapacity
+	}
+	m.latencyMu.Unlock()
+	switch kind {
+	case DecisionFlag:
+		m.flagged.Add(1)
+	case DecisionBlock:
+		m.blocked.Add(1)
+	case DecisionUnavailable:
+		m.unavailable.Add(1)
+	case DecisionInvalid:
+		m.invalid.Add(1)
+	default:
+		m.allowed.Add(1)
+	}
+}
+
+func percentile(sorted []int64, quantile float64) int64 {
+	if len(sorted) == 0 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	index := int(float64(len(sorted)-1) * quantile)
+	if index < 0 {
+		index = 0
+	}
+	if index >= len(sorted) {
+		index = len(sorted) - 1
+	}
+	return sorted[index]
+}
+
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) IncEnqueued() {
+	if m != nil {
+		m.enqueued.Add(1)
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) IncDropped() {
+	if m != nil {
+		m.dropped.Add(1)
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) IncTimeout() {
+	if m != nil {
+		m.timeouts.Add(1)
+	}
+}
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) IncFailover() {
+	if m != nil {
+		m.failovers.Add(1)
+	}
+}
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) IncBulkheadFull() {
+	if m != nil {
+		m.bulkheadFull.Add(1)
+	}
+}
+func (m *AtomicMetrics) IncRecordFailed() {
+	if m != nil {
+		m.recordFailed.Add(1)
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_metrics_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestAtomicMetricsExposeCountsLatencyDistributionAndAsyncDelivery(t *testing.T) {
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	latencies := []time.Duration{10, 20, 30, 40, 100}
+	kinds := []DecisionKind{DecisionAllow, DecisionFlag, DecisionBlock, DecisionUnavailable, DecisionInvalid}
+	for index := range latencies {
+		metrics.Observe(kinds[index], latencies[index]*time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	metrics.IncTimeout()
+	metrics.IncFailover()
+	metrics.IncBulkheadFull()
+	metrics.IncRecordFailed()
+	metrics.IncEnqueued()
+	metrics.IncDropped()
+
+	snapshot := metrics.Snapshot()
+	require.Equal(t, int64(5), snapshot.Total)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(5), snapshot.LatencyCount)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(40), snapshot.LatencyAvgMS)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(30), snapshot.LatencyP50MS)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(40), snapshot.LatencyP95MS)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(40), snapshot.LatencyP99MS)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(100), snapshot.LatencyMaxMS)
+	require.Equal(t, AuditMetricsSnapshot{Enqueued: 1, Dropped: 1}, metrics.AuditSnapshot())
+}
+
+func TestAtomicMetricsConcurrentObservationIsBoundedAndRaceSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	const observations = 4096
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for index := 0; index < observations; index++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(value int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			metrics.Observe(DecisionAllow, time.Duration(value%250)*time.Millisecond)
+		}(index)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	require.Equal(t, int64(observations), metrics.Snapshot().Total)
+	metrics.latencyMu.RLock()
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, len(metrics.latencies), latencySampleCapacity)
+	metrics.latencyMu.RUnlock()
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_module.go

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import "github.com/google/wire"
+
+var ProviderSet = wire.NewSet(
+	NewPostgreSQLRepository,
+	wire.Bind(new(JobRepository), new(*PostgreSQLRepository)),
+	wire.Bind(new(EventRepository), new(*PostgreSQLRepository)),
+	NewRedisPayloadStore,
+	wire.Bind(new(PayloadStore), new(*RedisPayloadStore)),
+	NewOpenAICompatibleScanner,
+	wire.Bind(new(PromptScanner), new(*OpenAICompatibleScanner)),
+	NewAtomicMetrics,
+	wire.Bind(new(Metrics), new(*AtomicMetrics)),
+	NewConfigManager,
+	wire.Bind(new(ConfigStore), new(*ConfigManager)),
+	NewPromptService,
+	wire.Bind(new(PromptEngine), new(*PromptService)),
+	wire.Bind(new(PromptAdminService), new(*PromptService)),
+	NewLegacyModerationAdapter,
+	NewCoordinator,
+	NewPromptAdminHandler,
+)

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	infraerrors "github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/pkg/errors"
+)
+
+const maxGuardResponseBytes int64 = 256 * 1024
+
+func NormalizeBaseURL(raw string) (string, error) {
+	raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
+	if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
+		return "", infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_base_url", "审计节点地址无效")
+	}
+	parsed.Scheme = strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
+	if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" {
+		return "", infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_base_url_scheme", "审计节点仅支持 HTTP(S)")
+	}
+	if parsed.User != nil || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" {
+		return "", infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_unsafe_base_url", "审计节点地址不能包含凭据、查询参数或片段")
+	}
+	host := strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Hostname())
+	if host == "" {
+		return "", infraerrors.BadRequest("prompt_audit_invalid_base_url", "审计节点地址无效")
+	}
+	path := strings.TrimRight(parsed.EscapedPath(), "/")
+	if strings.EqualFold(path, "/v1") {
+		path = ""
+	}
+	parsed.Path = path
+	parsed.RawPath = ""
+	return strings.TrimRight(parsed.String(), "/"), nil
+}
+
+func ChatCompletionsURL(base string) (string, error) {
+	normalized, err := NormalizeBaseURL(base)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return normalized + "/v1/chat/completions", nil
+}
+
+func ModelsURL(base string) (string, error) {
+	normalized, err := NormalizeBaseURL(base)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return normalized + "/v1/models", nil
+}
+
+func NewSecureHTTPClient(endpoint ActiveEndpoint) (*http.Client, error) {
+	_, err := NormalizeBaseURL(endpoint.BaseURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 3 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		// Do not inherit HTTP(S)_PROXY. A proxy would move the actual destination
+		// dial outside secureDialContext and bypass this module's DNS/IP validation.
+		Proxy:                 nil,
+		ForceAttemptHTTP2:     true,
+		MaxIdleConns:          64,
+		MaxIdleConnsPerHost:   16,
+		IdleConnTimeout:       90 * time.Second,
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   5 * time.Second,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: time.Duration(endpoint.TimeoutMS) * time.Millisecond,
+		ExpectContinueTimeout: time.Second,
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
+	}
+	// Endpoint ownership and destination trust are administrator concerns.
+	// Use the standard dialer so configured private, loopback, reserved, and
+	// DNS-resolved addresses are all reachable from the service environment.
+	transport.DialContext = dialer.DialContext
+	timeout := time.Duration(endpoint.TimeoutMS) * time.Millisecond
+	if timeout <= 0 {
+		timeout = DefaultTimeoutMS * time.Millisecond
+	}
+	return &http.Client{
+		Transport: transport,
+		Timeout:   timeout,
+	}, nil
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestNormalizeBaseURLAllowsAdministratorConfiguredDestinations(t *testing.T) {
+	allowed := []string{
+		"https://guard.example.com", "https://guard.example.com/v1", "http://guard.example.com",
+		"http://127.0.0.1:8080", "http://10.0.0.8:8080", "https://172.16.0.5",
+		"http://169.254.169.254", "https://metadata.google.internal", "https://192.0.2.1",
+		"http://internal-admin.local", "http://guard.local:8080",
+	}
+	for _, raw := range allowed {
+		_, err := NormalizeBaseURL(raw)
+		require.NoError(t, err, raw)
+	}
+	blocked := []string{
+		"ftp://guard.example.com", "https://user:pass@guard.example.com",
+		"https://guard.example.com?q=secret", "https://guard.example.com/#fragment",
+	}
+	for _, raw := range blocked {
+		_, err := NormalizeBaseURL(raw)
+		require.Error(t, err, raw)
+	}
+	url, err := ChatCompletionsURL("https://guard.example.com/v1")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "https://guard.example.com/v1/chat/completions", url)
+}
+
+func TestHTTPClientUsesDirectStandardDialer(t *testing.T) {
+	client, err := NewSecureHTTPClient(ActiveEndpoint{BaseURL: "https://guard.example.com", TimeoutMS: 1000})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	transport, ok := client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.Nil(t, transport.Proxy)
+	require.NotNil(t, transport.DialContext)
+}
+
+func TestOpenAICompatibleScannerRequestContract(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		require.Equal(t, "/v1/chat/completions", r.URL.Path)
+		require.Equal(t, "Bearer token", r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+		var payload map[string]any
+		require.NoError(t, json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&payload))
+		require.Equal(t, DefaultGuardModel, payload["model"])
+		require.Equal(t, float64(0), payload["temperature"])
+		require.Equal(t, float64(64), payload["max_tokens"])
+		require.Equal(t, float64(42), payload["seed"])
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"Safety: Safe\nCategories: None"}}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+	scanner := NewOpenAICompatibleScanner()
+	result, err := scanner.Scan(context.Background(), ActiveEndpoint{ID: "one", BaseURL: server.URL, Model: DefaultGuardModel, Token: "token", TimeoutMS: 1000}, "hello", AllScannerIDs)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, EventPass, result.Decision)
+}
+
+func TestOpenAICompatibleScannerFollowsRedirectAndRejectsOversize(t *testing.T) {
+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"Safety: Safe\nCategories: None"}}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer target.Close()
+	redirect := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL, http.StatusFound) }))
+	defer redirect.Close()
+	result, err := NewOpenAICompatibleScanner().Scan(context.Background(), ActiveEndpoint{ID: "redirect", BaseURL: redirect.URL, Model: DefaultGuardModel, TimeoutMS: 1000}, "hello", AllScannerIDs)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, EventPass, result.Decision)
+	oversize := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(strings.Repeat("x", int(maxGuardResponseBytes)+1)))
+	}))
+	defer oversize.Close()
+	_, err = NewOpenAICompatibleScanner().Scan(context.Background(), ActiveEndpoint{ID: "large", BaseURL: oversize.URL, Model: DefaultGuardModel, TimeoutMS: 1000}, "hello", AllScannerIDs)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestOpenAICompatibleScannerClassifiesHTTPConnectionAndTimeoutFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name      string
+		status    int
+		retryable bool
+	}{
+		{name: "authentication", status: http.StatusUnauthorized, retryable: false},
+		{name: "forbidden", status: http.StatusForbidden, retryable: false},
+		{name: "rate limited", status: http.StatusTooManyRequests, retryable: true},
+		{name: "server failure", status: http.StatusBadGateway, retryable: true},
+		{name: "other client error", status: http.StatusBadRequest, retryable: false},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				w.WriteHeader(tt.status)
+			}))
+			defer server.Close()
+			_, err := NewOpenAICompatibleScanner().Scan(context.Background(), ActiveEndpoint{ID: "status", BaseURL: server.URL, Model: DefaultGuardModel, TimeoutMS: 1000}, "hello", AllScannerIDs)
+			var guardErr *GuardError
+			require.ErrorAs(t, err, &guardErr)
+			require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, guardErr.Code)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.status, guardErr.HTTPStatus)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.retryable, guardErr.Retryable)
+			require.NotContains(t, err.Error(), server.URL)
+		})
+	}
+
+	closed := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}))
+	closedURL := closed.URL
+	closed.Close()
+	_, err := NewOpenAICompatibleScanner().Scan(context.Background(), ActiveEndpoint{ID: "closed", BaseURL: closedURL, Model: DefaultGuardModel, TimeoutMS: 100}, "hello", AllScannerIDs)
+	var connectionErr *GuardError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &connectionErr)
+	require.True(t, connectionErr.Retryable)
+
+	timeout := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer timeout.Close()
+	_, err = NewOpenAICompatibleScanner().Scan(context.Background(), ActiveEndpoint{ID: "timeout", BaseURL: timeout.URL, Model: DefaultGuardModel, TimeoutMS: 20}, "hello", AllScannerIDs)
+	var timeoutErr *GuardError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &timeoutErr)
+	require.True(t, timeoutErr.Retryable)
+	require.True(t, timeoutErr.Timeout)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditProbeModelsFallbackAndResponseSafety(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("models contains configured model", func(t *testing.T) {
+		var chatCalls atomic.Int64
+		server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			require.Equal(t, "Bearer temporary-token", r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+			if r.URL.Path == "/v1/models" {
+				_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"` + DefaultGuardModel + `"}]}`))
+				return
+			}
+			chatCalls.Add(1)
+		}))
+		defer server.Close()
+		result := newProbeTestService().Probe(context.Background(), ProbeRequest{Endpoint: probeEndpoint(server.URL, "temporary-token")})
+		require.True(t, result.OK)
+		require.True(t, result.TokenApplied)
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, result.HTTPStatus)
+		require.Zero(t, chatCalls.Load())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("invalid models response performs real guard fallback", func(t *testing.T) {
+		var chatCalls atomic.Int64
+		server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			if r.URL.Path == "/v1/models" {
+				_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"unexpected":true}`))
+				return
+			}
+			chatCalls.Add(1)
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"Safety: Safe\nCategories: None"}}]}`))
+		}))
+		defer server.Close()
+		result := newProbeTestService().Probe(context.Background(), ProbeRequest{Endpoint: probeEndpoint(server.URL, "temporary-token")})
+		require.True(t, result.OK)
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), chatCalls.Load())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("fallback authentication failure is stable", func(t *testing.T) {
+		server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			if r.URL.Path == "/v1/models" {
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+				return
+			}
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		}))
+		defer server.Close()
+		result := newProbeTestService().Probe(context.Background(), ProbeRequest{Endpoint: probeEndpoint(server.URL, "temporary-token")})
+		require.False(t, result.OK)
+		require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, result.ErrorCode)
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, result.HTTPStatus)
+		require.False(t, result.Retryable)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("oversized models response is rejected without fallback", func(t *testing.T) {
+		var chatCalls atomic.Int64
+		server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			if r.URL.Path != "/v1/models" {
+				chatCalls.Add(1)
+			}
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(strings.Repeat("x", int(maxGuardResponseBytes)+1)))
+		}))
+		defer server.Close()
+		result := newProbeTestService().Probe(context.Background(), ProbeRequest{Endpoint: probeEndpoint(server.URL, "temporary-token")})
+		require.False(t, result.OK)
+		require.Equal(t, "response_too_large", result.ErrorCode)
+		require.Zero(t, chatCalls.Load())
+	})
+}
+
+func TestResolveProbeEndpointReusesTokenOnlyForMatchingBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{}
+	manager.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{active: ActiveConfig{Endpoints: []ActiveEndpoint{{
+		ID: "guard-1", BaseURL: "https://guard.example.com", Token: "STORED_GUARD_TOKEN", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024, Enabled: true,
+	}}}})
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager}
+
+	matched, applied, err := service.resolveProbeEndpoint(UpdateEndpoint{
+		ID: "guard-1", BaseURL: "https://guard.example.com/v1", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, applied)
+	require.Equal(t, "STORED_GUARD_TOKEN", matched.Token)
+
+	mismatched, applied, err := service.resolveProbeEndpoint(UpdateEndpoint{
+		ID: "guard-1", BaseURL: "https://attacker.example.com", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, applied)
+	require.Empty(t, mismatched.Token)
+}
+
+func newProbeTestService() *PromptService {
+	return &PromptService{
+		config: &ConfigManager{}, scanner: NewOpenAICompatibleScanner(), clock: realClock{},
+		probes: map[string]ProbeResult{},
+	}
+}
+
+func probeEndpoint(baseURL, token string) UpdateEndpoint {
+	return UpdateEndpoint{
+		ID: "probe-one", Name: "Probe One", Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: baseURL,
+		Model: DefaultGuardModel, Token: token, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024, Enabled: true,
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_payload_store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
+)
+
+type PayloadStore interface {
+	Set(ctx context.Context, jobID int64, scanText string, ttl time.Duration) error
+	Get(ctx context.Context, jobID int64) (string, error)
+	Delete(ctx context.Context, jobID int64) error
+	Ping(ctx context.Context) error
+}
+
+type RedisPayloadStore struct {
+	client *redis.Client
+}
+
+func NewRedisPayloadStore(client *redis.Client) *RedisPayloadStore {
+	return &RedisPayloadStore{client: client}
+}
+
+func (s *RedisPayloadStore) Set(ctx context.Context, jobID int64, scanText string, ttl time.Duration) error {
+	if s == nil || s.client == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("prompt audit payload store unavailable")
+	}
+	if jobID <= 0 || scanText == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("prompt audit payload input invalid")
+	}
+	if ttl <= 0 || ttl > DefaultPayloadTTL {
+		ttl = DefaultPayloadTTL
+	}
+	return s.client.Set(ctx, payloadKey(jobID), scanText, ttl).Err()
+}
+
+func (s *RedisPayloadStore) Get(ctx context.Context, jobID int64) (string, error) {
+	if s == nil || s.client == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("prompt audit payload store unavailable")
+	}
+	return s.client.Get(ctx, payloadKey(jobID)).Result()
+}
+
+func (s *RedisPayloadStore) Delete(ctx context.Context, jobID int64) error {
+	if s == nil || s.client == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("prompt audit payload store unavailable")
+	}
+	return s.client.Del(ctx, payloadKey(jobID)).Err()
+}
+
+func (s *RedisPayloadStore) Ping(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if s == nil || s.client == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("prompt audit payload store unavailable")
+	}
+	return s.client.Ping(ctx).Err()
+}
+
+func payloadKey(jobID int64) string {
+	return PayloadKeyPrefix + strconv.FormatInt(jobID, 10)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_payload_store_integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestRedisPayloadStoreRoundTripTTLNamespaceAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
+	address := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(promptAuditRedisTestEnv))
+	if address == "" {
+		t.Skip(promptAuditRedisTestEnv + " is not set")
+	}
+	client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: address})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, client.Close()) })
+	store := NewRedisPayloadStore(client)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	const jobID int64 = 987654321
+	const canary = "PROMPT_CANARY_REDIS_ONLY_PAYLOAD"
+	_ = store.Delete(ctx, jobID)
+	require.NoError(t, store.Set(ctx, jobID, canary, 2*DefaultPayloadTTL))
+	require.Equal(t, PayloadKeyPrefix+"987654321", payloadKey(jobID))
+	value, err := store.Get(ctx, jobID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, canary, value)
+	ttl, err := client.TTL(ctx, payloadKey(jobID)).Result()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Greater(t, ttl, time.Duration(0))
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, ttl, DefaultPayloadTTL)
+	require.NoError(t, store.Delete(ctx, jobID))
+	_, err = store.Get(ctx, jobID)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, redis.Nil)
+}
+
+func TestPromptRuntimeAggregatesConfigWorkersQueueRedisEndpointsAndGuardMetrics(t *testing.T) {
+	address := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(promptAuditRedisTestEnv))
+	if address == "" {
+		t.Skip(promptAuditRedisTestEnv + " is not set")
+	}
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	client := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: address})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, client.Close()) })
+
+	config := &fakeConfigStore{active: true, cfg: ActiveConfig{
+		RiskControlEnabled: true, Enabled: true, WorkerCount: 3, QueueCapacity: 123,
+		ConfigVersion: 9, AllGroups: true,
+	}}
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	metrics.Observe(DecisionBlock, 25*time.Millisecond)
+	metrics.IncFailover()
+	metrics.IncEnqueued()
+	metrics.IncDropped()
+	service := NewPromptService(
+		config,
+		NewPostgreSQLRepository(db),
+		NewRedisPayloadStore(client),
+		NewOpenAICompatibleScanner(),
+		metrics,
+	)
+	service.probes["guard-1"] = ProbeResult{OK: true, Status: "healthy", HTTPStatus: 200}
+
+	runtime := service.Runtime(context.Background())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeAsync, runtime.EffectiveMode)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(9), runtime.ExpectedConfigVersion)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(9), runtime.ActiveConfigVersion)
+	require.Equal(t, 3, runtime.WorkerTotal)
+	require.Equal(t, 123, runtime.QueueCapacity)
+	require.Equal(t, "ok", runtime.DatabaseStatus)
+	require.Equal(t, "ok", runtime.RedisStatus)
+	require.Contains(t, runtime.Endpoints, "guard-1")
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), runtime.GuardMetrics.Total)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), runtime.GuardMetrics.Blocked)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), runtime.GuardMetrics.Failovers)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(25), runtime.GuardMetrics.LatencyP95MS)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), runtime.EnqueuedTotal)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), runtime.DroppedTotal)
+	// The runner has not been started in this integration test, so the honest
+	// process status is degraded rather than a fabricated running heartbeat.
+	require.Equal(t, "degraded", runtime.ProcessStatus)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_qwen3guard.go

@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type ScannerDefinition struct {
+	ID          string `json:"id"`
+	Label       string `json:"label"`
+	LabelZH     string `json:"label_zh"`
+	Description string `json:"description"`
+}
+
+var AllScannerIDs = []string{
+	"violent",
+	"non_violent_illegal_acts",
+	"sexual_content_or_sexual_acts",
+	"pii",
+	"suicide_and_self_harm",
+	"unethical_acts",
+	"politically_sensitive_topics",
+	"copyright_violation",
+	"jailbreak",
+}
+
+var ScannerCatalog = map[string]ScannerDefinition{
+	"violent":                       {ID: "violent", Label: "Violent", LabelZH: "暴力", Description: "Violence or threats of violence"},
+	"non_violent_illegal_acts":      {ID: "non_violent_illegal_acts", Label: "Non-violent Illegal Acts", LabelZH: "非暴力违法行为", Description: "Non-violent illegal activity"},
+	"sexual_content_or_sexual_acts": {ID: "sexual_content_or_sexual_acts", Label: "Sexual Content or Sexual Acts", LabelZH: "性内容或性行为", Description: "Sexual content or sexual acts"},
+	"pii":                           {ID: "pii", Label: "PII", LabelZH: "个人敏感信息", Description: "Personal identifying information"},
+	"suicide_and_self_harm":         {ID: "suicide_and_self_harm", Label: "Suicide & Self-Harm", LabelZH: "自杀与自残", Description: "Suicide or self-harm"},
+	"unethical_acts":                {ID: "unethical_acts", Label: "Unethical Acts", LabelZH: "不道德行为", Description: "Unethical behavior"},
+	"politically_sensitive_topics":  {ID: "politically_sensitive_topics", Label: "Politically Sensitive Topics", LabelZH: "政治敏感话题", Description: "Politically sensitive topics"},
+	"copyright_violation":           {ID: "copyright_violation", Label: "Copyright Violation", LabelZH: "版权侵权", Description: "Copyright infringement"},
+	"jailbreak":                     {ID: "jailbreak", Label: "Jailbreak", LabelZH: "越狱攻击", Description: "Prompt injection or jailbreak attempt"},
+}
+
+var categoryAliases = map[string]string{
+	"violent": "violent", "violence": "violent",
+	"non violent illegal acts": "non_violent_illegal_acts", "non-violent illegal acts": "non_violent_illegal_acts",
+	"sexual content or sexual acts": "sexual_content_or_sexual_acts", "sexual": "sexual_content_or_sexual_acts",
+	"pii": "pii", "personal identifying information": "pii", "personal identifiable information": "pii",
+	"suicide self harm": "suicide_and_self_harm", "suicide and self harm": "suicide_and_self_harm", "suicide & self-harm": "suicide_and_self_harm",
+	"unethical acts": "unethical_acts", "unethical": "unethical_acts",
+	"politically sensitive topics": "politically_sensitive_topics", "political": "politically_sensitive_topics",
+	"copyright violation": "copyright_violation", "copyright": "copyright_violation",
+	"jailbreak": "jailbreak", "prompt injection": "jailbreak",
+}
+
+type GuardError struct {
+	Code       string
+	HTTPStatus int
+	Retryable  bool
+	Timeout    bool
+	Cause      error
+}
+
+func (e *GuardError) Error() string {
+	if e == nil {
+		return "<nil>"
+	}
+	return e.Code
+}
+
+func (e *GuardError) Unwrap() error { return e.Cause }
+
+func NormalizeCategory(value string) string {
+	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(value))
+	normalized = strings.NewReplacer("_", " ", "&", " and ", "/", " ", "-", " ", "–", " ", "—", " ").Replace(normalized)
+	normalized = strings.Join(strings.Fields(normalized), " ")
+	if canonical, ok := categoryAliases[normalized]; ok {
+		return canonical
+	}
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(normalized, " ", "_")
+}
+
+func ParseQwen3Guard(content string, enabledScanners []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	var safety string
+	var categoryLine string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(strings.ReplaceAll(content, "\r\n", "\n"), "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if line == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		lower := strings.ToLower(line)
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "safety:"):
+			if safety != "" {
+				return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+			}
+			safety = strings.TrimSpace(line[len("safety:"):])
+		case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "categories:"):
+			if categoryLine != "" {
+				return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+			}
+			categoryLine = strings.TrimSpace(line[len("categories:"):])
+		default:
+			// Auxiliary Guard fields, such as Refusal, do not affect audit decisions.
+		}
+	}
+	switch strings.ToLower(safety) {
+	case "safe":
+		safety = "Safe"
+	case "controversial":
+		safety = "Controversial"
+	case "unsafe":
+		safety = "Unsafe"
+	default:
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+	}
+	if categoryLine == "" {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+	}
+	enabled := make(map[string]struct{}, len(enabledScanners))
+	for _, scanner := range enabledScanners {
+		enabled[NormalizeCategory(scanner)] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	known := map[string]struct{}{}
+	unknown := map[string]struct{}{}
+	for _, raw := range strings.Split(categoryLine, ",") {
+		raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+		if raw == "" || strings.EqualFold(raw, "none") || strings.EqualFold(raw, "n/a") {
+			continue
+		}
+		category := NormalizeCategory(raw)
+		if _, ok := ScannerCatalog[category]; ok {
+			known[category] = struct{}{}
+		} else {
+			unknown[unknownCategoryID(category)] = struct{}{}
+		}
+	}
+	knownList := orderedScannerKeys(known)
+	unknownList := sortedKeys(unknown)
+	matched := make([]string, 0, len(knownList))
+	for _, category := range knownList {
+		if _, ok := enabled[category]; ok {
+			matched = append(matched, category)
+		}
+	}
+	result := &NormalizedResult{
+		Safety: safety, Categories: knownList, MatchedScanners: matched, UnknownCategories: unknownList,
+		ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{},
+		ScannerBackend: "qwen3guard-openai", ScannerVersion: "qwen3guard",
+		PolicyID: "priority", PolicyVersion: 1,
+		Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow,
+	}
+	score := 0.0
+	if safety == "Controversial" {
+		score = 0.5
+		result.Decision, result.RiskLevel, result.Action = EventFlag, RiskMedium, ActionWarn
+	}
+	if safety == "Unsafe" {
+		score = 1
+		if len(matched) > 0 || len(unknownList) > 0 || len(knownList) == 0 {
+			result.Decision, result.RiskLevel, result.Action = EventCritical, RiskCritical, ActionBlock
+		} else {
+			result.Decision, result.RiskLevel, result.Action = EventFlag, RiskHigh, ActionWarn
+		}
+	}
+	for _, category := range matched {
+		result.ScannerScores[category] = score
+		result.ScannerEvidence[category] = ScannerCatalog[category].Label
+		if safety == "Controversial" && isElevatedControversial(category) {
+			result.Decision, result.RiskLevel, result.Action = EventCritical, RiskCritical, ActionBlock
+		}
+	}
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+func unknownCategoryID(value string) string {
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(value))))
+	return fmt.Sprintf("unknown:%x", digest[:8])
+}
+
+func isElevatedControversial(category string) bool {
+	return category == "jailbreak" || category == "pii" || category == "suicide_and_self_harm"
+}
+
+type OpenAICompatibleScanner struct {
+	clients sync.Map
+}
+
+func NewOpenAICompatibleScanner() *OpenAICompatibleScanner { return &OpenAICompatibleScanner{} }
+
+func (s *OpenAICompatibleScanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, enabledScanners []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	client, err := s.clientFor(endpoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Cause: err}
+	}
+	requestURL, err := ChatCompletionsURL(endpoint.BaseURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Cause: err}
+	}
+	payload := map[string]any{
+		"model":       endpoint.Model,
+		"messages":    []map[string]string{{"role": "user", "content": chunk}},
+		"temperature": 0,
+		"max_tokens":  64,
+		"seed":        42,
+	}
+	body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Cause: err}
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, requestURL, bytes.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Cause: err}
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	if endpoint.Token != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+endpoint.Token)
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		timeout := errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded)
+		var netErr net.Error
+		if errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout() {
+			timeout = true
+		}
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Timeout: timeout, Cause: err}
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		retryable := resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests || resp.StatusCode >= 500
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, HTTPStatus: resp.StatusCode, Retryable: retryable}
+	}
+	limited := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxGuardResponseBytes+1)
+	responseBody, err := io.ReadAll(limited)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Cause: err}
+	}
+	if int64(len(responseBody)) > maxGuardResponseBytes {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+	}
+	content, err := extractOpenAIContent(responseBody)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Cause: err}
+	}
+	result, err := ParseQwen3Guard(content, enabledScanners)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	result.GuardEndpointID = endpoint.ID
+	result.ScannerVersion = endpoint.Model
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+func (s *OpenAICompatibleScanner) clientFor(endpoint ActiveEndpoint) (*http.Client, error) {
+	key := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%d", endpoint.ID, endpoint.BaseURL, endpoint.TimeoutMS)
+	if cached, ok := s.clients.Load(key); ok {
+		client, valid := cached.(*http.Client)
+		if !valid {
+			s.clients.Delete(key)
+			return nil, errors.New("prompt guard client cache invalid")
+		}
+		return client, nil
+	}
+	client, err := NewSecureHTTPClient(endpoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	actual, _ := s.clients.LoadOrStore(key, client)
+	actualClient, ok := actual.(*http.Client)
+	if !ok {
+		s.clients.Delete(key)
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt guard client cache invalid")
+	}
+	return actualClient, nil
+}
+
+func extractOpenAIContent(body []byte) (string, error) {
+	var response struct {
+		Choices []struct {
+			Message struct {
+				Content any `json:"content"`
+			} `json:"message"`
+		} `json:"choices"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &response); err != nil || len(response.Choices) == 0 {
+		return "", errors.New("prompt guard response envelope invalid")
+	}
+	content := response.Choices[0].Message.Content
+	switch typed := content.(type) {
+	case string:
+		if strings.TrimSpace(typed) == "" {
+			return "", errors.New("prompt guard response content empty")
+		}
+		return typed, nil
+	case []any:
+		parts := make([]string, 0, len(typed))
+		for _, item := range typed {
+			object, ok := item.(map[string]any)
+			if !ok {
+				continue
+			}
+			if text, ok := object["text"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(text) != "" {
+				parts = append(parts, text)
+			}
+		}
+		if len(parts) == 0 {
+			return "", errors.New("prompt guard response content empty")
+		}
+		return strings.Join(parts, "\n"), nil
+	default:
+		return "", errors.New("prompt guard response content invalid")
+	}
+}
+
+func ScannerDefinitions() []ScannerDefinition {
+	result := make([]ScannerDefinition, 0, len(AllScannerIDs))
+	for _, id := range AllScannerIDs {
+		result = append(result, ScannerCatalog[id])
+	}
+	sort.SliceStable(result, func(i, j int) bool { return i < j })
+	return result
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_qwen3guard_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestParseQwen3GuardStrictAndPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name, output string
+		enabled      []string
+		decision     EventDecision
+		action       Action
+		wantErr      bool
+	}{
+		{"safe", "Safety: Safe\nCategories: None", AllScannerIDs, EventPass, ActionAllow, false},
+		{"controversial", "Safety: Controversial\nCategories: Violent", AllScannerIDs, EventFlag, ActionWarn, false},
+		{"controversial pii escalates", "Safety: Controversial\nCategories: PII", AllScannerIDs, EventCritical, ActionBlock, false},
+		{"unsafe", "Safety: Unsafe\nCategories: Jailbreak", AllScannerIDs, EventCritical, ActionBlock, false},
+		{"unknown unsafe", "Safety: Unsafe\nCategories: Future Risk", AllScannerIDs, EventCritical, ActionBlock, false},
+		{"disabled unsafe warns", "Safety: Unsafe\nCategories: Violent", []string{"PII"}, EventFlag, ActionWarn, false},
+		{"extra explanation", "Safety: Safe\nCategories: None\nThis is safe", AllScannerIDs, EventPass, ActionAllow, false},
+		{"duplicate", "Safety: Safe\nSafety: Safe", AllScannerIDs, "", "", true},
+		{"duplicate categories", "Safety: Safe\nCategories: None\nCategories: PII", AllScannerIDs, "", "", true},
+		{"missing categories", "Safety: Safe\n", AllScannerIDs, "", "", true},
+		{"unknown safety", "Safety: Maybe\nCategories: PII", AllScannerIDs, "", "", true},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result, err := ParseQwen3Guard(tt.output, tt.enabled)
+			if tt.wantErr {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				return
+			}
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.decision, result.Decision)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.action, result.Action)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseQwen3GuardIgnoresAuxiliaryResponseFields(t *testing.T) {
+	result, err := ParseQwen3Guard("Safety: Unsafe\nCategories: Jailbreak\nRefusal: No", AllScannerIDs)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "Unsafe", result.Safety)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"jailbreak"}, result.Categories)
+
+	serialized, err := json.Marshal(result)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, string(serialized), "Refusal")
+	require.NotContains(t, string(serialized), "No")
+}
+
+func TestQwen3GuardOfficialCategoriesAliasesAndUnknownAreStable(t *testing.T) {
+	official := "Violent, Non-violent Illegal Acts, Sexual Content or Sexual Acts, PII, Suicide & Self-Harm, Unethical Acts, Politically Sensitive Topics, Copyright Violation, Jailbreak"
+	result, err := ParseQwen3Guard("Safety: Unsafe\nCategories: "+official, AllScannerIDs)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, AllScannerIDs, result.MatchedScanners)
+	require.Empty(t, result.UnknownCategories)
+	require.Equal(t, "priority", result.PolicyID)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, result.PolicyVersion)
+
+	aliases := map[string]string{
+		"violence": "violent", "non_violent_illegal_acts": "non_violent_illegal_acts",
+		"sexual": "sexual_content_or_sexual_acts", "personal identifiable information": "pii",
+		"suicide/self harm": "suicide_and_self_harm", "unethical": "unethical_acts",
+		"political": "politically_sensitive_topics", "copyright": "copyright_violation",
+		"prompt injection": "jailbreak",
+	}
+	for alias, canonical := range aliases {
+		require.Equal(t, canonical, NormalizeCategory(alias), alias)
+	}
+
+	const canary = "PROMPT_CANARY_RAW_UNKNOWN_CATEGORY"
+	unknown, err := ParseQwen3Guard("Safety: Unsafe\nCategories: "+canary, AllScannerIDs)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, unknown.UnknownCategories, 1)
+	require.NotContains(t, unknown.UnknownCategories[0], "canary")
+	require.NotContains(t, unknown.UnknownCategories[0], "raw")
+	require.Contains(t, unknown.UnknownCategories[0], "unknown:")
+}
+
+func TestExtractOpenAIContentSupportsStringAndTextBlocks(t *testing.T) {
+	content, err := extractOpenAIContent([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"Safety: Safe\nCategories: None"}}]}`))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "Safety: Safe\nCategories: None", content)
+	content, err = extractOpenAIContent([]byte(`{"choices":[{"message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"Safety: Safe"},{"type":"text","text":"Categories: None"}]}}]}`))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "Safety: Safe\nCategories: None", content)
+	for _, body := range []string{`{}`, `{"choices":[]}`, `{"choices":[{"message":{"content":null}}]}`} {
+		_, err := extractOpenAIContent([]byte(body))
+		require.Error(t, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAggregateRequiresEveryResult(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := AggregateResults([]*NormalizedResult{{Decision: EventPass, Action: ActionAllow}, nil}, 0)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	result, err := AggregateResults([]*NormalizedResult{
+		{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, Categories: []string{"pii"}},
+		{Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock, Categories: []string{"jailbreak"}},
+	}, 0)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, EventCritical, result.Decision)
+	require.Equal(t, ActionBlock, result.Action)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"pii", "jailbreak"}, result.Categories)
+}
+
+func TestAggregateDeduplicatesFactsAndUsesMostSevereEndpointMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	result, err := AggregateResults([]*NormalizedResult{
+		{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, Safety: "Safe", Categories: []string{"pii"}, MatchedScanners: []string{"pii"}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"pii": 0}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{"pii": "first"}, GuardEndpointID: "safe-node", ScannerVersion: "safe-version", PolicyID: "priority", PolicyVersion: 1},
+		{Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock, Safety: "Unsafe", Categories: []string{"pii", "jailbreak"}, MatchedScanners: []string{"pii", "jailbreak"}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"pii": 1, "jailbreak": 1}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{"pii": "second", "jailbreak": "blocked"}, GuardEndpointID: "block-node", ScannerVersion: "block-version", PolicyID: "priority", PolicyVersion: 2},
+	}, 7*time.Millisecond)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"pii", "jailbreak"}, result.Categories)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"pii", "jailbreak"}, result.MatchedScanners)
+	require.Equal(t, "first", result.ScannerEvidence["pii"], "evidence is deterministically first-seen")
+	require.Equal(t, "block-node", result.GuardEndpointID)
+	require.Equal(t, "block-version", result.ScannerVersion)
+	require.Equal(t, 2, result.PolicyVersion)
+	require.Equal(t, 7, result.LatencyMS)
+}
+
+func TestIssueSummariesAreDeterministicRedactedDerivedDTOs(t *testing.T) {
+	const canary = "PROMPT_CANARY_EVIDENCE_SECRET"
+	result := NormalizedResult{
+		Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock,
+		Categories: []string{"jailbreak", "pii"}, MatchedScanners: []string{"pii"},
+		ScannerScores: map[string]float64{"pii": 1}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{"pii": canary},
+		UnknownCategories: []string{unknownCategoryID("future risk")},
+	}
+	summaries := BuildIssueSummaries(result)
+	require.Len(t, summaries, 3, "known categories are not hidden merely because policy disabled one")
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(summaries)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, string(raw), canary)
+	for _, summary := range summaries {
+		require.NotEmpty(t, summary.Title)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, summary.Description)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, summary.Code)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, summary.EvidenceHash)
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_repository.go

@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	promptAuditAdmissionLockKey int64 = 579147893221901921
+	promptAuditConfigLockKey    int64 = 579147893221901922
+)
+
+var (
+	ErrQueueFull          = errors.New("prompt audit queue full")
+	ErrQueueAdmissionBusy = errors.New("prompt audit queue admission busy")
+	ErrLeaseLost          = errors.New("prompt audit worker lease lost")
+	ErrEventNotFound      = errors.New("prompt audit event not found")
+)
+
+type Job struct {
+	ID                  int64
+	Snapshot            PromptSnapshot
+	ExecutionMode       Mode
+	ConfigVersion       int64
+	Status              string
+	Attempts            int
+	MaxAttempts         int
+	ClaimVersion        int64
+	NextAttemptAt       time.Time
+	ProcessingStartedAt *time.Time
+	ProcessedAt         *time.Time
+	LastErrorCode       string
+	LastErrorMessage    string
+	CreatedAt           time.Time
+	UpdatedAt           time.Time
+}
+
+type Event struct {
+	ID              int64              `json:"id"`
+	JobID           int64              `json:"job_id"`
+	Snapshot        PromptSnapshot     `json:"snapshot"`
+	Decision        EventDecision      `json:"decision"`
+	RiskLevel       RiskLevel          `json:"risk_level"`
+	Action          Action             `json:"action"`
+	Categories      []string           `json:"categories"`
+	MatchedScanners []string           `json:"matched_scanners"`
+	ScannerScores   map[string]float64 `json:"scanner_scores"`
+	ScannerEvidence map[string]string  `json:"scanner_evidence"`
+	ScannerBackend  string             `json:"scanner_backend"`
+	ScannerVersion  string             `json:"scanner_version"`
+	GuardEndpointID string             `json:"guard_endpoint_id"`
+	PolicyID        string             `json:"policy_id"`
+	PolicyVersion   int                `json:"policy_version"`
+	ConfigVersion   int64              `json:"config_version"`
+	ChunkTotal      int                `json:"chunk_total"`
+	LatencyMS       int                `json:"latency_ms"`
+	IssueSummaries  []IssueSummary     `json:"issue_summaries"`
+	CreatedAt       time.Time          `json:"created_at"`
+}
+
+type JobRepository interface {
+	CreateStagingWithCapacity(ctx context.Context, snapshot PromptSnapshot, configVersion int64, maxAttempts, capacity int) (*Job, error)
+	PublishQueued(ctx context.Context, jobID int64) error
+	MarkStagingFailed(ctx context.Context, jobID int64, code, message string) error
+	ClaimNextJob(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) (*Job, bool, error)
+	RefreshLease(ctx context.Context, jobID, claimVersion int64, now time.Time) error
+	Complete(ctx context.Context, job *Job, result *NormalizedResult, storePassEvents bool) (*Event, error)
+	Retry(ctx context.Context, jobID, claimVersion int64, next time.Time, code, message string) error
+	Fail(ctx context.Context, jobID, claimVersion int64, code, message string) error
+	ReclaimStale(ctx context.Context, stagingBefore, processingBefore time.Time, limit int) (int64, error)
+	QueueStats(ctx context.Context) (QueueStats, error)
+	RecordBlocking(ctx context.Context, snapshot PromptSnapshot, configVersion int64, result *NormalizedResult, storePassEvents bool) (*Event, error)
+}
+
+type PostgreSQLRepository struct {
+	db    *sql.DB
+	clock Clock
+}
+
+func NewPostgreSQLRepository(db *sql.DB) *PostgreSQLRepository {
+	return &PostgreSQLRepository{db: db, clock: realClock{}}
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) CreateStagingWithCapacity(ctx context.Context, snapshot PromptSnapshot, configVersion int64, maxAttempts, capacity int) (*Job, error) {
+	if r == nil || r.db == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit database unavailable")
+	}
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, &sql.TxOptions{Isolation: sql.LevelReadCommitted})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	var locked bool
+	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT pg_try_advisory_xact_lock($1)`, promptAuditAdmissionLockKey).Scan(&locked); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !locked {
+		return nil, ErrQueueAdmissionBusy
+	}
+	var active int
+	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT COUNT(*) FROM prompt_audit_jobs
+		WHERE status IN ('staging','queued','processing','retry')`).Scan(&active); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if capacity <= 0 || active >= capacity {
+		return nil, ErrQueueFull
+	}
+	if maxAttempts <= 0 {
+		maxAttempts = 3
+	}
+	job, err := insertJob(ctx, tx, snapshot.Redacted(), ModeAsync, configVersion, "staging", maxAttempts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return job, nil
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) PublishQueued(ctx context.Context, jobID int64) error {
+	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs SET status='queued', next_attempt_at=NOW(), updated_at=NOW()
+		WHERE id=$1 AND status='staging'`, jobID)
+	return requireOneRow(result, err, ErrLeaseLost)
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) MarkStagingFailed(ctx context.Context, jobID int64, code, _ string) error {
+	code, message := sanitizeStoredError(code)
+	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs
+		SET status='failed', processed_at=NOW(), updated_at=NOW(), last_error_code=$2, last_error_message=$3
+		WHERE id=$1 AND status='staging'`, jobID, code, message)
+	return requireOneRow(result, err, ErrLeaseLost)
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) ClaimNextJob(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) (*Job, bool, error) {
+	row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		WITH candidate AS (
+			SELECT id FROM prompt_audit_jobs
+			WHERE status IN ('queued','retry') AND next_attempt_at <= $1
+			ORDER BY next_attempt_at, id
+			FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
+			LIMIT 1
+		)
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs AS j
+		SET status='processing', attempts=j.attempts+1, claim_version=j.claim_version+1,
+			processing_started_at=$1, updated_at=$1
+		FROM candidate
+		WHERE j.id=candidate.id
+		RETURNING `+jobColumns("j"), now.UTC())
+	job, err := scanJob(row)
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return nil, false, nil
+	}
+	return job, err == nil, err
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) RefreshLease(ctx context.Context, jobID, claimVersion int64, now time.Time) error {
+	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs SET processing_started_at=$3, updated_at=$3
+		WHERE id=$1 AND status='processing' AND claim_version=$2`, jobID, claimVersion, now.UTC())
+	return requireOneRow(result, err, ErrLeaseLost)
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) Complete(ctx context.Context, job *Job, result *NormalizedResult, storePassEvents bool) (*Event, error) {
+	if job == nil || result == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit completion requires job and result")
+	}
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	updateResult, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs SET status='done', processed_at=NOW(), updated_at=NOW(),
+			last_error_code='', last_error_message=''
+		WHERE id=$1 AND status='processing' AND claim_version=$2`, job.ID, job.ClaimVersion)
+	if err := requireOneRow(updateResult, err, ErrLeaseLost); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var event *Event
+	if shouldStorePromptAuditEvent(result.Decision, storePassEvents) {
+		event, err = insertEvent(ctx, tx, job.ID, job.Snapshot.Redacted(), job.ConfigVersion, result)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return event, nil
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) Retry(ctx context.Context, jobID, claimVersion int64, next time.Time, code, _ string) error {
+	code, message := sanitizeStoredError(code)
+	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs SET status='retry', next_attempt_at=$3, processing_started_at=NULL,
+			updated_at=NOW(), last_error_code=$4, last_error_message=$5
+		WHERE id=$1 AND status='processing' AND claim_version=$2`,
+		jobID, claimVersion, next.UTC(), code, message)
+	return requireOneRow(result, err, ErrLeaseLost)
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) Fail(ctx context.Context, jobID, claimVersion int64, code, _ string) error {
+	code, message := sanitizeStoredError(code)
+	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs SET status='failed', processed_at=NOW(), processing_started_at=NULL,
+			updated_at=NOW(), last_error_code=$3, last_error_message=$4
+		WHERE id=$1 AND status='processing' AND claim_version=$2`,
+		jobID, claimVersion, code, message)
+	return requireOneRow(result, err, ErrLeaseLost)
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) ReclaimStale(ctx context.Context, stagingBefore, processingBefore time.Time, limit int) (int64, error) {
+	if limit <= 0 || limit > 1000 {
+		limit = 100
+	}
+	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		WITH stale AS (
+			SELECT id FROM prompt_audit_jobs
+			WHERE (status='staging' AND updated_at < $1)
+			   OR (status='processing' AND processing_started_at < $2)
+			ORDER BY updated_at, id FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED LIMIT $3
+		)
+		UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs AS j
+		SET status=CASE
+			WHEN j.status='staging' THEN 'failed'
+			WHEN j.attempts < j.max_attempts THEN 'retry'
+			ELSE 'failed' END,
+			next_attempt_at=CASE WHEN j.status='processing' AND j.attempts < j.max_attempts THEN NOW() ELSE j.next_attempt_at END,
+			processing_started_at=NULL,
+			processed_at=CASE WHEN j.status='staging' OR j.attempts >= j.max_attempts THEN NOW() ELSE NULL END,
+			last_error_code=CASE WHEN j.status='staging' THEN 'staging_timeout' ELSE 'processing_lease_expired' END,
+			last_error_message='', updated_at=NOW()
+		FROM stale WHERE j.id=stale.id`, stagingBefore.UTC(), processingBefore.UTC(), limit)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return result.RowsAffected()
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) QueueStats(ctx context.Context) (QueueStats, error) {
+	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT status, COUNT(*) FROM prompt_audit_jobs GROUP BY status`)
+	if err != nil {
+		return QueueStats{}, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+	var stats QueueStats
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var status string
+		var count int64
+		if err := rows.Scan(&status, &count); err != nil {
+			return QueueStats{}, err
+		}
+		switch status {
+		case "staging":
+			stats.Staging = count
+		case "queued":
+			stats.Queued = count
+		case "processing":
+			stats.Processing = count
+		case "retry":
+			stats.Retry = count
+		case "done":
+			stats.Done = count
+		case "failed":
+			stats.Failed = count
+		}
+	}
+	stats.Active = stats.Staging + stats.Queued + stats.Processing + stats.Retry
+	return stats, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func (r *PostgreSQLRepository) RecordBlocking(ctx context.Context, snapshot PromptSnapshot, configVersion int64, result *NormalizedResult, storePassEvents bool) (*Event, error) {
+	if result == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt guard result required")
+	}
+	tx, err := r.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+	job, err := insertJob(ctx, tx, snapshot.Redacted(), ModeBlocking, configVersion, "done", 1)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var event *Event
+	if shouldStorePromptAuditEvent(result.Decision, storePassEvents) {
+		event, err = insertEvent(ctx, tx, job.ID, snapshot.Redacted(), configVersion, result)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return event, nil
+}
+
+// shouldStorePromptAuditEvent keeps store_pass_events scoped to safe results.
+// Risk events are always persisted while prompt auditing itself is enabled.
+func shouldStorePromptAuditEvent(decision EventDecision, storePassEvents bool) bool {
+	return decision != EventPass || storePassEvents
+}
+
+type sqlQueryer interface {
+	QueryRowContext(context.Context, string, ...any) *sql.Row
+}
+
+func insertJob(ctx context.Context, queryer sqlQueryer, snapshot PromptSnapshot, mode Mode, configVersion int64, status string, maxAttempts int) (*Job, error) {
+	processedExpr := "NULL"
+	if status == "done" || status == "failed" {
+		processedExpr = "NOW()"
+	}
+	row := queryer.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO prompt_audit_jobs (
+			request_id,user_id,username_snapshot,user_email_snapshot,api_key_id,api_key_name_snapshot,
+			group_id,group_name,provider,endpoint,protocol,model,prompt_hash,redacted_preview,
+			prompt_length,message_count,stage,execution_mode,config_version,status,max_attempts,processed_at
+		) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11,$12,$13,$14,$15,$16,$17,$18,$19,$20,$21,`+processedExpr+`)
+		RETURNING `+jobColumns("prompt_audit_jobs"),
+		snapshot.RequestID, nullableID(snapshot.UserID), snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot,
+		nullableID(snapshot.APIKeyID), snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot, snapshot.GroupID, snapshot.GroupName,
+		snapshot.Provider, snapshot.Endpoint, snapshot.Protocol, snapshot.Model, snapshot.PromptHash,
+		snapshot.RedactedPreview, snapshot.PromptLength, snapshot.MessageCount, normalizeStage(snapshot.Stage),
+		string(mode), configVersion, status, maxAttempts)
+	return scanJob(row)
+}
+
+func insertEvent(ctx context.Context, queryer sqlQueryer, jobID int64, snapshot PromptSnapshot, configVersion int64, result *NormalizedResult) (*Event, error) {
+	categories, _ := json.Marshal(result.Categories)
+	matched, _ := json.Marshal(result.MatchedScanners)
+	scores, _ := json.Marshal(result.ScannerScores)
+	evidence := make(map[string]string, len(result.ScannerEvidence))
+	for key, value := range result.ScannerEvidence {
+		evidence[key] = RedactPreview(value, 160)
+	}
+	evidenceJSON, _ := json.Marshal(evidence)
+	row := queryer.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO prompt_audit_events (
+			job_id,request_id,user_id,username_snapshot,user_email_snapshot,api_key_id,api_key_name_snapshot,
+			group_id,group_name,provider,endpoint,protocol,model,prompt_hash,redacted_preview,stage,
+			decision,risk_level,action,categories,matched_scanners,scanner_scores,scanner_evidence,
+			scanner_backend,scanner_version,guard_endpoint_id,policy_id,policy_version,config_version,chunk_total,latency_ms,
+			full_prompt
+		) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11,$12,$13,$14,$15,$16,$17,$18,$19,
+			$20::jsonb,$21::jsonb,$22::jsonb,$23::jsonb,$24,$25,$26,$27,$28,$29,$30,$31,$32)
+		RETURNING `+eventDetailColumns("prompt_audit_events"),
+		jobID, snapshot.RequestID, nullableID(snapshot.UserID), snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot,
+		nullableID(snapshot.APIKeyID), snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot, snapshot.GroupID, snapshot.GroupName,
+		snapshot.Provider, snapshot.Endpoint, snapshot.Protocol, snapshot.Model, snapshot.PromptHash,
+		snapshot.RedactedPreview, normalizeStage(snapshot.Stage), string(result.Decision), string(result.RiskLevel),
+		string(result.Action), categories, matched, scores, evidenceJSON, result.ScannerBackend, result.ScannerVersion,
+		result.GuardEndpointID, result.PolicyID, result.PolicyVersion, configVersion, result.ChunkTotal, result.LatencyMS,
+		snapshot.FullPrompt)
+	return scanEvent(row, true)
+}
+
+type rowScanner interface{ Scan(...any) error }
+
+func scanJob(row rowScanner) (*Job, error) {
+	job := &Job{}
+	var userID, apiKeyID, groupID sql.NullInt64
+	var processingStarted, processed sql.NullTime
+	err := row.Scan(
+		&job.ID, &job.Snapshot.RequestID, &userID, &job.Snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, &job.Snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot,
+		&apiKeyID, &job.Snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot, &groupID, &job.Snapshot.GroupName, &job.Snapshot.Provider,
+		&job.Snapshot.Endpoint, &job.Snapshot.Protocol, &job.Snapshot.Model, &job.Snapshot.PromptHash,
+		&job.Snapshot.RedactedPreview, &job.Snapshot.PromptLength, &job.Snapshot.MessageCount, &job.Snapshot.Stage,
+		&job.ExecutionMode, &job.ConfigVersion, &job.Status, &job.Attempts, &job.MaxAttempts, &job.ClaimVersion,
+		&job.NextAttemptAt, &processingStarted, &processed, &job.LastErrorCode, &job.LastErrorMessage,
+		&job.CreatedAt, &job.UpdatedAt,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	job.Snapshot.UserID = nullableInt64Value(userID)
+	job.Snapshot.APIKeyID = nullableInt64Value(apiKeyID)
+	job.Snapshot.GroupID = nullableInt64Ptr(groupID)
+	if processingStarted.Valid {
+		value := processingStarted.Time
+		job.ProcessingStartedAt = &value
+	}
+	if processed.Valid {
+		value := processed.Time
+		job.ProcessedAt = &value
+	}
+	return job, nil
+}
+
+func jobColumns(alias string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`%[1]s.id,%[1]s.request_id,%[1]s.user_id,%[1]s.username_snapshot,%[1]s.user_email_snapshot,
+		%[1]s.api_key_id,%[1]s.api_key_name_snapshot,%[1]s.group_id,%[1]s.group_name,%[1]s.provider,
+		%[1]s.endpoint,%[1]s.protocol,%[1]s.model,%[1]s.prompt_hash,%[1]s.redacted_preview,
+		%[1]s.prompt_length,%[1]s.message_count,%[1]s.stage,%[1]s.execution_mode,%[1]s.config_version,%[1]s.status,
+		%[1]s.attempts,%[1]s.max_attempts,%[1]s.claim_version,%[1]s.next_attempt_at,
+		%[1]s.processing_started_at,%[1]s.processed_at,%[1]s.last_error_code,%[1]s.last_error_message,
+		%[1]s.created_at,%[1]s.updated_at`, alias)
+}
+
+func normalizeStage(stage string) string {
+	stage = strings.TrimSpace(stage)
+	if stage == "" {
+		return "http"
+	}
+	return stage
+}
+
+func requireOneRow(result sql.Result, err error, missing error) error {
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if rows != 1 {
+		return missing
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func nullableID(value int64) any {
+	if value <= 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return value
+}
+
+func nullableInt64Value(value sql.NullInt64) int64 {
+	if !value.Valid {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return value.Int64
+}
+
+func nullableInt64Ptr(value sql.NullInt64) *int64 {
+	if !value.Valid {
+		return nil
+	}
+	result := value.Int64
+	return &result
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_repository_integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	_ "github.com/lib/pq"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+const promptAuditPostgresTestEnv = "PROMPT_AUDIT_TEST_POSTGRES_DSN"
+
+func openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	dsn := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(promptAuditPostgresTestEnv))
+	if dsn == "" {
+		t.Skip(promptAuditPostgresTestEnv + " is not set")
+	}
+	db, err := sql.Open("postgres", dsn)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	db.SetMaxOpenConns(16)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	require.NoError(t, db.PingContext(ctx))
+	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY);
+		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS groups (id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY);
+		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS api_keys (id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY);
+		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS settings (
+			key VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
+			value TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+			updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+		);
+	`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	for _, name := range []string{"181_prompt_audit.sql", "182_prompt_audit_full_prompt.sql"} {
+		migration, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("..", "..", "migrations", name))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		// The migration runner can retry an interrupted deployment; the migration
+		// must therefore be safe to execute more than once.
+		_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, string(migration))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, string(migration))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, db.Close()) })
+	resetPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t, db)
+	return db
+}
+
+func resetPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB) {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, err := db.Exec(`TRUNCATE TABLE prompt_audit_events, prompt_audit_jobs, api_keys, users, groups, settings RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+func insertIdentity(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, table string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	var id int64
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`INSERT INTO `+table+` DEFAULT VALUES RETURNING id`).Scan(&id))
+	return id
+}
+
+func integrationSnapshot(seed string) PromptSnapshot {
+	return PromptSnapshot{
+		RequestID: "request-" + seed, UsernameSnapshot: "user-" + seed,
+		UserEmailSnapshot: "user-" + seed + "@example.test", APIKeyNameSnapshot: "key-" + seed,
+		GroupName: "group-" + seed, Provider: "openai", Endpoint: "/v1/chat/completions",
+		Protocol: "openai_chat", Model: "gpt-test", PromptHash: strings.Repeat(seed[:1], 64),
+		RedactedPreview: "redacted-" + seed, PromptLength: len([]rune(seed)), MessageCount: 1,
+	}
+}
+
+func integrationResult(decision EventDecision) *NormalizedResult {
+	result := &NormalizedResult{
+		Decision: decision, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, Safety: "Safe",
+		Categories: []string{}, MatchedScanners: []string{}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{},
+		ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}, ScannerBackend: "qwen3guard-openai",
+		ScannerVersion: "test", GuardEndpointID: "guard-1", PolicyID: "priority",
+		PolicyVersion: 1, ChunkTotal: 1, LatencyMS: 2,
+	}
+	if decision != EventPass {
+		result.RiskLevel = RiskCritical
+		result.Action = ActionBlock
+		result.Safety = "Unsafe"
+		result.Categories = []string{"pii"}
+		result.MatchedScanners = []string{"pii"}
+		result.ScannerScores["pii"] = 1
+		result.ScannerEvidence["pii"] = "redacted evidence"
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditMigrationSchemaAndLeakageGate(t *testing.T) {
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columns
+		WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name IN ('prompt_audit_jobs','prompt_audit_events')`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
+	forbidden := []string{"raw_prompt", "raw_request", "payload", "token", "authorization", "credential", "ciphertext"}
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var tableName, columnName string
+		require.NoError(t, rows.Scan(&tableName, &columnName))
+		lower := strings.ToLower(columnName)
+		for _, word := range forbidden {
+			require.NotContainsf(t, lower, word, "%s.%s is a forbidden raw/credential column", tableName, columnName)
+		}
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, rows.Err())
+
+	indexRows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `SELECT indexname FROM pg_indexes
+		WHERE schemaname='public' AND tablename IN ('prompt_audit_jobs','prompt_audit_events')`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer func() { _ = indexRows.Close() }()
+	indexes := map[string]bool{}
+	for indexRows.Next() {
+		var name string
+		require.NoError(t, indexRows.Scan(&name))
+		indexes[name] = true
+	}
+	for _, name := range []string{
+		"idx_prompt_audit_jobs_schedule", "idx_prompt_audit_jobs_request", "idx_prompt_audit_jobs_user_created",
+		"idx_prompt_audit_jobs_api_key_created", "idx_prompt_audit_jobs_group_created", "idx_prompt_audit_jobs_prompt_hash",
+		"idx_prompt_audit_jobs_created", "idx_prompt_audit_events_job", "idx_prompt_audit_events_request",
+		"idx_prompt_audit_events_decision_created", "idx_prompt_audit_events_risk_created",
+		"idx_prompt_audit_events_user_created", "idx_prompt_audit_events_api_key_created",
+		"idx_prompt_audit_events_group_created", "idx_prompt_audit_events_prompt_hash", "idx_prompt_audit_events_created",
+	} {
+		require.Truef(t, indexes[name], "missing index %s", name)
+	}
+
+	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO prompt_audit_jobs(status) VALUES ('unknown')`)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO prompt_audit_jobs(prompt_length) VALUES (-1)`)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	var jobID int64
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO prompt_audit_jobs DEFAULT VALUES RETURNING id`).Scan(&jobID))
+	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO prompt_audit_events(job_id,chunk_total) VALUES ($1,-1)`, jobID)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditDatabasePersistsFullPromptOnEventsOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	repo := NewPostgreSQLRepository(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	const promptCanary = "PROMPT_AUDIT_CANARY_SECRET_DO_NOT_PERSIST"
+	request := Request{
+		RequestID: "canary-request", Provider: "openai",
+		Endpoint: "/v1/chat/completions", Protocol: "openai_chat", Model: "gpt-test", Stage: "http",
+		Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"` + promptCanary + `"}]}`),
+	}
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(request)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, promptCanary)
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.FullPrompt, promptCanary)
+	event, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, snapshot.Redacted(), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	// The event intentionally retains the full prompt for admin review; the
+	// redacted preview and transient job row still never contain it.
+	adminJSON, err := json.Marshal(event)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, string(adminJSON), promptCanary)
+	require.NotContains(t, event.Snapshot.RedactedPreview, promptCanary)
+
+	var storedFullPrompt string
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT full_prompt FROM prompt_audit_events WHERE id=$1`, event.ID).Scan(&storedFullPrompt))
+	require.Contains(t, storedFullPrompt, promptCanary)
+
+	detail, err := repo.GetEvent(ctx, event.ID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, detail.Snapshot.FullPrompt, promptCanary)
+
+	var jobJSON string
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT row_to_json(j)::text FROM prompt_audit_jobs j WHERE id=$1`, event.JobID).Scan(&jobJSON))
+	require.NotContains(t, jobJSON, promptCanary)
+
+	failedJob, err := repo.CreateStagingWithCapacity(ctx, integrationSnapshot("error"), 1, 3, 10)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	const errorCanary = "GUARD_RAW_RESPONSE_CANARY_SECRET"
+	require.NoError(t, repo.MarkStagingFailed(ctx, failedJob.ID, "payload_store_failed", "raw guard body: "+errorCanary))
+	var code, message string
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT last_error_code,last_error_message FROM prompt_audit_jobs WHERE id=$1`, failedJob.ID).Scan(&code, &message))
+	require.Equal(t, "payload_store_failed", code)
+	require.Equal(t, stableErrorMessage(code), message)
+	require.NotContains(t, message, errorCanary)
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, len([]rune(message)), 160)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditRepositoryAdmissionClaimFencingAndEventTransaction(t *testing.T) {
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	repo := NewPostgreSQLRepository(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	start := make(chan struct{})
+	type admissionResult struct {
+		job *Job
+		err error
+	}
+	results := make(chan admissionResult, 2)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(index int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			<-start
+			job, err := repo.CreateStagingWithCapacity(ctx, integrationSnapshot(string(rune('a'+index))), 1, 3, 1)
+			results <- admissionResult{job: job, err: err}
+		}(i)
+	}
+	close(start)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(results)
+	var accepted *Job
+	rejected := 0
+	for result := range results {
+		if result.err == nil {
+			require.Nil(t, accepted)
+			accepted = result.job
+			continue
+		}
+		require.True(t, errors.Is(result.err, ErrQueueFull) || errors.Is(result.err, ErrQueueAdmissionBusy))
+		rejected++
+	}
+	require.NotNil(t, accepted)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rejected)
+	stats, err := repo.QueueStats(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), stats.Active)
+	require.NoError(t, repo.PublishQueued(ctx, accepted.ID))
+
+	claimStart := make(chan struct{})
+	claims := make(chan *Job, 2)
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			<-claimStart
+			job, claimed, claimErr := repo.ClaimNextJob(ctx, time.Now().Add(time.Second))
+			require.NoError(t, claimErr)
+			if claimed {
+				claims <- job
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+	close(claimStart)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(claims)
+	claimedJobs := make([]*Job, 0, 1)
+	for job := range claims {
+		claimedJobs = append(claimedJobs, job)
+	}
+	require.Len(t, claimedJobs, 1)
+	firstClaim := claimedJobs[0]
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), firstClaim.ClaimVersion)
+
+	reclaimed, err := repo.ReclaimStale(ctx, time.Now().Add(time.Hour), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), 10)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), reclaimed)
+	secondClaim, claimed, err := repo.ClaimNextJob(ctx, time.Now().Add(time.Second))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, claimed)
+	require.Greater(t, secondClaim.ClaimVersion, firstClaim.ClaimVersion)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, repo.RefreshLease(ctx, firstClaim.ID, firstClaim.ClaimVersion, time.Now()), ErrLeaseLost)
+	_, err = repo.Complete(ctx, firstClaim, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrLeaseLost)
+
+	event, err := repo.Complete(ctx, secondClaim, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, event)
+	var status string
+	var eventCount int
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT status FROM prompt_audit_jobs WHERE id=$1`, secondClaim.ID).Scan(&status))
+	require.Equal(t, "done", status)
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM prompt_audit_events WHERE job_id=$1`, secondClaim.ID).Scan(&eventCount))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, eventCount)
+
+	staging, err := repo.CreateStagingWithCapacity(ctx, integrationSnapshot("stale"), 1, 3, 10)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	reclaimed, err = repo.ReclaimStale(ctx, time.Now().Add(time.Hour), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), 10)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), reclaimed)
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT status FROM prompt_audit_jobs WHERE id=$1`, staging.ID).Scan(&status))
+	require.Equal(t, "failed", status)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditRepositoryForeignKeysFiltersAndStableIdentitySnapshots(t *testing.T) {
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	repo := NewPostgreSQLRepository(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	userID := insertIdentity(t, db, "users")
+	apiKeyID := insertIdentity(t, db, "api_keys")
+	groupID := insertIdentity(t, db, "groups")
+	snapshot := integrationSnapshot("identity")
+	snapshot.UserID, snapshot.APIKeyID, snapshot.GroupID = userID, apiKeyID, &groupID
+	event, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, snapshot, 7, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, event)
+
+	start, end := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	page, err := repo.ListEvents(ctx, EventFilter{
+		Decision: string(EventCritical), RiskLevel: string(RiskCritical), Endpoint: snapshot.Endpoint,
+		GroupID: &groupID, UserID: &userID, APIKeyID: &apiKeyID, RequestID: snapshot.RequestID,
+		PromptHash: snapshot.PromptHash, Keyword: snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, StartAt: &start, EndAt: &end,
+	}, 1, 10)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), page.Total)
+	require.Len(t, page.Items, 1)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, page.Items[0].IssueSummaries)
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, page.Items[0].Snapshot.UsernameSnapshot)
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot, page.Items[0].Snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot)
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot, page.Items[0].Snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot)
+
+	_, err = db.Exec(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id=$1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = db.Exec(`DELETE FROM api_keys WHERE id=$1`, apiKeyID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = db.Exec(`DELETE FROM groups WHERE id=$1`, groupID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	stored, err := repo.GetEvent(ctx, event.ID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Zero(t, stored.Snapshot.UserID)
+	require.Zero(t, stored.Snapshot.APIKeyID)
+	require.Nil(t, stored.Snapshot.GroupID)
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.UsernameSnapshot, stored.Snapshot.UsernameSnapshot)
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot, stored.Snapshot.UserEmailSnapshot)
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot, stored.Snapshot.APIKeyNameSnapshot)
+
+	_, err = db.Exec(`DELETE FROM prompt_audit_jobs WHERE id=$1`, event.JobID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = repo.GetEvent(ctx, event.ID)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrEventNotFound)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditRepositoryHighWaterAndSafeDeletion(t *testing.T) {
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	repo := NewPostgreSQLRepository(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	first, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("first"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	second, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("second"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	start, end := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	filter := EventFilter{Decision: string(EventCritical), StartAt: &start, EndAt: &end}
+	preview, err := repo.PreviewDelete(ctx, filter)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), preview.MatchedCount)
+	require.Equal(t, second.ID, preview.SnapshotMaxID)
+	require.Equal(t, FilterHash(preview.FilterSummary, preview.SnapshotMaxID), preview.FilterHash)
+
+	newer, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("newer"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	result, err := repo.DeleteEventsByFilter(ctx, filter, preview.SnapshotMaxID, 1)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), result.DeletedEvents)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), result.DeletedJobs)
+	_, err = repo.GetEvent(ctx, first.ID)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrEventNotFound)
+	_, err = repo.GetEvent(ctx, second.ID)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrEventNotFound)
+	_, err = repo.GetEvent(ctx, newer.ID)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "an event created after preview must survive high-water deletion")
+
+	processingEvent, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("processing"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = db.Exec(`UPDATE prompt_audit_jobs SET status='processing' WHERE id=$1`, processingEvent.JobID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	deleteResult, err := repo.DeleteEvent(ctx, processingEvent.ID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), deleteResult.DeletedEvents)
+	require.Zero(t, deleteResult.DeletedJobs)
+	var remaining int
+	require.NoError(t, db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM prompt_audit_jobs WHERE id=$1`, processingEvent.JobID).Scan(&remaining))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, remaining, "processing jobs must not be deleted as orphans")
+
+	batchOne, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("batch-one"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	batchTwo, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("batch-two"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	ids := []int64{batchTwo.ID, batchOne.ID, batchOne.ID}
+	sort.Slice(ids, func(i, j int) bool { return ids[i] > ids[j] })
+	batchResult, err := repo.DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx, ids)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), batchResult.DeletedEvents)
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditServiceConfirmationKeepsPostPreviewEventsAndConcurrentDeletesAreSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	db := openPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t)
+	repo := NewPostgreSQLRepository(db)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	start, end := now.Add(-time.Hour), now.Add(time.Hour)
+	filter := EventFilter{Decision: string(EventCritical), StartAt: &start, EndAt: &end}
+
+	for i := 0; i < 12; i++ {
+		_, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot(fmt.Sprintf("event-%02d", i)), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+	}
+	service := &PromptService{
+		config: &fakeConfigStore{}, repo: repo, payload: NewRedisPayloadStore(nil), clock: fixedClock{now: now},
+	}
+	preview, err := service.PreviewDelete(ctx, filter, 77)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(12), preview.MatchedCount)
+
+	newer, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot("post-preview"), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	result, err := service.DeleteByFilter(ctx, DeleteByFilterRequest{
+		Filter: filter, SnapshotMaxID: preview.SnapshotMaxID, FilterHash: preview.FilterHash,
+		ConfirmationToken: preview.ConfirmationToken, Confirm: true,
+	}, 77)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(12), result.DeletedEvents)
+	_, err = repo.GetEvent(ctx, newer.ID)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "events created after delete-preview must survive")
+
+	resetPromptAuditIntegrationDB(t, db)
+	for i := 0; i < 24; i++ {
+		_, err := repo.RecordBlocking(ctx, integrationSnapshot(fmt.Sprintf("race-%02d", i)), 1, integrationResult(EventCritical), true)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+	}
+	preview, err = repo.PreviewDelete(ctx, filter)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	type deleteOutcome struct {
+		result *DeleteResult
+		err    error
+	}
+	outcomes := make(chan deleteOutcome, 2)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			deleted, deleteErr := repo.DeleteEventsByFilter(ctx, filter, preview.SnapshotMaxID, 1)
+			outcomes <- deleteOutcome{result: deleted, err: deleteErr}
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(outcomes)
+	var deletedTotal int64
+	for outcome := range outcomes {
+		require.NoError(t, outcome.err)
+		require.NotNil(t, outcome.result)
+		deletedTotal += outcome.result.DeletedEvents
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, int64(24), deletedTotal, "concurrent deleters must neither double-count nor strand matching events")
+	remaining, err := repo.ListEvents(ctx, filter, 1, 100)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Zero(t, remaining.Total)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_repository_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestShouldStorePromptAuditEvent(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name            string
+		storePassEvents bool
+		decision        EventDecision
+		want            bool
+	}{
+		{name: "pass disabled", storePassEvents: false, decision: EventPass, want: false},
+		{name: "flag disabled", storePassEvents: false, decision: EventFlag, want: true},
+		{name: "critical disabled", storePassEvents: false, decision: EventCritical, want: true},
+		{name: "pass enabled", storePassEvents: true, decision: EventPass, want: true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if got := shouldStorePromptAuditEvent(tt.decision, tt.storePassEvents); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("shouldStorePromptAuditEvent(%q, %t) = %t, want %t", tt.decision, tt.storePassEvents, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_scanner.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func SplitRunes(value string, limit int) []string {
+	if limit <= 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	segments := strings.Split(value, promptAuditPrioritySeparator)
+	chunks := make([]string, 0, len(segments))
+	for _, segment := range segments {
+		runes := []rune(segment)
+		for start := 0; start < len(runes); start += limit {
+			end := start + limit
+			if end > len(runes) {
+				end = len(runes)
+			}
+			chunks = append(chunks, string(runes[start:end]))
+		}
+	}
+	return chunks
+}
+
+func AggregateResults(results []*NormalizedResult, latency time.Duration) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	if len(results) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt guard produced no complete result")
+	}
+	aggregated := &NormalizedResult{
+		Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow,
+		ScannerBackend: "qwen3guard-openai", Categories: []string{}, MatchedScanners: []string{},
+		ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}, ChunkTotal: len(results),
+		LatencyMS: int(latency.Milliseconds()),
+	}
+	categories := map[string]struct{}{}
+	matched := map[string]struct{}{}
+	unknown := map[string]struct{}{}
+	for _, result := range results {
+		if result == nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("prompt guard partial result is not allowed")
+		}
+		if resultSeverity(result.Decision) > resultSeverity(aggregated.Decision) {
+			aggregated.Decision = result.Decision
+			aggregated.RiskLevel = result.RiskLevel
+			aggregated.Action = result.Action
+			aggregated.Safety = result.Safety
+			aggregated.GuardEndpointID = result.GuardEndpointID
+			aggregated.ScannerVersion = result.ScannerVersion
+			aggregated.PolicyID = result.PolicyID
+			aggregated.PolicyVersion = result.PolicyVersion
+		}
+		if aggregated.GuardEndpointID == "" {
+			aggregated.GuardEndpointID = result.GuardEndpointID
+			aggregated.ScannerVersion = result.ScannerVersion
+			aggregated.PolicyID = result.PolicyID
+			aggregated.PolicyVersion = result.PolicyVersion
+		}
+		for _, category := range result.Categories {
+			categories[category] = struct{}{}
+		}
+		for _, scanner := range result.MatchedScanners {
+			matched[scanner] = struct{}{}
+		}
+		for scanner, score := range result.ScannerScores {
+			if score > aggregated.ScannerScores[scanner] {
+				aggregated.ScannerScores[scanner] = score
+			}
+		}
+		for scanner, evidence := range result.ScannerEvidence {
+			if _, exists := aggregated.ScannerEvidence[scanner]; !exists {
+				aggregated.ScannerEvidence[scanner] = RedactPreview(evidence, 160)
+			}
+		}
+		for _, category := range result.UnknownCategories {
+			unknown[category] = struct{}{}
+		}
+	}
+	aggregated.Categories = orderedScannerKeys(categories)
+	aggregated.MatchedScanners = orderedScannerKeys(matched)
+	aggregated.UnknownCategories = sortedKeys(unknown)
+	return aggregated, nil
+}
+
+func resultSeverity(decision EventDecision) int {
+	switch decision {
+	case EventCritical:
+		return 3
+	case EventFlag:
+		return 2
+	default:
+		return 1
+	}
+}
+
+func sortedKeys(values map[string]struct{}) []string {
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
+	for key := range values {
+		result = append(result, key)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(result)
+	return result
+}
+
+func orderedScannerKeys(values map[string]struct{}) []string {
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
+	remaining := make(map[string]struct{}, len(values))
+	for key := range values {
+		remaining[key] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	for _, scannerID := range AllScannerIDs {
+		if _, ok := remaining[scannerID]; ok {
+			result = append(result, scannerID)
+			delete(remaining, scannerID)
+		}
+	}
+	result = append(result, sortedKeys(remaining)...)
+	return result
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_service.go

@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type PromptService struct {
+	config    ConfigStore
+	repo      *PostgreSQLRepository
+	payload   *RedisPayloadStore
+	enqueuer  *Enqueuer
+	runner    *Runner
+	evaluator *GuardEvaluator
+	scanner   *OpenAICompatibleScanner
+	metrics   *AtomicMetrics
+	clock     Clock
+
+	lifecycleMu  sync.Mutex
+	cancel       context.CancelFunc
+	background   context.Context
+	enqueueWG    sync.WaitGroup
+	enqueueSlots chan struct{}
+	probeMu      sync.RWMutex
+	probes       map[string]ProbeResult
+}
+
+func NewPromptService(
+	config ConfigStore,
+	repo *PostgreSQLRepository,
+	payload *RedisPayloadStore,
+	scanner *OpenAICompatibleScanner,
+	metrics *AtomicMetrics,
+) *PromptService {
+	enqueuer := NewEnqueuer(config, repo, payload, metrics)
+	evaluator := NewGuardEvaluator(scanner, repo, metrics)
+	runner := NewRunner(config, repo, payload, scanner, metrics)
+	return &PromptService{
+		config: config, repo: repo, payload: payload, scanner: scanner, metrics: metrics,
+		enqueuer: enqueuer, evaluator: evaluator, runner: runner, clock: realClock{},
+		enqueueSlots: make(chan struct{}, 128), probes: map[string]ProbeResult{},
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if s == nil || s.config == nil || s.runner == nil {
+		return errors.New("prompt audit service unavailable")
+	}
+	s.lifecycleMu.Lock()
+	if s.cancel != nil {
+		s.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+	background, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+	s.background, s.cancel = background, cancel
+	s.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+	configErr := s.config.Start(background)
+	workerErr := s.runner.Start(background)
+	return errors.Join(configErr, workerErr)
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if s == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.lifecycleMu.Lock()
+	cancel := s.cancel
+	s.cancel = nil
+	s.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+	if cancel != nil {
+		cancel()
+	}
+	var workerErr error
+	if s.runner != nil {
+		workerErr = s.runner.Shutdown(ctx)
+	}
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() { s.enqueueWG.Wait(); close(done) }()
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		if workerErr == nil {
+			workerErr = ctx.Err()
+		}
+	}
+	var configErr error
+	if s.config != nil {
+		configErr = s.config.Shutdown(ctx)
+	}
+	if workerErr != nil {
+		return workerErr
+	}
+	return configErr
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) EffectiveMode() Mode {
+	if s == nil || s.config == nil {
+		return ModeOff
+	}
+	return s.config.EffectiveMode()
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) Enqueue(_ context.Context, req Request) error {
+	if s == nil || s.enqueuer == nil || s.EffectiveMode() != ModeAsync {
+		return nil
+	}
+	select {
+	case s.enqueueSlots <- struct{}{}:
+	default:
+		if s.metrics != nil {
+			s.metrics.IncDropped()
+		}
+		LogWarn(EventEnqueueDropped, map[string]any{"request_id": req.RequestID, "status": "dropped", "error_code": "local_enqueue_busy"})
+		return nil
+	}
+	s.lifecycleMu.Lock()
+	background := s.background
+	s.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
+	if background == nil {
+		<-s.enqueueSlots
+		return errors.New("prompt audit service not started")
+	}
+	requestCopy := req.Clone()
+	s.enqueueWG.Add(1)
+	go func() {
+		defer s.enqueueWG.Done()
+		defer func() { <-s.enqueueSlots }()
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(background, 2*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		_ = s.enqueuer.Enqueue(ctx, requestCopy)
+	}()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) Evaluate(ctx context.Context, req Request) (*PromptDecision, error) {
+	if s == nil || s.config == nil || s.evaluator == nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	if s.config.BlockingActivationDegraded() {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	cfg, ok := s.config.Active()
+	if !ok {
+		if s.config.EffectiveMode() == ModeBlocking {
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+		}
+		return &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionAllow, AllowNextStage: true}, nil
+	}
+	if cfg.EffectiveMode() != ModeBlocking || !cfg.IncludesGroup(req.GroupID) {
+		return &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionAllow, AllowNextStage: true}, nil
+	}
+	snapshot, err := ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot(req, cfg.BlockingLatestTurnOnly)
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrNoPromptText) {
+		return &PromptDecision{Kind: DecisionAllow, AllowNextStage: true}, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Cause: err}
+	}
+	return s.evaluator.Evaluate(ctx, cfg, snapshot)
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) GetConfig() (PublicConfig, error) { return s.config.Public() }
+
+func (s *PromptService) SaveConfig(ctx context.Context, req UpdateConfigRequest, actorID int64) (PublicConfig, error) {
+	return s.config.Save(ctx, req, actorID)
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) Runtime(ctx context.Context) RuntimeSnapshot {
+	expected, activeVersion, loadedAt, loadError := s.config.RuntimeState()
+	cfg, hasConfig := s.config.Active()
+	mode := s.EffectiveMode()
+	workerTotal, queueCapacity := 0, 0
+	if hasConfig {
+		workerTotal, queueCapacity = cfg.WorkerCount, cfg.QueueCapacity
+	}
+	runtime := RuntimeSnapshot{
+		ProcessStatus: "disabled", EffectiveMode: mode, ExpectedConfigVersion: expected,
+		ActiveConfigVersion: activeVersion, ConfigLoadedAt: loadedAt, ConfigLoadError: loadError,
+		WorkerTotal: workerTotal, QueueCapacity: queueCapacity, DatabaseStatus: "ok", RedisStatus: "ok",
+		Endpoints: s.probeSnapshot(), GuardMetrics: s.metrics.Snapshot(),
+	}
+	if s.repo != nil {
+		stats, err := s.repo.QueueStats(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			runtime.DatabaseStatus = "error"
+			runtime.LastErrorCode = "database_unavailable"
+		} else {
+			runtime.Queue = stats
+		}
+	} else {
+		runtime.DatabaseStatus = "error"
+	}
+	if s.payload == nil || s.payload.Ping(ctx) != nil {
+		runtime.RedisStatus = "error"
+		if runtime.LastErrorCode == "" {
+			runtime.LastErrorCode = "payload_store_unavailable"
+		}
+	}
+	activeWorkers, processed, failed, heartbeat, lastProcessed, workerCode, workerMessage := s.runner.Snapshot()
+	runtime.WorkerActive, runtime.ProcessedTotal, runtime.FailedTotal = activeWorkers, processed, failed
+	if s.metrics != nil {
+		auditMetrics := s.metrics.AuditSnapshot()
+		runtime.EnqueuedTotal, runtime.DroppedTotal = auditMetrics.Enqueued, auditMetrics.Dropped
+	}
+	runtime.WorkerHeartbeatAt, runtime.LastProcessedAt = heartbeat, lastProcessed
+	if workerCode != "" {
+		runtime.LastErrorCode, runtime.LastErrorMessage = workerCode, workerMessage
+	}
+	if mode != ModeOff {
+		runtime.ProcessStatus = "running"
+		if loadError != "" || runtime.DatabaseStatus != "ok" || runtime.RedisStatus != "ok" || activeVersion != expected {
+			runtime.ProcessStatus = "degraded"
+		}
+		if heartbeat == nil || s.clock.Now().Sub(*heartbeat) > 10*time.Second {
+			runtime.ProcessStatus = "degraded"
+		}
+	}
+	return runtime
+}
+
+type ProbeRequest struct {
+	Endpoint UpdateEndpoint `json:"endpoint"`
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) Probe(ctx context.Context, request ProbeRequest) ProbeResult {
+	started := s.clock.Now()
+	endpoint, tokenApplied, err := s.resolveProbeEndpoint(request.Endpoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return s.finishProbe(request.Endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: "endpoint_invalid", Message: "审计节点配置无效"})
+	}
+	LogInfo(EventProbeStarted, map[string]any{"guard_endpoint_id": endpoint.ID, "status": "started"})
+	client, err := NewSecureHTTPClient(endpoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: "endpoint_unsafe", Message: "审计节点地址不在允许范围", TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	modelsURL, _ := ModelsURL(endpoint.BaseURL)
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, modelsURL, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: "probe_request_invalid", Message: "无法创建探测请求", TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	if endpoint.Token != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+endpoint.Token)
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		code := "connection_failed"
+		var netErr net.Error
+		if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || (errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout()) {
+			code = "timeout"
+		}
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: code, Message: "无法连接审计节点", Retryable: true, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	responseBody, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxGuardResponseBytes+1))
+	_ = resp.Body.Close()
+	if readErr != nil {
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: "response_read_failed", Message: "审计节点响应读取失败", HTTPStatus: resp.StatusCode, Retryable: true, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	if int64(len(responseBody)) > maxGuardResponseBytes {
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: "response_too_large", Message: "审计节点响应无效", HTTPStatus: resp.StatusCode, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 && modelsResponseReady(responseBody, endpoint.Model) {
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{OK: true, Status: "healthy", Message: "审计节点连接正常", HTTPStatus: resp.StatusCode, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	if (resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300) || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
+		result, scanErr := s.scanner.Scan(ctx, endpoint, "Hello", AllScannerIDs)
+		if scanErr == nil && result != nil {
+			return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{OK: true, Status: "healthy", Message: "审计节点模型调用正常", HTTPStatus: http.StatusOK, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+		}
+		code, status, retryable := guardErrorCode(scanErr), 0, false
+		var guardErr *GuardError
+		if errors.As(scanErr, &guardErr) {
+			status, retryable = guardErr.HTTPStatus, guardErr.Retryable
+		}
+		if code == "" {
+			code = ErrorCodeInvalidResponse
+		}
+		return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: code, Message: "审计节点模型调用失败", HTTPStatus: status, Retryable: retryable, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+	}
+	code, retryable := "probe_http_error", resp.StatusCode == 429 || resp.StatusCode >= 500
+	if resp.StatusCode == 401 || resp.StatusCode == 403 {
+		code = "authentication_failed"
+	}
+	return s.finishProbe(endpoint.ID, started, ProbeResult{Status: "failed", ErrorCode: code, Message: "审计节点探测失败", HTTPStatus: resp.StatusCode, Retryable: retryable, TokenApplied: tokenApplied})
+}
+
+func modelsResponseReady(body []byte, model string) bool {
+	var response struct {
+		Data []struct {
+			ID string `json:"id"`
+		} `json:"data"`
+	}
+	if json.Unmarshal(body, &response) != nil || response.Data == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
+	if model == "" {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, item := range response.Data {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(item.ID) == model {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) resolveProbeEndpoint(input UpdateEndpoint) (ActiveEndpoint, bool, error) {
+	baseURL, err := NormalizeBaseURL(input.BaseURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ActiveEndpoint{}, false, err
+	}
+	token := strings.TrimSpace(input.Token)
+	if token == "" {
+		if cfg, ok := s.config.Active(); ok {
+			for _, endpoint := range cfg.Endpoints {
+				if endpoint.ID != strings.TrimSpace(input.ID) {
+					continue
+				}
+				// Reuse a stored credential only when the probe targets the same
+				// normalized base URL. Otherwise an admin probe could exfiltrate
+				// the Guard token to an attacker-controlled HTTPS host.
+				if endpoint.BaseURL == baseURL {
+					token = endpoint.Token
+				}
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	model := strings.TrimSpace(input.Model)
+	if model == "" {
+		model = DefaultGuardModel
+	}
+	timeout := input.TimeoutMS
+	if timeout == 0 {
+		timeout = DefaultTimeoutMS
+	}
+	limit := input.InputLimit
+	if limit == 0 {
+		limit = DefaultInputLimit
+	}
+	storage := storageConfig{Enabled: false, Strategy: "priority", WorkerCount: DefaultWorkerCount, QueueCapacity: DefaultQueueCapacity, Scanners: append([]string(nil), AllScannerIDs...), AllGroups: true,
+		Endpoints: []StorageEndpoint{{ID: strings.TrimSpace(input.ID), Name: strings.TrimSpace(input.Name), Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: baseURL, Model: model, TimeoutMS: timeout, InputLimit: limit}}}
+	if storage.Endpoints[0].ID == "" {
+		storage.Endpoints[0].ID = "probe"
+	}
+	if storage.Endpoints[0].Name == "" {
+		storage.Endpoints[0].Name = "Probe"
+	}
+	if err := validateStorageConfig(storage); err != nil {
+		return ActiveEndpoint{}, false, err
+	}
+	return ActiveEndpoint{ID: storage.Endpoints[0].ID, Name: storage.Endpoints[0].Name, Protocol: "openai_compatible", BaseURL: baseURL, Model: model, Token: token, TimeoutMS: timeout, InputLimit: limit, Enabled: true}, token != "", nil
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) finishProbe(id string, started time.Time, result ProbeResult) ProbeResult {
+	result.CheckedAt = s.clock.Now()
+	result.LatencyMS = int(result.CheckedAt.Sub(started).Milliseconds())
+	if result.OK {
+		LogInfo(EventProbeFinished, map[string]any{"guard_endpoint_id": id, "status": result.Status, "latency_ms": result.LatencyMS, "http_status": result.HTTPStatus})
+	} else {
+		LogWarn(EventProbeFailed, map[string]any{"guard_endpoint_id": id, "status": result.Status, "latency_ms": result.LatencyMS, "http_status": result.HTTPStatus, "error_code": result.ErrorCode, "retryable": result.Retryable})
+	}
+	s.probeMu.Lock()
+	s.probes[id] = result
+	s.probeMu.Unlock()
+	return result
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) probeSnapshot() map[string]ProbeResult {
+	s.probeMu.RLock()
+	defer s.probeMu.RUnlock()
+	result := make(map[string]ProbeResult, len(s.probes))
+	for id, probe := range s.probes {
+		result[id] = probe
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) ListEvents(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, page, pageSize int) (*EventPage, error) {
+	return s.repo.ListEvents(ctx, filter, page, pageSize)
+}
+func (s *PromptService) GetEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*Event, error) {
+	return s.repo.GetEvent(ctx, id)
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) DeleteEvent(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	result, err := s.repo.DeleteEvent(ctx, id)
+	if err == nil {
+		s.deletePayloads(ctx, result.JobIDs)
+	}
+	return result, err
+}
+func (s *PromptService) DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx context.Context, ids []int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	result, err := s.repo.DeleteEventsByIDs(ctx, ids)
+	if err == nil {
+		s.deletePayloads(ctx, result.JobIDs)
+	}
+	return result, err
+}
+
+type deleteClaims struct {
+	FilterHash    string    `json:"filter_hash"`
+	SnapshotMaxID int64     `json:"snapshot_max_id"`
+	AdminID       int64     `json:"admin_id"`
+	IssuedAt      time.Time `json:"issued_at"`
+	ExpiresAt     time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) PreviewDelete(ctx context.Context, filter EventFilter, adminID int64) (*DeletePreview, error) {
+	preview, err := s.repo.PreviewDelete(ctx, filter)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	now := s.clock.Now()
+	expires := now.Add(5 * time.Minute)
+	claimsRaw, _ := json.Marshal(deleteClaims{FilterHash: preview.FilterHash, SnapshotMaxID: preview.SnapshotMaxID, AdminID: adminID, IssuedAt: now, ExpiresAt: expires})
+	token, err := s.config.Encrypt(string(claimsRaw))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	preview.ConfirmationToken, preview.ExpiresAt = token, expires
+	LogInfo(EventDeletePreviewed, map[string]any{"user_id": adminID, "status": "previewed"})
+	return preview, nil
+}
+
+type DeleteByFilterRequest struct {
+	Filter            EventFilter `json:"filter"`
+	SnapshotMaxID     int64       `json:"snapshot_max_id"`
+	FilterHash        string      `json:"filter_hash"`
+	ConfirmationToken string      `json:"confirmation_token"`
+	Confirm           bool        `json:"confirm"`
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) DeleteByFilter(ctx context.Context, request DeleteByFilterRequest, adminID int64) (*DeleteResult, error) {
+	if !request.Confirm {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit filter delete requires confirm=true")
+	}
+	plain, err := s.config.Decrypt(strings.TrimSpace(request.ConfirmationToken))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit confirmation token invalid")
+	}
+	var claims deleteClaims
+	if json.Unmarshal([]byte(plain), &claims) != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit confirmation token invalid")
+	}
+	computed := FilterHash(request.Filter, request.SnapshotMaxID)
+	if claims.AdminID != adminID || claims.SnapshotMaxID != request.SnapshotMaxID || claims.FilterHash != request.FilterHash || request.FilterHash != computed || !s.clock.Now().Before(claims.ExpiresAt) {
+		return nil, errors.New("prompt audit confirmation token does not match deletion request")
+	}
+	result, err := s.repo.DeleteEventsByFilter(ctx, request.Filter, request.SnapshotMaxID, 200)
+	if err == nil {
+		s.deletePayloads(ctx, result.JobIDs)
+		LogWarn(EventEventsFilterDeleted, map[string]any{"user_id": adminID, "status": "deleted"})
+	}
+	return result, err
+}
+
+func (s *PromptService) deletePayloads(ctx context.Context, jobIDs []int64) {
+	for _, id := range jobIDs {
+		_ = s.payload.Delete(ctx, id)
+	}
+}
+
+func parseTimeQuery(value string) *time.Time {
+	parsed, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, strings.TrimSpace(value))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	parsed = parsed.UTC()
+	return &parsed
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_service_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api/internal/service"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type staticSettingRepository struct {
+	values map[string]string
+}
+
+func (r staticSettingRepository) Get(context.Context, string) (*service.Setting, error) {
+	return nil, service.ErrSettingNotFound
+}
+func (r staticSettingRepository) GetValue(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
+	return "", service.ErrSettingNotFound
+}
+func (r staticSettingRepository) Set(context.Context, string, string) error { return nil }
+func (r staticSettingRepository) GetMultiple(_ context.Context, keys []string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	result := make(map[string]string, len(keys))
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		result[key] = r.values[key]
+	}
+	return result, nil
+}
+func (r staticSettingRepository) SetMultiple(context.Context, map[string]string) error { return nil }
+func (r staticSettingRepository) GetAll(context.Context) (map[string]string, error) {
+	return r.values, nil
+}
+func (r staticSettingRepository) Delete(context.Context, string) error { return nil }
+
+func TestPromptServiceHasExplicitIdempotentLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
+	config := NewConfigManager(nil, staticSettingRepository{values: map[string]string{
+		SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig: "",
+		SettingKeyRiskControl:       "false",
+	}}, nil, prefixEncryptor{}, testTotpKeyConfig())
+	service := NewPromptService(
+		config,
+		NewPostgreSQLRepository(nil),
+		NewRedisPayloadStore(nil),
+		NewOpenAICompatibleScanner(),
+		NewAtomicMetrics(),
+	)
+
+	require.Nil(t, service.cancel, "construction must not start background work")
+	require.NoError(t, service.Start(context.Background()))
+	require.NotNil(t, service.cancel)
+	require.NoError(t, service.Start(context.Background()), "Start must be idempotent")
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	require.NoError(t, service.Shutdown(ctx))
+	require.Nil(t, service.cancel)
+	require.NoError(t, service.Shutdown(ctx), "Shutdown must be idempotent")
+}
+
+func TestPromptServiceStartReportsDependencyFailureWithoutPanic(t *testing.T) {
+	service := &PromptService{}
+	require.Error(t, service.Start(context.Background()))
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	require.NoError(t, service.Shutdown(ctx))
+}
+
+func TestPromptServiceBlockingLatestTurnOnlyUsesNarrowSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
+	seen := make([]string, 0, 2)
+	evaluator := newGuardEvaluator(PromptScannerFunc(func(_ context.Context, _ ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		seen = append(seen, chunk)
+		return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}}, nil
+	}), nil, NewAtomicMetrics(), 2, 2)
+	service := &PromptService{
+		config: &fakeConfigStore{active: true, cfg: ActiveConfig{
+			RiskControlEnabled: true, Enabled: true, BlockingEnabled: true, BlockingLatestTurnOnly: true, AllGroups: true,
+			Scanners: AllScannerIDs, Endpoints: []ActiveEndpoint{{ID: "guard-1", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 4096}},
+		}},
+		evaluator: evaluator,
+	}
+	decision, err := service.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"system instruction"},{"role":"user","content":"older user input"},{"role":"assistant","content":"previous output"},{"role":"user","content":"latest user input"}]}`)})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, DecisionAllow, decision.Kind)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"latest user input", "previous output"}, seen)
+}
+
+func TestPromptServiceRejectsInvalidDeleteConfirmationClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Date(2026, 7, 16, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	start, end := now.Add(-time.Hour), now.Add(time.Hour)
+	filter := EventFilter{Decision: string(EventCritical), StartAt: &start, EndAt: &end}
+	const snapshotMaxID int64 = 10
+	filterHash := FilterHash(filter, snapshotMaxID)
+	validClaims := deleteClaims{
+		FilterHash: filterHash, SnapshotMaxID: snapshotMaxID, AdminID: 7,
+		IssuedAt: now, ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),
+	}
+	claimsToken := func(claims deleteClaims) string {
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(claims)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		return string(raw)
+	}
+	validRequest := DeleteByFilterRequest{
+		Filter: filter, SnapshotMaxID: snapshotMaxID, FilterHash: filterHash,
+		ConfirmationToken: claimsToken(validClaims), Confirm: true,
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		request DeleteByFilterRequest
+		adminID int64
+	}{
+		{name: "confirm false", request: func() DeleteByFilterRequest { value := validRequest; value.Confirm = false; return value }(), adminID: 7},
+		{name: "malformed token", request: func() DeleteByFilterRequest {
+			value := validRequest
+			value.ConfirmationToken = "not-json"
+			return value
+		}(), adminID: 7},
+		{name: "different administrator", request: validRequest, adminID: 8},
+		{name: "filter hash mismatch", request: func() DeleteByFilterRequest {
+			value := validRequest
+			value.FilterHash = strings.Repeat("b", 64)
+			return value
+		}(), adminID: 7},
+		{name: "snapshot mismatch", request: func() DeleteByFilterRequest { value := validRequest; value.SnapshotMaxID++; return value }(), adminID: 7},
+		{name: "expired", request: func() DeleteByFilterRequest {
+			value := validRequest
+			claims := validClaims
+			claims.ExpiresAt = now
+			value.ConfirmationToken = claimsToken(claims)
+			return value
+		}(), adminID: 7},
+	}
+
+	service := &PromptService{config: &fakeConfigStore{}, clock: fixedClock{now: now}}
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result, err := service.DeleteByFilter(context.Background(), test.request, test.adminID)
+			require.Error(t, err)
+			require.Nil(t, result)
+		})
+	}
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot.go

@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"regexp"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+)
+
+var (
+	ErrNoPromptText = errors.New("prompt audit request contains no user text")
+
+	bearerPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+\-/]+=*`)
+	apiKeyPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(sk|rk|pk|api[_-]?key|token|secret|password)[-_:=\s]+[A-Za-z0-9._~+\-/]{8,}`)
+	canaryPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)([A-Z]+_CANARY_)[A-Za-z0-9_-]+`)
+	emailPattern  = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b[A-Z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b`)
+	phonePattern  = regexp.MustCompile(`(?:\+?\d[\d\s().-]{8,}\d)`)
+)
+
+const promptAuditPrioritySeparator = "\x00SUB2API_PROMPT_AUDIT_PRIORITY_END\x00"
+
+type promptSegment struct {
+	text string
+	user bool
+	role string
+}
+
+func ExtractPromptSnapshot(req Request) (PromptSnapshot, error) {
+	return extractPromptSnapshot(req, false)
+}
+
+// ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot builds the narrow, low-latency blocking input
+// when configured. Asynchronous auditing always uses ExtractPromptSnapshot so
+// the complete client-controlled transcript is retained for review.
+func ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot(req Request, latestTurnOnly bool) (PromptSnapshot, error) {
+	return extractPromptSnapshot(req, latestTurnOnly)
+}
+
+func extractPromptSnapshot(req Request, latestTurnOnly bool) (PromptSnapshot, error) {
+	var document any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(req.Body, &document); err != nil {
+		return PromptSnapshot{}, errors.New("prompt audit request JSON is invalid")
+	}
+	extracted := extractProtocolSegments(req.Protocol, document)
+	segments := normalizeSegmentsLatestUserFirst(extracted)
+	if latestTurnOnly {
+		segments = blockingSegmentsLatestUserAndPreviousOutput(extracted)
+	}
+	if len(segments) == 0 {
+		return PromptSnapshot{}, ErrNoPromptText
+	}
+	scanText, metadataText := buildPrioritizedScanText(segments)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(metadataText))
+	stage := strings.TrimSpace(req.Stage)
+	if stage == "" {
+		stage = "http"
+	}
+	return PromptSnapshot{
+		RequestID: req.RequestID, UserID: req.UserID, UsernameSnapshot: req.Username,
+		UserEmailSnapshot: req.UserEmail, APIKeyID: req.APIKeyID, APIKeyNameSnapshot: req.APIKeyName,
+		GroupID: cloneInt64Ptr(req.GroupID), GroupName: req.GroupName, Provider: req.Provider,
+		Endpoint: req.Endpoint, Protocol: req.Protocol, Model: req.Model,
+		PromptHash: hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]), RedactedPreview: BuildPromptPreview(metadataText, DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes),
+		FullPrompt:   BuildFullPrompt(metadataText, DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes),
+		PromptLength: utf8.RuneCountInString(metadataText), MessageCount: len(segments), Stage: stage,
+		ScanText: scanText,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes caps how much sanitized prompt text may be
+// considered before BuildPromptPreview withholds the majority for storage/UI.
+const DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes = 96
+
+// DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes caps how much unredacted prompt text is persisted
+// on an audit event for admin review. It is deliberately generous so realistic
+// prompts are kept intact while bounding per-row storage.
+const DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes = 65536
+
+func extractProtocolSegments(protocol string, document any) []promptSegment {
+	root, _ := document.(map[string]any)
+	protocol = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(protocol))
+	switch protocol {
+	case "openai_chat_completions", "openai_chat", "chat_completions":
+		return extractChatLikeSegments(root)
+	case "anthropic_messages", "claude_messages", "messages":
+		return append(extractAnthropicSystem(root["system"]), extractMessages(root["messages"], clientInstructionRoles...)...)
+	case "gemini", "gemini_generate_content":
+		return extractGeminiRoot(root)
+	case "openai_responses", "responses", "responses_websocket":
+		if frameType := stringValue(root["type"]); frameType != "" || protocol == "responses_websocket" {
+			if frameType != "response.create" {
+				return nil
+			}
+			if input, exists := root["input"]; exists && input != nil {
+				return append(extractInstructions(root["instructions"]), extractResponses(input)...)
+			}
+			if response, ok := root["response"].(map[string]any); ok {
+				return append(extractInstructions(response["instructions"]), extractResponses(response["input"])...)
+			}
+			return extractInstructions(root["instructions"])
+		}
+		return append(extractInstructions(root["instructions"]), extractResponses(root["input"])...)
+	case "openai_images", "grok_media", "media", "images":
+		return userPromptSegments(extractMediaPrompts(root))
+	default:
+		if segments := extractChatLikeSegments(root); len(segments) > 0 {
+			return segments
+		}
+		if responses := append(extractInstructions(root["instructions"]), extractResponses(root["input"])...); len(responses) > 0 {
+			return responses
+		}
+		if gemini := extractGeminiRoot(root); len(gemini) > 0 {
+			return gemini
+		}
+		return userPromptSegments(extractMediaPrompts(root))
+	}
+}
+
+// clientInstructionRoles are roles a client may freely populate. Attackers can
+// place jailbreak/PII text in assistant/tool turns, so blocking audit must scan
+// them too—not only user/system/developer instructions.
+var clientInstructionRoles = []string{"user", "system", "developer", "assistant", "tool"}
+
+func extractChatLikeSegments(root map[string]any) []promptSegment {
+	if root == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return extractMessages(root["messages"], clientInstructionRoles...)
+}
+
+func extractMessages(value any, wantedRoles ...string) []promptSegment {
+	items, ok := value.([]any)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	wanted := make(map[string]struct{}, len(wantedRoles))
+	for _, role := range wantedRoles {
+		wanted[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(role))] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	result := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(items))
+	for _, item := range items {
+		message, ok := item.(map[string]any)
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(message["role"]))
+		if _, match := wanted[role]; !match {
+			continue
+		}
+		texts := contentTexts(message["content"])
+		for _, text := range texts {
+			result = append(result, promptSegment{text: text, user: role == "user", role: role})
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func extractInstructions(value any) []promptSegment {
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case string:
+		if text := strings.TrimSpace(typed); text != "" {
+			return []promptSegment{{text: text, role: "system"}}
+		}
+	case []any:
+		return systemPromptSegments(contentTexts(typed))
+	case map[string]any:
+		return systemPromptSegments(contentTexts(typed))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func extractAnthropicSystem(value any) []promptSegment {
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case string:
+		if text := strings.TrimSpace(typed); text != "" {
+			return []promptSegment{{text: text, role: "system"}}
+		}
+	case []any:
+		return systemPromptSegments(contentTexts(typed))
+	case map[string]any:
+		return systemPromptSegments(contentTexts(typed))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func extractResponses(value any) []promptSegment {
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case string:
+		return []promptSegment{{text: typed, user: true, role: "user"}}
+	case []any:
+		result := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(typed))
+		for _, item := range typed {
+			switch entry := item.(type) {
+			case string:
+				result = append(result, promptSegment{text: entry, user: true, role: "user"})
+			case map[string]any:
+				role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(entry["role"]))
+				if role != "" && !isClientInstructionRole(role) {
+					continue
+				}
+				if content, exists := entry["content"]; exists {
+					for _, text := range contentTexts(content) {
+						result = append(result, promptSegment{text: text, user: role == "" || role == "user", role: role})
+					}
+				} else if text := stringValue(entry["text"]); text != "" {
+					result = append(result, promptSegment{text: text, user: role == "" || role == "user", role: role})
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return result
+	case map[string]any:
+		role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(typed["role"]))
+		if role != "" && !isClientInstructionRole(role) {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return promptSegmentsForRole(contentTexts(typed["content"]), role)
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+func isClientInstructionRole(role string) bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(role)) {
+	case "user", "system", "developer", "assistant", "tool", "model":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func extractGemini(value any) []promptSegment {
+	var contents []any
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case []any:
+		contents = typed
+	case map[string]any:
+		contents = []any{typed}
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+	result := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(contents))
+	for _, item := range contents {
+		content, ok := item.(map[string]any)
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(content["role"]))
+		if role != "" && !isClientInstructionRole(role) {
+			continue
+		}
+		parts, _ := content["parts"].([]any)
+		for _, part := range parts {
+			if object, ok := part.(map[string]any); ok {
+				if text := stringValue(object["text"]); text != "" {
+					result = append(result, promptSegment{text: text, user: role == "" || role == "user", role: role})
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func extractGeminiRoot(root map[string]any) []promptSegment {
+	if root == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	result := extractGeminiSystemInstruction(root["systemInstruction"])
+	result = append(result, extractGeminiSystemInstruction(root["system_instruction"])...)
+	result = append(result, extractGemini(root["contents"])...)
+	result = append(result, extractGemini(root["content"])...)
+	result = append(result, extractGeminiInstances(root["instances"])...)
+	if requests, ok := root["requests"].([]any); ok {
+		for _, item := range requests {
+			request, ok := item.(map[string]any)
+			if !ok {
+				continue
+			}
+			result = append(result, extractGeminiSystemInstruction(request["systemInstruction"])...)
+			result = append(result, extractGeminiSystemInstruction(request["system_instruction"])...)
+			result = append(result, extractGemini(request["contents"])...)
+			result = append(result, extractGemini(request["content"])...)
+			result = append(result, extractGeminiInstances(request["instances"])...)
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func extractGeminiSystemInstruction(value any) []promptSegment {
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case string:
+		if text := strings.TrimSpace(typed); text != "" {
+			return []promptSegment{{text: text, role: "system"}}
+		}
+	case map[string]any:
+		if parts, ok := typed["parts"].([]any); ok {
+			result := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(parts))
+			for _, part := range parts {
+				if object, ok := part.(map[string]any); ok {
+					if text := stringValue(object["text"]); text != "" {
+						result = append(result, promptSegment{text: text, role: "system"})
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			return result
+		}
+		return systemPromptSegments(contentTexts(typed))
+	case []any:
+		segments := extractGemini(typed)
+		for index := range segments {
+			segments[index].user = false
+			segments[index].role = "system"
+		}
+		return segments
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func extractGeminiInstances(value any) []promptSegment {
+	instances, ok := value.([]any)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	result := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(instances))
+	for _, item := range instances {
+		if instance, ok := item.(map[string]any); ok {
+			if prompt := stringValue(instance["prompt"]); prompt != "" {
+				result = append(result, promptSegment{text: prompt, user: true, role: "user"})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func extractMediaPrompts(root map[string]any) []string {
+	if root == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	result := make([]string, 0, 4)
+	seen := map[string]struct{}{}
+	var walk func(any, string)
+	walk = func(value any, key string) {
+		switch typed := value.(type) {
+		case map[string]any:
+			keys := make([]string, 0, len(typed))
+			for childKey := range typed {
+				keys = append(keys, childKey)
+			}
+			sort.Strings(keys)
+			for _, childKey := range keys {
+				walk(typed[childKey], childKey)
+			}
+		case []any:
+			for _, item := range typed {
+				walk(item, key)
+			}
+		case string:
+			if !isMediaPromptKey(key) || looksLikeMediaPayload(typed) {
+				return
+			}
+			text := strings.TrimSpace(typed)
+			if text == "" {
+				return
+			}
+			if _, duplicate := seen[text]; duplicate {
+				return
+			}
+			seen[text] = struct{}{}
+			result = append(result, text)
+		}
+	}
+	walk(root, "")
+	return result
+}
+
+func isMediaPromptKey(key string) bool {
+	normalized := strings.NewReplacer("_", "", "-", "").Replace(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key)))
+	switch normalized {
+	case "prompt", "inputprompt", "textprompt", "description", "query", "lyrics", "negativeprompt",
+		"positiveprompt", "gptdescriptionprompt", "prompten", "finalprompt", "finalzhprompt",
+		"origprompt", "actualprompt", "imageprompt", "input":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+func looksLikeMediaPayload(value string) bool {
+	trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(value)
+	lower := strings.ToLower(trimmed)
+	if strings.HasPrefix(lower, "data:image/") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "data:video/") ||
+		strings.HasPrefix(lower, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "https://") {
+		return true
+	}
+	if len(trimmed) >= 256 {
+		for _, r := range trimmed {
+			alphaNumeric := (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
+			if !alphaNumeric && r != '+' && r != '/' && r != '=' {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func contentTexts(value any) []string {
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case string:
+		return []string{typed}
+	case []any:
+		result := make([]string, 0, len(typed))
+		for _, part := range typed {
+			object, ok := part.(map[string]any)
+			if !ok {
+				continue
+			}
+			typeName := strings.ToLower(stringValue(object["type"]))
+			if typeName != "" && typeName != "text" && typeName != "input_text" && typeName != "output_text" {
+				continue
+			}
+			if text := stringValue(object["text"]); text != "" {
+				result = append(result, text)
+			}
+		}
+		return result
+	case map[string]any:
+		if text := stringValue(typed["text"]); text != "" {
+			return []string{text}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func normalizeSegmentsLatestUserFirst(values []promptSegment) []string {
+	normalized := normalizedPromptSegments(values)
+	if len(normalized) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	priorityIndex := len(normalized) - 1
+	for index := len(normalized) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
+		if isUserSegment(normalized[index]) {
+			priorityIndex = index
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(normalized))
+	result = append(result, normalized[priorityIndex].text)
+	for index, segment := range normalized {
+		if index != priorityIndex {
+			result = append(result, segment.text)
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+// blockingSegmentsLatestUserAndPreviousOutput limits synchronous guard input to
+// the current user turn and the nearest preceding assistant/model turn. It is
+// deliberately opt-in because full transcript scanning remains stronger at
+// finding client-controlled content placed in older or non-user messages.
+func blockingSegmentsLatestUserAndPreviousOutput(values []promptSegment) []string {
+	normalized := normalizedPromptSegments(values)
+	latestUserStart := latestUserSegmentStart(normalized)
+	if latestUserStart < 0 {
+		// A request without user content cannot be narrowed safely. Preserve the
+		// established full-snapshot behavior for unusual protocol payloads.
+		return normalizeSegmentsLatestUserFirst(values)
+	}
+	latestUserEnd := latestUserStart
+	for latestUserEnd < len(normalized) && isUserSegment(normalized[latestUserEnd]) {
+		latestUserEnd++
+	}
+	currentUserText := make([]string, 0, latestUserEnd-latestUserStart)
+	for _, segment := range normalized[latestUserStart:latestUserEnd] {
+		currentUserText = append(currentUserText, segment.text)
+	}
+	// A single client turn may have several text content parts. Keep it in one
+	// priority segment so every part of the latest input is scanned before the
+	// prior output begins.
+	selected := []promptSegment{{text: strings.Join(currentUserText, "\n\n"), user: true, role: "user"}}
+	for index := latestUserStart - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
+		if !isAssistantOutputSegment(normalized[index]) {
+			continue
+		}
+		start := index
+		for start > 0 && isAssistantOutputSegment(normalized[start-1]) {
+			start--
+		}
+		selected = append(selected, normalized[start:index+1]...)
+		break
+	}
+	return promptSegmentTexts(selected)
+}
+
+func normalizedPromptSegments(values []promptSegment) []promptSegment {
+	normalized := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(values))
+	for _, value := range values {
+		value.text = strings.TrimSpace(value.text)
+		if value.text != "" {
+			normalized = append(normalized, value)
+		}
+	}
+	return normalized
+}
+
+func latestUserSegmentStart(values []promptSegment) int {
+	latest := -1
+	for index := len(values) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
+		if isUserSegment(values[index]) {
+			latest = index
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	for latest > 0 && isUserSegment(values[latest-1]) {
+		latest--
+	}
+	return latest
+}
+
+func isUserSegment(segment promptSegment) bool {
+	return segment.user || segment.role == "user"
+}
+
+func isAssistantOutputSegment(segment promptSegment) bool {
+	return segment.role == "assistant" || segment.role == "model"
+}
+
+func promptSegmentTexts(values []promptSegment) []string {
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
+	for _, value := range values {
+		result = append(result, value.text)
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func buildPrioritizedScanText(segments []string) (scanText string, metadataText string) {
+	metadataText = strings.Join(segments, "\n\n")
+	if len(segments) <= 1 {
+		return metadataText, metadataText
+	}
+	return segments[0] + promptAuditPrioritySeparator + strings.Join(segments[1:], "\n\n"), metadataText
+}
+
+func promptSegmentsForRole(texts []string, role string) []promptSegment {
+	result := make([]promptSegment, 0, len(texts))
+	for _, text := range texts {
+		result = append(result, promptSegment{text: text, user: role == "" || role == "user", role: role})
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func userPromptSegments(texts []string) []promptSegment {
+	return promptSegmentsForRole(texts, "user")
+}
+
+func systemPromptSegments(texts []string) []promptSegment {
+	return promptSegmentsForRole(texts, "system")
+}
+
+func RedactPreview(value string, maxRunes int) string {
+	value = bearerPattern.ReplaceAllString(value, "Bearer ***")
+	value = apiKeyPattern.ReplaceAllStringFunc(value, func(match string) string {
+		if index := strings.IndexAny(match, ":= \t"); index >= 0 {
+			return match[:index+1] + "***"
+		}
+		return "***"
+	})
+	value = canaryPattern.ReplaceAllString(value, "${1}***")
+	value = emailPattern.ReplaceAllString(value, "***@***")
+	value = phonePattern.ReplaceAllString(value, "***PHONE***")
+	return TrimRunes(value, maxRunes)
+}
+
+// BuildPromptPreview stores only a short, non-recoverable head of sanitized
+// input. Ordinary confidential prompts must not land nearly intact in PostgreSQL
+// or the admin UI merely because no secret regex matched.
+func BuildPromptPreview(value string, maxRunes int) string {
+	if maxRunes <= 0 {
+		maxRunes = DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes
+	}
+	redacted := strings.TrimSpace(RedactPreview(value, maxRunes))
+	if redacted == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	runes := []rune(redacted)
+	hadTruncation := strings.HasSuffix(redacted, "…")
+	if hadTruncation && len(runes) > 0 {
+		runes = runes[:len(runes)-1]
+	}
+	if len(runes) == 0 {
+		return "***…"
+	}
+	// Short unlabelled secrets would otherwise leak a recoverable prefix (e.g.
+	// 20 runes → 5 visible). Fully withhold anything below the keep threshold.
+	const minLengthForPartialPreview = 32
+	if len(runes) < minLengthForPartialPreview {
+		if hadTruncation {
+			return "***…"
+		}
+		return "***"
+	}
+	// Keep at most a quarter of the already-truncated text, and never more than
+	// 24 runes, so the majority of prompt content is withheld by default.
+	keep := len(runes) / 4
+	if keep > 24 {
+		keep = 24
+	}
+	preview := string(runes[:keep]) + "***"
+	if hadTruncation || keep < len(runes) {
+		preview += "…"
+	}
+	return preview
+}
+
+// BuildFullPrompt returns the complete prompt text for audit-event storage and
+// admin review, without redaction. NUL bytes are stripped because PostgreSQL
+// TEXT rejects them, and the result is capped at maxRunes.
+func BuildFullPrompt(value string, maxRunes int) string {
+	if maxRunes <= 0 {
+		maxRunes = DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes
+	}
+	value = strings.ReplaceAll(value, "\x00", "")
+	return TrimRunes(strings.TrimSpace(value), maxRunes)
+}
+
+// FullPromptFromScanText reconstructs the display prompt from the worker scan
+// payload. buildPrioritizedScanText inserts exactly one priority separator
+// between the prioritized segment and the remainder, so replacing it with the
+// metadata joiner yields the original multi-segment text.
+func FullPromptFromScanText(scanText string) string {
+	return BuildFullPrompt(strings.ReplaceAll(scanText, promptAuditPrioritySeparator, "\n\n"), DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes)
+}
+
+func TrimRunes(value string, limit int) string {
+	if limit <= 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	runes := []rune(value)
+	if len(runes) <= limit {
+		return value
+	}
+	return string(runes[:limit]) + "…"
+}
+
+func stringValue(value any) string {
+	text, _ := value.(string)
+	return strings.TrimSpace(text)
+}
+
+func cloneInt64Ptr(value *int64) *int64 {
+	if value == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	cloned := *value
+	return &cloned
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestExtractPromptSnapshotProtocols(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		protocol, body, first string
+		count                 int
+	}{
+		{"openai_chat_completions", `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"old"},{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant turn"},{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"最新😀"}]}]}`, "最新😀", 3},
+		{"openai_responses", `{"input":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"response text"}]}]}`, "response text", 1},
+		{"anthropic_messages", `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"claude"}]}]}`, "claude", 1},
+		{"gemini", `{"contents":[{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"gemini"},{"inline_data":{"data":"BASE64"}}]}]}`, "gemini", 1},
+		{"openai_images", `{"prompt":"draw a cat","image":"BASE64SECRET"}`, "draw a cat", 1},
+		{"responses_websocket", `{"type":"response.create","response":{"input":"turn two"}}`, "turn two", 1},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.protocol, func(t *testing.T) {
+			snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: tt.protocol, Body: []byte(tt.body), Stage: "http"})
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.ScanText, tt.first))
+			require.Equal(t, tt.count, snapshot.MessageCount)
+			require.Equal(t, utf8.RuneCountInString(metadataTextForTest(snapshot.ScanText)), snapshot.PromptLength)
+			require.NotEmpty(t, snapshot.PromptHash)
+			require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "BASE64SECRET")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSnapshotRedactsCanariesAndPreservesHashOfScanText(t *testing.T) {
+	body := `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"PROMPT_CANARY_ABC123 email@example.com +86 138 0013 8000 Bearer AUTH_CANARY_XYZ sk-secretvalue123 password=supersecret123"}]}`
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(body)})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "ABC123")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "email@example.com")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "AUTH_CANARY_XYZ")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "secretvalue123")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "supersecret123")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "138 0013 8000")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "PROMPT_CANARY_ABC123")
+	require.NotEqual(t, snapshot.ScanText, snapshot.RedactedPreview)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(metadataTextForTest(snapshot.ScanText)))
+	require.Equal(t, hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]), snapshot.PromptHash)
+	require.Empty(t, snapshot.Redacted().ScanText)
+}
+
+func TestSnapshotFullPromptKeepsUnredactedText(t *testing.T) {
+	body := `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"PROMPT_CANARY_ABC123 email@example.com sk-secretvalue123"}]}`
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(body)})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	// The full prompt is stored verbatim for admin review, unlike the preview.
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.FullPrompt, "PROMPT_CANARY_ABC123 email@example.com sk-secretvalue123")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.RedactedPreview, "PROMPT_CANARY_ABC123")
+	require.Equal(t, snapshot.FullPrompt, snapshot.Redacted().FullPrompt)
+}
+
+func TestBuildFullPromptStripsNULAndTruncates(t *testing.T) {
+	require.Equal(t, "abcd", BuildFullPrompt("ab\x00cd", 0))
+	long := strings.Repeat("长", DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes+10)
+	trimmed := BuildFullPrompt(long, DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes)
+	require.Equal(t, DefaultFullPromptMaxRunes+1, utf8.RuneCountInString(trimmed))
+	require.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, "…"))
+}
+
+func TestFullPromptFromScanTextRestoresMultiSegmentLayout(t *testing.T) {
+	scanText, metadataText := buildPrioritizedScanText([]string{"latest user", "system policy", "earlier user"})
+	require.Contains(t, scanText, promptAuditPrioritySeparator)
+	require.Equal(t, metadataText, FullPromptFromScanText(scanText))
+
+	singleScan, singleMeta := buildPrioritizedScanText([]string{"only"})
+	require.NotContains(t, singleScan, promptAuditPrioritySeparator)
+	require.Equal(t, singleMeta, FullPromptFromScanText(singleScan))
+}
+
+func TestSplitRunesDoesNotSplitUTF8(t *testing.T) {
+	chunks := SplitRunes("中文😀éabc", 2)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"中文", "😀e", "́a", "bc"}, chunks)
+	for _, chunk := range chunks {
+		require.True(t, utf8.ValidString(chunk))
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, "中文😀éabc", strings.Join(chunks, ""))
+}
+
+func TestSplitRunesKeepsPrioritySegmentIndependent(t *testing.T) {
+	latest := "请帮我编写一篇黄色小说 名字你来取"
+	history := strings.Repeat("AGENTS.md 项目约束。", 40)
+	chunks := SplitRunes(latest+promptAuditPrioritySeparator+history, 128)
+	require.Greater(t, len(chunks), 2)
+	require.Equal(t, latest, chunks[0])
+	require.Equal(t, history, strings.Join(chunks[1:], ""))
+	for _, chunk := range chunks {
+		require.NotContains(t, chunk, promptAuditPrioritySeparator)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotLatestUserTextBlockIsOnePrioritizedSegment(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{
+		"messages":[
+			{"role":"user","content":"历史输入"},
+			{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant client injection"},
+			{"role":"tool","content":"tool client injection"},
+			{"role":"user","content":[
+				{"type":"text","text":"最新第一块😀"},
+				{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"_CANARY_BASE64"}},
+				{"type":"text","text":"最新第二块é"}
+			]}
+		]
+	}`)
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: body})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 5, snapshot.MessageCount)
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.ScanText, "最新第二块é"+promptAuditPrioritySeparator))
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "最新第一块😀")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "历史输入")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "assistant client injection")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "tool client injection")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "IMAGE_CANARY_BASE64")
+	require.Equal(t, utf8.RuneCountInString(metadataTextForTest(snapshot.ScanText)), snapshot.PromptLength)
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotSeparatesAnthropicUserPromptFromHarnessBlocks(t *testing.T) {
+	latest := "请帮我编写一篇黄色小说 名字你来取"
+	agents := "# AGENTS.md instructions\n<INSTRUCTIONS>" + strings.Repeat("安全约束。", 80) + "</INSTRUCTIONS>"
+	environment := "<environment_context><cwd>/workspace</cwd></environment_context>"
+	body := []byte(`{"system":"system policy","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[` +
+		`{"type":"text","text":` + string(mustJSON(t, agents)) + `},` +
+		`{"type":"text","text":` + string(mustJSON(t, environment)) + `},` +
+		`{"type":"text","text":` + string(mustJSON(t, latest)) + `}` +
+		`]}]}`)
+
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "anthropic_messages", Body: body})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 4, snapshot.MessageCount)
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.ScanText, latest+promptAuditPrioritySeparator))
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.RedactedPreview, "请帮我编写一篇黄色小说"))
+
+	chunks := SplitRunes(snapshot.ScanText, 128)
+	require.Equal(t, latest, chunks[0])
+	require.Contains(t, strings.Join(chunks[1:], ""), "# AGENTS.md instructions")
+	require.Contains(t, strings.Join(chunks[1:], ""), "<environment_context>")
+	require.NotContains(t, strings.Join(chunks, ""), promptAuditPrioritySeparator)
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotResponsesShapes(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		body string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{name: "string", body: `{"input":"plain response input"}`, want: "plain response input"},
+		{name: "message array", body: `{"input":[{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant turn"},{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"message block"}]}]}`, want: "message block\n\nassistant turn"},
+		{name: "direct input text", body: `{"input":[{"type":"input_text","text":"direct block"}]}`, want: "direct block"},
+		{name: "single object", body: `{"input":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"single object"}]}}`, want: "single object"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_responses", Body: []byte(tt.body)})
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want, metadataTextForTest(snapshot.ScanText))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotGeminiBatchShapesAndMediaExclusion(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{
+		"contents":{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"root content"},{"inlineData":{"data":"ROOT_BASE64"}}]},
+		"instances":[{"prompt":"instance prompt"}],
+		"requests":[
+			{"contents":[{"role":"model","parts":[{"text":"ignore model"}]},{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"nested user"}]}]},
+			{"instances":[{"prompt":"nested instance"}]}
+		]
+	}`)
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "gemini", Body: body})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.ScanText, "nested instance"))
+	for _, expected := range []string{"root content", "instance prompt", "nested user", "nested instance"} {
+		require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, expected)
+	}
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "ROOT_BASE64")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "ignore model")
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotMediaOnlyExtractsDeterministicTextPrompts(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{
+		"prompt":"draw a lighthouse",
+		"image":"_CANARY",
+		"input":{"negative_prompt":"no fog","image_prompt":"https://example.test/input.png","prompt":"draw a lighthouse"},
+		"request":{"lyrics":"ocean song","input":"` + strings.Repeat("A", 300) + `"},
+		"images":[{"description":"nested textual direction","image_url":"https://example.test/image.png"}]
+	}`)
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "grok_media", Body: body})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 4, snapshot.MessageCount)
+	for _, expected := range []string{"draw a lighthouse", "no fog", "ocean song", "nested textual direction"} {
+		require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, expected)
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, 1, strings.Count(snapshot.ScanText, "draw a lighthouse"))
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "IMAGE_CANARY")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "example.test")
+	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, strings.Repeat("A", 100))
+}
+
+func TestResponsesWebSocketOnlyAuditsResponseCreateAndPreservesStage(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, stage := range []string{"first_turn", "subsequent_turn"} {
+		snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{
+			Protocol: "openai_responses", Stage: stage,
+			Body: []byte(`{"type":"response.create","response":{"model":"gpt-test","input":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"ws turn"}]}]}}`),
+		})
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, "ws turn", snapshot.ScanText)
+		require.Equal(t, stage, snapshot.Stage)
+	}
+	_, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{
+		Protocol: "openai_responses", Stage: "subsequent_turn",
+		Body: []byte(`{"type":"conversation.item.create","response":{"input":"must not scan this frame"}}`),
+	})
+	require.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrNoPromptText))
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotEmptyAndLongUnicodeInput(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"function","content":"not audited role"},{"role":"user","content":"  "}]}`)})
+	require.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrNoPromptText))
+
+	latest := strings.Repeat("最新😀é", 80)
+	history := strings.Repeat("历史中文", 80)
+	body := []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":` + string(mustJSON(t, history)) + `},{"role":"user","content":` + string(mustJSON(t, latest)) + `}]}`)
+	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: body})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.ScanText, latest))
+	chunks := SplitRunes(snapshot.ScanText, 127)
+	require.Equal(t, strings.Replace(snapshot.ScanText, promptAuditPrioritySeparator, "", 1), strings.Join(chunks, ""))
+	require.Equal(t, latest, chunks[0]+strings.Join(chunks[1:len(SplitRunes(latest, 127))], ""))
+	for _, chunk := range chunks {
+		require.LessOrEqual(t, len([]rune(chunk)), 127)
+		require.True(t, utf8.ValidString(chunk))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPromptSnapshotIncludesClientControlledInstructions(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name, protocol, body string
+		want                 []string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "openai system developer assistant tool",
+			protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+			body:     `{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"system jailbreak"},{"role":"developer","content":"developer policy"},{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant jailbreak"},{"role":"tool","content":"tool payload"},{"role":"user","content":"hello"}]}`,
+			want:     []string{"system jailbreak", "developer policy", "assistant jailbreak", "tool payload", "hello"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "openai system only",
+			protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+			body:     `{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"only system instruction"}]}`,
+			want:     []string{"only system instruction"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "responses instructions",
+			protocol: "openai_responses",
+			body:     `{"instructions":"response instructions","input":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"user turn"}]}]}`,
+			want:     []string{"response instructions", "user turn"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "anthropic system",
+			protocol: "anthropic_messages",
+			body:     `{"system":"claude system","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"claude user"}]}]}`,
+			want:     []string{"claude system", "claude user"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "gemini systemInstruction",
+			protocol: "gemini",
+			body:     `{"systemInstruction":{"parts":[{"text":"gemini system"}]},"contents":[{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"gemini user"}]}]}`,
+			want:     []string{"gemini system", "gemini user"},
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: tt.protocol, Body: []byte(tt.body)})
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			for _, expected := range tt.want {
+				require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBlockingPromptSnapshotLimitsInputToLatestUserAndPreviousOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name, protocol, body, want string
+		omitted                    []string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "chat keeps multipart latest user and prior assistant",
+			protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
+			body: `{"messages":[
+				{"role":"system","content":"system instruction"},
+				{"role":"user","content":"older user input"},
+				{"role":"assistant","content":"older assistant output"},
+				{"role":"tool","content":"tool payload"},
+				{"role":"assistant","content":"previous assistant output"},
+				{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"latest user first part"},{"type":"text","text":"latest user second part"}]}
+			]}`,
+			want:    "latest user first part\n\nlatest user second part" + promptAuditPrioritySeparator + "previous assistant output",
+			omitted: []string{"system instruction", "older user input", "older assistant output", "tool payload"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "gemini keeps prior model output",
+			protocol: "gemini",
+			body: `{"systemInstruction":{"parts":[{"text":"system instruction"}]},"contents":[
+				{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"older user input"}]},
+				{"role":"model","parts":[{"text":"previous model output"}]},
+				{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"latest user input"}]}
+			]}`,
+			want:    "latest user input" + promptAuditPrioritySeparator + "previous model output",
+			omitted: []string{"system instruction", "older user input"},
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			snapshot, err := ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: tt.protocol, Body: []byte(tt.body)}, true)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want, snapshot.ScanText)
+			for _, omitted := range tt.omitted {
+				require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, omitted)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestContentTextsIncludesSupportedTextTypes(t *testing.T) {
+	value := []any{
+		map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "plain text"},
+		map[string]any{"type": "input_text", "text": "input text"},
+		map[string]any{"type": "output_text", "text": "output text"},
+		map[string]any{"type": "image_url", "text": "ignored text"},
+	}
+
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"plain text", "input text", "output text"}, contentTexts(value))
+}
+
+func TestResponsesOutputTextIncludedInFullAndLatestTurnSnapshots(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{"input":[
+		{"type":"message","role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"earlier user input"}]},
+		{"type":"message","role":"assistant","status":"completed","content":[{"type":"output_text","annotations":[],"text":"captured previous assistant output"}]},
+		{"type":"message","role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"captured latest user input"}]}
+	]}`)
+
+	req := Request{Protocol: "openai_responses", Body: body}
+	full, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, full.ScanText, "captured previous assistant output")
+	require.Contains(t, full.FullPrompt, "captured previous assistant output")
+	require.Equal(t, 3, full.MessageCount)
+
+	latestTurn, err := ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot(req, true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "captured latest user input"+promptAuditPrioritySeparator+"captured previous assistant output", latestTurn.ScanText)
+	require.Equal(t, 2, latestTurn.MessageCount)
+	require.NotContains(t, latestTurn.ScanText, "earlier user input")
+}
+
+func TestBlockingPromptSnapshotPreservesFullScopeByDefaultAndWithoutUserInput(t *testing.T) {
+	req := Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"system instruction"},{"role":"user","content":"older user input"},{"role":"assistant","content":"previous output"},{"role":"user","content":"latest user input"}]}`)}
+	full, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(req)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defaultBlocking, err := ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot(req, false)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, full, defaultBlocking)
+
+	noUser := Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"system instruction"},{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant output"}]}`)}
+	fullWithoutUser, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(noUser)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	narrowWithoutUser, err := ExtractBlockingPromptSnapshot(noUser, true)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, fullWithoutUser, narrowWithoutUser)
+}
+
+func TestBuildPromptPreviewWithholdsMajorityOfOrdinaryText(t *testing.T) {
+	prompt := strings.Repeat("机密业务提示词内容", 40)
+	preview := BuildPromptPreview(prompt, DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, preview)
+	require.Contains(t, preview, "***")
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, utf8.RuneCountInString(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSuffix(preview, "…"), "***")), 24)
+	require.Less(t, utf8.RuneCountInString(preview), utf8.RuneCountInString(prompt)/2)
+	require.NotContains(t, preview, prompt)
+}
+
+func TestBuildPromptPreviewFullyMasksShortUnlabelledSecrets(t *testing.T) {
+	require.Equal(t, "***", BuildPromptPreview("short-secret-value!!", DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes))
+	require.Equal(t, "***", BuildPromptPreview(strings.Repeat("a", 31), DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes))
+	partial := BuildPromptPreview(strings.Repeat("b", 32), DefaultPromptPreviewMaxRunes)
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(partial, "b"))
+	require.Contains(t, partial, "***")
+}
+
+func mustJSON(t *testing.T, value string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(value)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return raw
+}
+
+func metadataTextForTest(scanText string) string {
+	return strings.Replace(scanText, promptAuditPrioritySeparator, "\n\n", 1)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_types.go

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig = "prompt_audit_config"
+	SettingKeyRiskControl       = "risk_control_enabled"
+
+	ConfigInvalidationChannel = "sub2api:prompt_guard:config:invalidate"
+	PayloadKeyPrefix          = "sub2api:prompt_audit:payload:"
+
+	ErrorCodeBlocked               = "prompt_guard_blocked"
+	ErrorCodeUnavailable           = "prompt_guard_unavailable"
+	ErrorCodeInvalidResponse       = "prompt_guard_invalid_response"
+	ErrorCodeConfigConflict        = "prompt_audit_config_conflict"
+	ErrorCodeConfigUnavailable     = "prompt_audit_config_unavailable"
+	ErrorCodeEncryptionKeyRequired = "prompt_audit_encryption_key_required"
+	ErrorCodeRequiresEnabled       = "prompt_guard_requires_audit_enabled"
+
+	DefaultGuardModel = "sileader/qwen3guard:0.6b"
+)
+
+type Mode string
+
+const (
+	ModeOff      Mode = "off"
+	ModeAsync    Mode = "async_audit"
+	ModeBlocking Mode = "blocking"
+)
+
+type DecisionKind string
+
+const (
+	DecisionAllow       DecisionKind = "allow"
+	DecisionFlag        DecisionKind = "flag"
+	DecisionBlock       DecisionKind = "block"
+	DecisionUnavailable DecisionKind = "unavailable"
+	DecisionInvalid     DecisionKind = "invalid"
+)
+
+type EventDecision string
+
+const (
+	EventPass     EventDecision = "pass"
+	EventFlag     EventDecision = "flag"
+	EventCritical EventDecision = "critical"
+)
+
+type RiskLevel string
+
+const (
+	RiskLow      RiskLevel = "low"
+	RiskMedium   RiskLevel = "medium"
+	RiskHigh     RiskLevel = "high"
+	RiskCritical RiskLevel = "critical"
+)
+
+type Action string
+
+const (
+	ActionAllow Action = "Allow"
+	ActionWarn  Action = "Warn"
+	ActionBlock Action = "Block"
+)
+
+type Request struct {
+	RequestID  string
+	UserID     int64
+	Username   string
+	UserEmail  string
+	APIKeyID   int64
+	APIKeyName string
+	GroupID    *int64
+	GroupName  string
+	Provider   string
+	Endpoint   string
+	Protocol   string
+	Model      string
+	Body       []byte
+	Stage      string
+}
+
+func (r Request) Clone() Request {
+	r.Body = append([]byte(nil), r.Body...)
+	if r.GroupID != nil {
+		id := *r.GroupID
+		r.GroupID = &id
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+type PromptSnapshot struct {
+	RequestID          string `json:"request_id"`
+	UserID             int64  `json:"user_id"`
+	UsernameSnapshot   string `json:"username"`
+	UserEmailSnapshot  string `json:"user_email"`
+	APIKeyID           int64  `json:"api_key_id"`
+	APIKeyNameSnapshot string `json:"api_key_name"`
+	GroupID            *int64 `json:"group_id,omitempty"`
+	GroupName          string `json:"group_name"`
+	Provider           string `json:"provider"`
+	Endpoint           string `json:"endpoint"`
+	Protocol           string `json:"protocol"`
+	Model              string `json:"model"`
+	PromptHash         string `json:"prompt_hash"`
+	RedactedPreview    string `json:"redacted_preview"`
+	FullPrompt         string `json:"full_prompt"`
+	PromptLength       int    `json:"prompt_length"`
+	MessageCount       int    `json:"message_count"`
+	Stage              string `json:"stage"`
+
+	ScanText string `json:"-"`
+}
+
+func (s PromptSnapshot) Redacted() PromptSnapshot {
+	s.ScanText = ""
+	return s
+}
+
+type NormalizedResult struct {
+	Decision          EventDecision      `json:"decision"`
+	RiskLevel         RiskLevel          `json:"risk_level"`
+	Action            Action             `json:"action"`
+	Safety            string             `json:"safety"`
+	Categories        []string           `json:"categories"`
+	MatchedScanners   []string           `json:"matched_scanners"`
+	ScannerScores     map[string]float64 `json:"scanner_scores"`
+	ScannerEvidence   map[string]string  `json:"scanner_evidence"`
+	ScannerBackend    string             `json:"scanner_backend"`
+	ScannerVersion    string             `json:"scanner_version"`
+	GuardEndpointID   string             `json:"guard_endpoint_id"`
+	PolicyID          string             `json:"policy_id"`
+	PolicyVersion     int                `json:"policy_version"`
+	ChunkTotal        int                `json:"chunk_total"`
+	LatencyMS         int                `json:"latency_ms"`
+	UnknownCategories []string           `json:"unknown_categories,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type PromptDecision struct {
+	Kind           DecisionKind      `json:"kind"`
+	ErrorCode      string            `json:"error_code,omitempty"`
+	Result         *NormalizedResult `json:"result,omitempty"`
+	AllowNextStage bool              `json:"allow_next_stage"`
+}
+
+type LegacyDecision struct {
+	Allowed    bool   `json:"allowed"`
+	Blocked    bool   `json:"blocked"`
+	Flagged    bool   `json:"flagged"`
+	Message    string `json:"message"`
+	StatusCode int    `json:"status_code"`
+	ErrorCode  string `json:"error_code"`
+	Action     string `json:"action"`
+}
+
+type Decision struct {
+	Kind           DecisionKind    `json:"kind"`
+	HTTPStatus     int             `json:"http_status"`
+	ErrorCode      string          `json:"error_code,omitempty"`
+	ClientMessage  string          `json:"client_message,omitempty"`
+	Legacy         *LegacyDecision `json:"legacy,omitempty"`
+	Prompt         *PromptDecision `json:"prompt,omitempty"`
+	AllowNextStage bool            `json:"allow_next_stage"`
+}
+
+type IssueSummary struct {
+	Category      string  `json:"category"`
+	ScannerID     string  `json:"scanner_id"`
+	Title         string  `json:"title"`
+	Description   string  `json:"description"`
+	Severity      string  `json:"severity"`
+	SeverityLabel string  `json:"severity_label"`
+	Action        string  `json:"action"`
+	ActionLabel   string  `json:"action_label"`
+	Code          string  `json:"code"`
+	Score         float64 `json:"score"`
+	Evidence      string  `json:"evidence"`
+	EvidenceHash  string  `json:"evidence_hash"`
+	StartRune     *int    `json:"start_rune,omitempty"`
+	EndRune       *int    `json:"end_rune,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type ProbeResult struct {
+	OK           bool      `json:"ok"`
+	Status       string    `json:"status"`
+	ErrorCode    string    `json:"error_code,omitempty"`
+	Message      string    `json:"message"`
+	LatencyMS    int       `json:"latency_ms"`
+	HTTPStatus   int       `json:"http_status"`
+	Retryable    bool      `json:"retryable"`
+	CheckedAt    time.Time `json:"checked_at"`
+	TokenApplied bool      `json:"token_applied"`
+}
+
+type GuardMetricsSnapshot struct {
+	Total        int64 `json:"total"`
+	Allowed      int64 `json:"allowed"`
+	Flagged      int64 `json:"flagged"`
+	Blocked      int64 `json:"blocked"`
+	Unavailable  int64 `json:"unavailable"`
+	Invalid      int64 `json:"invalid"`
+	Timeouts     int64 `json:"timeouts"`
+	Failovers    int64 `json:"failovers"`
+	BulkheadFull int64 `json:"bulkhead_full"`
+	RecordFailed int64 `json:"record_failed"`
+	LatencyCount int64 `json:"latency_count"`
+	LatencyAvgMS int64 `json:"latency_avg_ms"`
+	LatencyP50MS int64 `json:"latency_p50_ms"`
+	LatencyP95MS int64 `json:"latency_p95_ms"`
+	LatencyP99MS int64 `json:"latency_p99_ms"`
+	LatencyMaxMS int64 `json:"latency_max_ms"`
+}
+
+type AuditMetricsSnapshot struct {
+	Enqueued int64 `json:"enqueued"`
+	Dropped  int64 `json:"dropped"`
+}
+
+type QueueStats struct {
+	Staging    int64 `json:"staging"`
+	Queued     int64 `json:"queued"`
+	Processing int64 `json:"processing"`
+	Retry      int64 `json:"retry"`
+	Done       int64 `json:"done"`
+	Failed     int64 `json:"failed"`
+	Active     int64 `json:"active"`
+}
+
+type RuntimeSnapshot struct {
+	ProcessStatus         string                 `json:"process_status"`
+	EffectiveMode         Mode                   `json:"effective_mode"`
+	ExpectedConfigVersion int64                  `json:"expected_config_version"`
+	ActiveConfigVersion   int64                  `json:"active_config_version"`
+	ConfigLoadedAt        *time.Time             `json:"config_loaded_at,omitempty"`
+	ConfigLoadError       string                 `json:"config_load_error,omitempty"`
+	WorkerTotal           int                    `json:"worker_total"`
+	WorkerActive          int64                  `json:"worker_active"`
+	WorkerHeartbeatAt     *time.Time             `json:"worker_heartbeat_at,omitempty"`
+	QueueCapacity         int                    `json:"queue_capacity"`
+	Queue                 QueueStats             `json:"queue"`
+	ProcessedTotal        int64                  `json:"processed_total"`
+	FailedTotal           int64                  `json:"failed_total"`
+	EnqueuedTotal         int64                  `json:"enqueued_total"`
+	DroppedTotal          int64                  `json:"dropped_total"`
+	LastProcessedAt       *time.Time             `json:"last_processed_at,omitempty"`
+	LastErrorCode         string                 `json:"last_error_code,omitempty"`
+	LastErrorMessage      string                 `json:"last_error_message,omitempty"`
+	DatabaseStatus        string                 `json:"database_status"`
+	RedisStatus           string                 `json:"redis_status"`
+	Endpoints             map[string]ProbeResult `json:"endpoints"`
+	GuardMetrics          GuardMetricsSnapshot   `json:"guard_metrics"`
+}
+
+type Clock interface {
+	Now() time.Time
+}
+
+type realClock struct{}
+
+func (realClock) Now() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() }
+
+type Metrics interface {
+	Snapshot() GuardMetricsSnapshot
+	AuditSnapshot() AuditMetricsSnapshot
+	Observe(kind DecisionKind, latency time.Duration)
+	IncEnqueued()
+	IncDropped()
+	IncTimeout()
+	IncFailover()
+	IncBulkheadFull()
+	IncRecordFailed()
+}
+
+type PromptScanner interface {
+	Scan(ctx context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, enabledScanners []string) (*NormalizedResult, error)
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_worker.go

@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type WorkerRuntime struct {
+	active           atomic.Int64
+	processed        atomic.Int64
+	failed           atomic.Int64
+	heartbeatNS      atomic.Int64
+	lastProcessedNS  atomic.Int64
+	lastErrorMu      sync.RWMutex
+	lastErrorCode    string
+	lastErrorMessage string
+}
+
+type Runner struct {
+	config  ConfigStore
+	repo    JobRepository
+	payload PayloadStore
+	scanner PromptScanner
+	metrics Metrics
+	clock   Clock
+	runtime WorkerRuntime
+
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	cancel context.CancelFunc
+	wg     sync.WaitGroup
+}
+
+func NewRunner(config ConfigStore, repo JobRepository, payload PayloadStore, scanner PromptScanner, metrics Metrics) *Runner {
+	return &Runner{config: config, repo: repo, payload: payload, scanner: scanner, metrics: metrics, clock: realClock{}}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if r == nil || r.config == nil || r.repo == nil || r.payload == nil || r.scanner == nil {
+		return errors.New("prompt audit worker dependencies unavailable")
+	}
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	if r.cancel != nil {
+		r.mu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+	runCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+	r.cancel = cancel
+	r.mu.Unlock()
+	if err := r.payload.Ping(runCtx); err != nil {
+		r.setLastError("payload_store_unavailable", err.Error())
+	}
+	for workerID := 0; workerID < MaxWorkerCount; workerID++ {
+		r.wg.Add(1)
+		go r.worker(runCtx, workerID)
+	}
+	r.wg.Add(1)
+	go r.reclaimer(runCtx)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
+	if r == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	cancel := r.cancel
+	r.cancel = nil
+	r.mu.Unlock()
+	if cancel != nil {
+		cancel()
+	}
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() { r.wg.Wait(); close(done) }()
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+		return nil
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		LogWarn(EventProcessFailed, map[string]any{"status": "shutdown_timeout", "error_code": "worker_shutdown_timeout"})
+		return ctx.Err()
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) worker(ctx context.Context, workerID int) {
+	defer r.wg.Done()
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			r.runtime.heartbeatNS.Store(r.clock.Now().UnixNano())
+			cfg, ok := r.config.Active()
+			if !ok || !cfg.RiskControlEnabled || !cfg.Enabled || workerID >= cfg.WorkerCount {
+				continue
+			}
+			for {
+				job, claimed, err := r.repo.ClaimNextJob(ctx, r.clock.Now())
+				if err != nil {
+					r.setLastError("claim_job_failed", err.Error())
+					break
+				}
+				if !claimed {
+					break
+				}
+				r.runtime.active.Add(1)
+				r.processSafely(ctx, workerID, cfg, job)
+				r.runtime.active.Add(-1)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) processSafely(ctx context.Context, workerID int, cfg ActiveConfig, job *Job) {
+	defer func() {
+		if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
+			r.runtime.failed.Add(1)
+			// Panic values may contain scanner response fragments or prompt data.
+			// Keep only a stable generic message in runtime state and logs.
+			r.setLastError("worker_panic", "worker panic recovered")
+			_ = r.repo.Fail(ctx, job.ID, job.ClaimVersion, "worker_panic", "worker panic recovered")
+			LogError(EventProcessFailed, mergeLogFields(jobLogFields(job), map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "status": "failed", "error_code": "worker_panic"}))
+		}
+	}()
+	if err := r.processJob(ctx, workerID, cfg, job); err != nil {
+		r.runtime.failed.Add(1)
+	} else {
+		r.runtime.processed.Add(1)
+		r.runtime.lastProcessedNS.Store(r.clock.Now().UnixNano())
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) processJob(ctx context.Context, workerID int, cfg ActiveConfig, job *Job) error {
+	baseFields := jobLogFields(job)
+	LogInfo(EventAuditStarted, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "attempts": job.Attempts, "status": "processing"}))
+	scanText, err := r.payload.Get(ctx, job.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return r.finishFailure(ctx, job, &GuardError{Code: "payload_missing", Retryable: false, Cause: err})
+	}
+	// The job row only carries redacted metadata; the full prompt for the audit
+	// event is reconstructed here from the transient scan payload.
+	job.Snapshot.FullPrompt = FullPromptFromScanText(scanText)
+	endpoints := cfg.EnabledEndpoints()
+	if len(endpoints) == 0 {
+		return r.finishFailure(ctx, job, &GuardError{Code: "no_enabled_endpoint", Retryable: true})
+	}
+	chunks := SplitRunes(scanText, minimumInputLimit(endpoints))
+	results := make([]*NormalizedResult, 0, len(chunks))
+	started := r.clock.Now()
+	for index, chunk := range chunks {
+		if err := r.repo.RefreshLease(ctx, job.ID, job.ClaimVersion, r.clock.Now()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		chunkStarted := r.clock.Now()
+		LogInfo(EventChunkStarted, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "chunk_index": index + 1, "chunk_total": len(chunks), "chunk_chars": len([]rune(chunk)), "input_chars": job.Snapshot.PromptLength, "input_limit": minimumInputLimit(endpoints), "status": "started"}))
+		result, scanErr := scanWithFailover(ctx, r.scanner, cfg.Scanners, endpoints, chunk, r.metrics)
+		if scanErr != nil {
+			LogWarn(EventChunkFailed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+				"worker_id": workerID, "chunk_index": index + 1, "chunk_total": len(chunks),
+				"chunk_chars": len([]rune(chunk)), "input_chars": job.Snapshot.PromptLength,
+				"input_limit": minimumInputLimit(endpoints), "latency_ms": r.clock.Now().Sub(chunkStarted).Milliseconds(),
+				"error_code": guardErrorCode(scanErr), "status": "failed",
+			}))
+			r.observeAsyncFailure(scanErr, r.clock.Now().Sub(started))
+			return r.finishFailure(ctx, job, scanErr)
+		}
+		results = append(results, result)
+		LogInfo(EventChunkCompleted, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "chunk_index": index + 1, "chunk_total": len(chunks), "guard_endpoint_id": result.GuardEndpointID, "action": result.Action, "latency_ms": r.clock.Now().Sub(chunkStarted).Milliseconds(), "status": "completed"}))
+		if result.Action == ActionBlock {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	aggregated, err := AggregateResults(results, r.clock.Now().Sub(started))
+	if err != nil {
+		if r.metrics != nil {
+			r.metrics.Observe(DecisionInvalid, r.clock.Now().Sub(started))
+		}
+		return r.finishFailure(ctx, job, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Cause: err})
+	}
+	aggregated.ChunkTotal = len(chunks)
+	if r.metrics != nil {
+		r.metrics.Observe(decisionKindForResult(aggregated), r.clock.Now().Sub(started))
+	}
+	LogInfo(EventChunksAggregated, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{
+		"worker_id": workerID, "decision": aggregated.Decision, "risk_level": aggregated.RiskLevel,
+		"action": aggregated.Action, "chunk_total": aggregated.ChunkTotal,
+		"latency_ms": aggregated.LatencyMS, "guard_endpoint_id": aggregated.GuardEndpointID, "status": "completed",
+	}))
+	event, err := r.repo.Complete(ctx, job, aggregated, cfg.StorePassEvents)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if deleteErr := r.payload.Delete(ctx, job.ID); deleteErr != nil {
+		LogWarn(EventProcessFailed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "status": "payload_delete_deferred", "error_code": "payload_delete_failed"}))
+	}
+	LogInfo(EventProcessed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "event_id": eventID(event), "decision": aggregated.Decision, "risk_level": aggregated.RiskLevel, "action": aggregated.Action, "guard_endpoint_id": aggregated.GuardEndpointID, "latency_ms": aggregated.LatencyMS, "status": "done"}))
+	if event != nil && aggregated.Decision != EventPass {
+		LogWarn(EventFindingRecorded, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"worker_id": workerID, "event_id": event.ID, "decision": aggregated.Decision, "risk_level": aggregated.RiskLevel, "action": aggregated.Action, "guard_endpoint_id": aggregated.GuardEndpointID, "status": "recorded"}))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) observeAsyncFailure(err error, latency time.Duration) {
+	if r == nil || r.metrics == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	kind := DecisionUnavailable
+	if guardErrorCode(err) == ErrorCodeInvalidResponse {
+		kind = DecisionInvalid
+	}
+	r.metrics.Observe(kind, latency)
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	if errors.As(err, &guardErr) && guardErr.Timeout {
+		r.metrics.IncTimeout()
+	}
+}
+
+func decisionKindForResult(result *NormalizedResult) DecisionKind {
+	if result == nil {
+		return DecisionInvalid
+	}
+	switch result.Action {
+	case ActionBlock:
+		return DecisionBlock
+	case ActionWarn:
+		return DecisionFlag
+	default:
+		return DecisionAllow
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) finishFailure(ctx context.Context, job *Job, err error) error {
+	baseFields := jobLogFields(job)
+	code := guardErrorCode(err)
+	retryable := false
+	var guardErr *GuardError
+	if errors.As(err, &guardErr) {
+		retryable = guardErr.Retryable
+	}
+	if retryable && job.Attempts < job.MaxAttempts {
+		next := r.clock.Now().Add(retryBackoff(job.Attempts))
+		if updateErr := r.repo.Retry(ctx, job.ID, job.ClaimVersion, next, code, "prompt guard temporarily unavailable"); updateErr != nil {
+			return updateErr
+		}
+		LogWarn(EventProcessFailed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"attempts": job.Attempts, "max_attempts": job.MaxAttempts, "status": "retry", "error_code": code, "retryable": true}))
+	} else {
+		if updateErr := r.repo.Fail(ctx, job.ID, job.ClaimVersion, code, "prompt guard processing failed"); updateErr != nil {
+			return updateErr
+		}
+		_ = r.payload.Delete(ctx, job.ID)
+		LogError(EventProcessFailed, mergeLogFields(baseFields, map[string]any{"attempts": job.Attempts, "max_attempts": job.MaxAttempts, "status": "failed", "error_code": code, "retryable": false}))
+	}
+	r.setLastError(code, err.Error())
+	return err
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) reclaimer(ctx context.Context) {
+	defer r.wg.Done()
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Minute)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			now := r.clock.Now()
+			count, err := r.repo.ReclaimStale(ctx, now.Add(-2*time.Minute), now.Add(-90*time.Second), 100)
+			if err != nil {
+				r.setLastError("reclaim_failed", err.Error())
+				continue
+			}
+			if count > 0 {
+				LogWarn(EventProcessingReclaimed, map[string]any{"reclaimed_total": count, "status": "reclaimed"})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) Snapshot() (active, processed, failed int64, heartbeat, lastProcessed *time.Time, code, message string) {
+	if r == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	active, processed, failed = r.runtime.active.Load(), r.runtime.processed.Load(), r.runtime.failed.Load()
+	if ns := r.runtime.heartbeatNS.Load(); ns > 0 {
+		value := time.Unix(0, ns).UTC()
+		heartbeat = &value
+	}
+	if ns := r.runtime.lastProcessedNS.Load(); ns > 0 {
+		value := time.Unix(0, ns).UTC()
+		lastProcessed = &value
+	}
+	r.runtime.lastErrorMu.RLock()
+	code, message = r.runtime.lastErrorCode, r.runtime.lastErrorMessage
+	r.runtime.lastErrorMu.RUnlock()
+	return
+}
+
+func (r *Runner) setLastError(code, _ string) {
+	code, message := sanitizeStoredError(code)
+	r.runtime.lastErrorMu.Lock()
+	r.runtime.lastErrorCode = code
+	r.runtime.lastErrorMessage = message
+	r.runtime.lastErrorMu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func scanWithFailover(ctx context.Context, scanner PromptScanner, scanners []string, endpoints []ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, metrics Metrics) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+	var lastErr error
+	for index, endpoint := range endpoints {
+		result, err := scanner.Scan(ctx, endpoint, chunk, scanners)
+		if err == nil && result != nil {
+			return result, nil
+		}
+		if err == nil {
+			err = &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Retryable: false}
+		}
+		lastErr = err
+		var guardErr *GuardError
+		if !errors.As(err, &guardErr) || !guardErr.Retryable {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if index < len(endpoints)-1 && metrics != nil {
+			metrics.IncFailover()
+		}
+	}
+	if lastErr == nil {
+		lastErr = &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable}
+	}
+	return nil, lastErr
+}
+
+func retryBackoff(attempt int) time.Duration {
+	switch attempt {
+	case 1:
+		return 5 * time.Second
+	case 2:
+		return 30 * time.Second
+	default:
+		return 2 * time.Minute
+	}
+}
+
+func eventID(event *Event) int64 {
+	if event == nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return event.ID
+}

backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_worker_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+package securityaudit
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"reflect"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type fixedClock struct{ now time.Time }
+
+func (c fixedClock) Now() time.Time { return c.now }
+
+type advancingClock struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	now  time.Time
+	step time.Duration
+}
+
+func (c *advancingClock) Now() time.Time {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	c.now = c.now.Add(c.step)
+	return c.now
+}
+
+type fakeConfigStore struct {
+	cfg    ActiveConfig
+	active bool
+}
+
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Start(context.Context) error    { return nil }
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Shutdown(context.Context) error { return nil }
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Active() (ActiveConfig, bool)   { return cloneActiveConfig(s.cfg), s.active }
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) EffectiveMode() Mode {
+	if s.BlockingActivationDegraded() {
+		return ModeBlocking
+	}
+	if !s.active {
+		return ModeOff
+	}
+	return s.cfg.EffectiveMode()
+}
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) BlockingActivationDegraded() bool { return false }
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Public() (PublicConfig, error)    { return PublicConfig{}, nil }
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Save(context.Context, UpdateConfigRequest, int64) (PublicConfig, error) {
+	return PublicConfig{}, nil
+}
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) RuntimeState() (int64, int64, *time.Time, string) {
+	return s.cfg.ConfigVersion, s.cfg.ConfigVersion, nil, ""
+}
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Encrypt(value string) (string, error) { return value, nil }
+func (s *fakeConfigStore) Decrypt(value string) (string, error) { return value, nil }
+
+type fakeJobRepository struct {
+	mu sync.Mutex
+
+	trace       *[]string
+	createJob   *Job
+	createErr   error
+	publishErr  error
+	refreshErr  error
+	completeErr error
+	retryErr    error
+	failErr     error
+
+	createdSnapshot PromptSnapshot
+	markedCode      string
+	completedResult *NormalizedResult
+	completedStore  bool
+	completeCount   int
+	eventCount      int
+	retryAt         time.Time
+	retryCode       string
+	retried         int
+	failedCode      string
+	failed          int
+	refreshes       int
+
+	claimQueue []*Job
+
+	recordBlockingCalls    int
+	recordBlockingSnapshot PromptSnapshot
+	recordBlockingResult   *NormalizedResult
+	recordBlockingErr      error
+}
+
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) record(value string) {
+	if r.trace != nil {
+		*r.trace = append(*r.trace, value)
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) CreateStagingWithCapacity(_ context.Context, snapshot PromptSnapshot, _ int64, _, _ int) (*Job, error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.record("create_staging")
+	r.createdSnapshot = snapshot
+	if r.createErr != nil {
+		return nil, r.createErr
+	}
+	if r.createJob == nil {
+		r.createJob = &Job{ID: 1, Snapshot: snapshot}
+	}
+	return r.createJob, nil
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) PublishQueued(context.Context, int64) error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.record("publish_queued")
+	return r.publishErr
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) MarkStagingFailed(_ context.Context, _ int64, code, _ string) error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.record("mark_staging_failed")
+	r.markedCode = code
+	return nil
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) ClaimNextJob(context.Context, time.Time) (*Job, bool, error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(r.claimQueue) == 0 {
+		return nil, false, nil
+	}
+	job := r.claimQueue[0]
+	r.claimQueue = r.claimQueue[1:]
+	return job, true, nil
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) RefreshLease(context.Context, int64, int64, time.Time) error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.refreshes++
+	return r.refreshErr
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) Complete(_ context.Context, _ *Job, result *NormalizedResult, storePass bool) (*Event, error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.completeCount++
+	r.completedResult, r.completedStore = result, storePass
+	if r.completeErr != nil {
+		return nil, r.completeErr
+	}
+	if result.Decision == EventPass && !storePass {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	r.eventCount++
+	return &Event{ID: 99, Decision: result.Decision}, nil
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) Retry(_ context.Context, _, _ int64, next time.Time, code, _ string) error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.retried++
+	r.retryAt, r.retryCode = next, code
+	return r.retryErr
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) Fail(_ context.Context, _, _ int64, code, _ string) error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.failed++
+	r.failedCode = code
+	return r.failErr
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) ReclaimStale(context.Context, time.Time, time.Time, int) (int64, error) {
+	return 0, nil
+}
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) QueueStats(context.Context) (QueueStats, error) { return QueueStats{}, nil }
+func (r *fakeJobRepository) RecordBlocking(_ context.Context, snapshot PromptSnapshot, _ int64, result *NormalizedResult, _ bool) (*Event, error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.recordBlockingCalls++
+	r.recordBlockingSnapshot, r.recordBlockingResult = snapshot, result
+	return nil, r.recordBlockingErr
+}
+
+type fakePayloadStore struct {
+	mu sync.Mutex
+
+	trace     *[]string
+	values    map[int64]string
+	setErr    error
+	getErr    error
+	deleteErr error
+	pingErr   error
+	setTTL    time.Duration
+	deleted   []int64
+}
+
+func (s *fakePayloadStore) Set(_ context.Context, jobID int64, value string, ttl time.Duration) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.trace != nil {
+		*s.trace = append(*s.trace, "payload_set")
+	}
+	if s.setErr != nil {
+		return s.setErr
+	}
+	if s.values == nil {
+		s.values = map[int64]string{}
+	}
+	s.values[jobID], s.setTTL = value, ttl
+	return nil
+}
+func (s *fakePayloadStore) Get(_ context.Context, jobID int64) (string, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.getErr != nil {
+		return "", s.getErr
+	}
+	value, ok := s.values[jobID]
+	if !ok {
+		return "", errors.New("missing")
+	}
+	return value, nil
+}
+func (s *fakePayloadStore) Delete(_ context.Context, jobID int64) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if s.trace != nil {
+		*s.trace = append(*s.trace, "payload_delete")
+	}
+	s.deleted = append(s.deleted, jobID)
+	delete(s.values, jobID)
+	return s.deleteErr
+}
+func (s *fakePayloadStore) Ping(context.Context) error { return s.pingErr }
+
+func asyncConfig() ActiveConfig {
+	return ActiveConfig{
+		RiskControlEnabled: true, Enabled: true, BlockingEnabled: false, Strategy: "priority",
+		WorkerCount: 1, QueueCapacity: 8, Scanners: []string{"pii"}, AllGroups: true, ConfigVersion: 7,
+		Endpoints: []ActiveEndpoint{{ID: "guard", Enabled: true, TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 3}},
+	}
+}
+
+func asyncRequest() Request {
+	return Request{RequestID: "request-async", Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"payload canary text"}]}`)}
+}
+
+func TestEnqueuerStagingPayloadPublishProtocolAndFailureCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		trace := []string{}
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{trace: &trace, createJob: &Job{ID: 41}}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{trace: &trace, values: map[int64]string{}}
+		enqueuer := NewEnqueuer(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload)
+		require.NoError(t, enqueuer.Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest()))
+		require.Equal(t, []string{"create_staging", "payload_set", "publish_queued"}, trace)
+		require.Empty(t, repo.createdSnapshot.ScanText)
+		require.Equal(t, "payload canary text", payload.values[41])
+		require.Equal(t, DefaultPayloadTTL, payload.setTTL)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("queue admission failures never touch payload", func(t *testing.T) {
+		for _, createErr := range []error{ErrQueueFull, ErrQueueAdmissionBusy, errors.New("database down")} {
+			trace := []string{}
+			repo := &fakeJobRepository{trace: &trace, createErr: createErr}
+			payload := &fakePayloadStore{trace: &trace, values: map[int64]string{}}
+			err := NewEnqueuer(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload).Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest())
+			require.ErrorIs(t, err, createErr)
+			require.Equal(t, []string{"create_staging"}, trace)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("payload failure marks staging failed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		trace := []string{}
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{trace: &trace, createJob: &Job{ID: 42}}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{trace: &trace, values: map[int64]string{}, setErr: errors.New("redis down")}
+		err := NewEnqueuer(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload).Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest())
+		require.Error(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, []string{"create_staging", "payload_set", "mark_staging_failed"}, trace)
+		require.Equal(t, "payload_store_failed", repo.markedCode)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("publish failure removes payload and marks staging failed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		trace := []string{}
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{trace: &trace, createJob: &Job{ID: 43}, publishErr: errors.New("publish down")}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{trace: &trace, values: map[int64]string{}}
+		err := NewEnqueuer(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload).Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest())
+		require.Error(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, []string{"create_staging", "payload_set", "publish_queued", "payload_delete", "mark_staging_failed"}, trace)
+		require.Equal(t, "queue_publish_failed", repo.markedCode)
+		require.NotContains(t, payload.values, int64(43))
+	})
+}
+
+func TestEnqueuerSkipsOffOutOfScopeAndNoText(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		cfg  ActiveConfig
+		req  Request
+	}{
+		{name: "off", cfg: ActiveConfig{}, req: asyncRequest()},
+		{name: "out of scope", cfg: func() ActiveConfig {
+			cfg := asyncConfig()
+			cfg.AllGroups = false
+			cfg.GroupIDs = []int64{9}
+			return cfg
+		}(), req: asyncRequest()},
+		{name: "no user text", cfg: asyncConfig(), req: Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"function","content":"not audited"}]}`)}},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+			err := NewEnqueuer(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: tt.cfg, active: true}, repo, &fakePayloadStore{}).Enqueue(context.Background(), tt.req)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Zero(t, repo.createdSnapshot.MessageCount)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnqueuerRecordsAcceptedDroppedAndSkippedMetrics(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("accepted increments enqueued", func(t *testing.T) {
+		metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{createJob: &Job{ID: 44}}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: map[int64]string{}}
+
+		require.NoError(t, NewEnqueuer(
+			&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true},
+			repo,
+			payload,
+			metrics,
+		).Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest()))
+
+		require.Equal(t, AuditMetricsSnapshot{Enqueued: 1}, metrics.AuditSnapshot())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("queue full increments dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
+		metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{createErr: ErrQueueFull}
+
+		err := NewEnqueuer(
+			&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true},
+			repo,
+			&fakePayloadStore{},
+			metrics,
+		).Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest())
+
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrQueueFull)
+		require.Equal(t, AuditMetricsSnapshot{Dropped: 1}, metrics.AuditSnapshot())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("skipped request does not increment dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
+		metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+
+		require.NoError(t, NewEnqueuer(
+			&fakeConfigStore{cfg: ActiveConfig{}, active: true},
+			&fakeJobRepository{},
+			&fakePayloadStore{},
+			metrics,
+		).Enqueue(context.Background(), asyncRequest()))
+
+		require.Equal(t, AuditMetricsSnapshot{}, metrics.AuditSnapshot())
+	})
+}
+
+func workerJob(attempts, maxAttempts int) *Job {
+	return &Job{ID: 51, ClaimVersion: 3, Attempts: attempts, MaxAttempts: maxAttempts, ConfigVersion: 7,
+		Snapshot: PromptSnapshot{RequestID: "worker-request", PromptLength: 6, RedactedPreview: "red***"}}
+}
+
+func TestWorkerCompletesPassWithoutEventRefreshesEveryChunkAndDeletesPayload(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+	payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: map[int64]string{51: "abcdef"}}
+	scannerCalls := 0
+	scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(_ context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		scannerCalls++
+		return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, Safety: "Safe", Categories: []string{}, MatchedScanners: []string{}, ScannerScores: map[string]float64{}, ScannerEvidence: map[string]string{}, GuardEndpointID: endpoint.ID}, nil
+	})
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	runner := NewRunner(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload, scanner, metrics)
+	runner.clock = fixedClock{now: time.Unix(100, 0).UTC()}
+	require.NoError(t, runner.processJob(context.Background(), 0, asyncConfig(), workerJob(1, 3)))
+	require.Equal(t, 2, scannerCalls)
+	require.Equal(t, 2, repo.refreshes)
+	require.NotNil(t, repo.completedResult)
+	require.Equal(t, EventPass, repo.completedResult.Decision)
+	require.False(t, repo.completedStore)
+	require.Equal(t, []int64{51}, payload.deleted)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Total)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Allowed)
+}
+
+func TestWorkerRetryBackoffTerminalFailureAndFailover(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Unix(200, 0).UTC()
+	for _, tt := range []struct {
+		name        string
+		attempts    int
+		maxAttempts int
+		err         *GuardError
+		wantRetry   bool
+		wantBackoff time.Duration
+	}{
+		{name: "first retry", attempts: 1, maxAttempts: 3, err: &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}, wantRetry: true, wantBackoff: 5 * time.Second},
+		{name: "second retry", attempts: 2, maxAttempts: 3, err: &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}, wantRetry: true, wantBackoff: 30 * time.Second},
+		{name: "third retry", attempts: 3, maxAttempts: 4, err: &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}, wantRetry: true, wantBackoff: 2 * time.Minute},
+		{name: "max attempts", attempts: 3, maxAttempts: 3, err: &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}},
+		{name: "invalid terminal", attempts: 1, maxAttempts: 3, err: &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse, Retryable: false}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+			payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: map[int64]string{51: "abc"}}
+			metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+			runner := NewRunner(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload, PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+				return nil, tt.err
+			}), metrics)
+			runner.clock = fixedClock{now: now}
+			err := runner.processJob(context.Background(), 0, asyncConfig(), workerJob(tt.attempts, tt.maxAttempts))
+			require.Error(t, err)
+			if tt.wantRetry {
+				require.Equal(t, 1, repo.retried)
+				require.Equal(t, now.Add(tt.wantBackoff), repo.retryAt)
+				require.Empty(t, payload.deleted)
+			} else {
+				require.Equal(t, 1, repo.failed)
+				require.Equal(t, tt.err.Code, repo.failedCode)
+				require.Equal(t, []int64{51}, payload.deleted)
+			}
+			snapshot := metrics.Snapshot()
+			require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshot.Total)
+			if tt.err.Code == ErrorCodeInvalidResponse {
+				require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshot.Invalid)
+			} else {
+				require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshot.Unavailable)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+	payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: map[int64]string{51: "abc"}}
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(_ context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, _ string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		if endpoint.ID == "first" {
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true}
+		}
+		return integrationResult(EventPass), nil
+	})
+	cfg := asyncConfig()
+	cfg.Endpoints = []ActiveEndpoint{{ID: "first", Enabled: true, InputLimit: 10}, {ID: "second", Enabled: true, InputLimit: 10}}
+	runner := NewRunner(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: cfg, active: true}, repo, payload, scanner, metrics)
+	require.NoError(t, runner.processJob(context.Background(), 0, cfg, workerJob(1, 3)))
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), metrics.Snapshot().Failovers)
+}
+
+func TestWorkerPanicLeaseLossAndLifecycleAreContained(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("panic", func(t *testing.T) {
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: map[int64]string{51: "abc"}}
+		runner := NewRunner(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload, PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			panic("scanner panic canary")
+		}), NewAtomicMetrics())
+		require.NotPanics(t, func() { runner.processSafely(context.Background(), 0, asyncConfig(), workerJob(1, 3)) })
+		_, _, failed, _, _, code, message := runner.Snapshot()
+		require.Equal(t, int64(1), failed)
+		require.Equal(t, "worker_panic", code)
+		require.NotContains(t, message, "canary")
+		require.Equal(t, 1, repo.failed)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("lease loss", func(t *testing.T) {
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{refreshErr: ErrLeaseLost}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: map[int64]string{51: "abc"}}
+		calls := 0
+		runner := NewRunner(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: asyncConfig(), active: true}, repo, payload, PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			calls++
+			return integrationResult(EventPass), nil
+		}), NewAtomicMetrics())
+		require.ErrorIs(t, runner.processJob(context.Background(), 0, asyncConfig(), workerJob(1, 3)), ErrLeaseLost)
+		require.Zero(t, calls)
+		require.Zero(t, repo.retried)
+		require.Zero(t, repo.failed)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("start and shutdown", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cfg := asyncConfig()
+		cfg.Enabled = false
+		configStore := &fakeConfigStore{cfg: cfg, active: true}
+		repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+		payload := &fakePayloadStore{pingErr: errors.New("redis unavailable")}
+		runner := NewRunner(configStore, repo, payload, PromptScannerFunc(func(context.Context, ActiveEndpoint, string, []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+			return integrationResult(EventPass), nil
+		}), NewAtomicMetrics())
+		require.NoError(t, runner.Start(context.Background()))
+		require.NoError(t, runner.Start(context.Background()))
+		_, _, _, _, _, code, _ := runner.Snapshot()
+		require.Equal(t, "payload_store_unavailable", code)
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		require.NoError(t, runner.Shutdown(ctx))
+		require.NoError(t, runner.Shutdown(ctx))
+	})
+
+	t.Run("shutdown timeout is bounded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		runner := &Runner{}
+		release := make(chan struct{})
+		runner.wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer runner.wg.Done()
+			<-release
+		}()
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Millisecond)
+		defer cancel()
+		require.ErrorIs(t, runner.Shutdown(ctx), context.DeadlineExceeded)
+		close(release)
+		ctx2, cancel2 := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
+		defer cancel2()
+		require.NoError(t, runner.Shutdown(ctx2))
+	})
+}
+
+func TestPromptAuditSyntheticAsyncBaseline(t *testing.T) {
+	const totalRequests = 100
+	cfg := asyncConfig()
+	cfg.Endpoints[0].InputLimit = 256
+	cfg.StorePassEvents = false
+	repo := &fakeJobRepository{}
+	payload := &fakePayloadStore{values: make(map[int64]string, totalRequests)}
+	metrics := NewAtomicMetrics()
+	knownBenignFindings := 0
+	knownMaliciousBlocked := 0
+	scanner := PromptScannerFunc(func(_ context.Context, endpoint ActiveEndpoint, chunk string, _ []string) (*NormalizedResult, error) {
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasPrefix(chunk, "benign"):
+			return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventPass, RiskLevel: RiskLow, Action: ActionAllow, Safety: "Safe", GuardEndpointID: endpoint.ID}, nil
+		case strings.HasPrefix(chunk, "flag"):
+			return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventFlag, RiskLevel: RiskMedium, Action: ActionWarn, Safety: "Controversial", Categories: []string{"politically_sensitive_topics"}, GuardEndpointID: endpoint.ID}, nil
+		case strings.HasPrefix(chunk, "block"):
+			knownMaliciousBlocked++
+			return &NormalizedResult{Decision: EventCritical, RiskLevel: RiskCritical, Action: ActionBlock, Safety: "Unsafe", Categories: []string{"jailbreak"}, GuardEndpointID: endpoint.ID}, nil
+		case strings.HasPrefix(chunk, "invalid"):
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeInvalidResponse}
+		default:
+			return nil, &GuardError{Code: ErrorCodeUnavailable, Retryable: true, Timeout: true}
+		}
+	})
+	runner := NewRunner(&fakeConfigStore{cfg: cfg, active: true}, repo, payload, scanner, metrics)
+	runner.clock = &advancingClock{now: time.Unix(1_000, 0).UTC(), step: time.Millisecond}
+
+	for index := 1; index <= totalRequests; index++ {
+		text := fmt.Sprintf("benign-%03d", index)
+		switch {
+		case index > 90 && index <= 95:
+			text = fmt.Sprintf("flag-%03d", index)
+		case index > 95 && index <= 98:
+			text = fmt.Sprintf("block-%03d", index)
+		case index == 99:
+			text = "invalid-099"
+		case index == 100:
+			text = "timeout-100"
+		}
+		jobID := int64(index)
+		payload.values[jobID] = text
+		job := &Job{ID: jobID, ClaimVersion: 1, Attempts: 1, MaxAttempts: 1, ConfigVersion: cfg.ConfigVersion,
+			Snapshot: PromptSnapshot{RequestID: fmt.Sprintf("baseline-%03d", index), PromptLength: len([]rune(text)), RedactedPreview: "synthetic"}}
+		err := runner.processJob(context.Background(), 0, cfg, job)
+		if index <= 98 {
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+		} else {
+			require.Error(t, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	snapshot := metrics.Snapshot()
+	require.Equal(t, int64(totalRequests), snapshot.Total)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(90), snapshot.Allowed)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(5), snapshot.Flagged)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(3), snapshot.Blocked)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshot.Invalid)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshot.Unavailable)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), snapshot.Timeouts)
+	require.Zero(t, knownBenignFindings)
+	require.Equal(t, 3, knownMaliciousBlocked)
+	require.Equal(t, 98, repo.completeCount)
+	require.Equal(t, 8, repo.eventCount, "store_pass_events=false only grows events for flag/block fixtures")
+	require.Positive(t, snapshot.LatencyP50MS)
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, snapshot.LatencyP50MS, snapshot.LatencyP95MS)
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, snapshot.LatencyP95MS, snapshot.LatencyP99MS)
+	t.Logf("synthetic async baseline: p50=%dms p95=%dms p99=%dms failure_rate=2%% false_positive_rate=0%% event_growth=8/100", snapshot.LatencyP50MS, snapshot.LatencyP95MS, snapshot.LatencyP99MS)
+}
+
+func TestRequestCloneOwnsMutableInputs(t *testing.T) {
+	groupID := int64(7)
+	req := Request{Body: []byte("original"), GroupID: &groupID}
+	clone := req.Clone()
+	clone.Body[0] = 'X'
+	*clone.GroupID = 8
+	require.Equal(t, []byte("original"), req.Body)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(7), *req.GroupID)
+	require.False(t, reflect.ValueOf(req.Body).Pointer() == reflect.ValueOf(clone.Body).Pointer())
+}