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379 lines
10 KiB
Go
379 lines
10 KiB
Go
// Package ip 提供客户端 IP 地址提取工具。
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package ip
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import (
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"net"
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"strings"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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)
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const forwardedIPSettingsKey = "sub2api.forwarded_ip_settings"
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type forwardedIPSettings struct {
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trustForwarded bool
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headers []string
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}
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// SetForwardedIPSettings snapshots the forwarded-IP mode and custom header list
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// for this request.
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func SetForwardedIPSettings(c *gin.Context, enabled bool, headers []string) {
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if c == nil {
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return
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}
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c.Set(forwardedIPSettingsKey, forwardedIPSettings{
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trustForwarded: enabled,
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headers: append([]string(nil), headers...),
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})
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}
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// SetLegacyForwardedIPTrust records whether raw forwarding headers override
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// Gin's server.trusted_proxies chain for this request.
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func SetLegacyForwardedIPTrust(c *gin.Context, enabled bool) {
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SetForwardedIPSettings(c, enabled, nil)
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}
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func requestForwardedIPSettings(c *gin.Context) (forwardedIPSettings, bool) {
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if c == nil {
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return forwardedIPSettings{}, false
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}
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value, ok := c.Get(forwardedIPSettingsKey)
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if !ok {
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return forwardedIPSettings{}, false
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}
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settings, ok := value.(forwardedIPSettings)
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return settings, ok
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}
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func requestUsesLegacyForwardedIPTrust(c *gin.Context) bool {
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settings, ok := requestForwardedIPSettings(c)
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return !ok || settings.trustForwarded
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}
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// GetClientIP resolves the client address using the legacy forwarding-header
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// precedence used before the trusted-proxy hardening. It remains the
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// compatibility path for request metadata and usage/error logs; security-
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// sensitive callers must use GetTrustedClientIP or GetSecurityClientIP.
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func GetClientIP(c *gin.Context) string {
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if c == nil {
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return ""
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}
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if !requestUsesLegacyForwardedIPTrust(c) {
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return GetTrustedClientIP(c)
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}
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settings, _ := requestForwardedIPSettings(c)
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customIP, customFallback := resolveCustomForwardedClientIP(c, settings.headers)
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if customIP != "" {
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return customIP
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}
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// Preserve the historical precedence used by existing reverse-proxy
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// deployments, while skipping an internal proxy address when a public XFF
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// value is available. This covers Docker/Nginx setups that accidentally
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// write the bridge address into X-Real-IP.
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legacyIP, legacyFallback := resolveLegacyForwardedHeaderIP(c)
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if legacyIP != "" {
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return legacyIP
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}
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if customFallback != "" {
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return customFallback
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}
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if legacyFallback != "" {
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return legacyFallback
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}
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return normalizeIP(c.ClientIP())
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}
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func resolveCustomForwardedClientIP(c *gin.Context, headers []string) (string, string) {
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if c == nil {
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return "", ""
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}
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var fallback string
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for _, header := range headers {
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for _, value := range c.Request.Header.Values(header) {
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for _, candidate := range strings.Split(value, ",") {
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parsed := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(candidate))
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if parsed == nil {
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continue
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}
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normalized := parsed.String()
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if isPrivateIP(normalized) {
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if fallback == "" {
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fallback = normalized
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}
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continue
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}
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return normalized, fallback
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}
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}
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}
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return "", fallback
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}
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func resolveLegacyForwardedHeaderIP(c *gin.Context) (string, string) {
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var fallback string
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if forwarded := normalizeValidIP(c.GetHeader("CF-Connecting-IP")); forwarded != "" {
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fallback = forwarded
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if !isPrivateIP(forwarded) {
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return forwarded, fallback
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}
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}
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if realIP := normalizeValidIP(c.GetHeader("X-Real-IP")); realIP != "" {
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if fallback == "" {
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fallback = realIP
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}
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if !isPrivateIP(realIP) {
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return realIP, fallback
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}
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}
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if xff := c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
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for _, candidate := range ips {
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candidate = normalizeValidIP(candidate)
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if candidate != "" && !isPrivateIP(candidate) {
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return candidate, fallback
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}
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}
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if fallback == "" {
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for _, candidate := range ips {
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if candidate = normalizeValidIP(candidate); candidate != "" {
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fallback = candidate
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break
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return "", fallback
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}
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// GetTrustedClientIP 从 Gin 的可信代理解析链提取客户端 IP。
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// 该方法依赖 gin.Engine.SetTrustedProxies 配置,不会优先直接信任原始转发头值。
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// 适用于 ACL / 风控等安全敏感场景。
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func GetTrustedClientIP(c *gin.Context) string {
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if c == nil {
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return ""
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}
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return normalizeIP(c.ClientIP())
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}
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// GetSecurityClientIP returns the address used by security-sensitive paths.
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// When legacy forwarded-IP trust is enabled, raw forwarding headers take over
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// client-IP resolution. When disabled, Gin's server.trusted_proxies chain is
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// authoritative.
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func GetSecurityClientIP(c *gin.Context, trustForwarded bool) string {
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if requestSettings, ok := requestForwardedIPSettings(c); ok {
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trustForwarded = requestSettings.trustForwarded
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}
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if trustForwarded {
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return GetClientIP(c)
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}
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return GetTrustedClientIP(c)
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}
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// normalizeIP 规范化 IP 地址,去除端口号和空格。
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func normalizeIP(ip string) string {
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ip = strings.TrimSpace(ip)
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// 移除端口号(如 "192.168.1.1:8080" -> "192.168.1.1")
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(ip); err == nil {
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return host
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}
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return ip
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}
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// normalizeValidIP 规范化并验证代理头中的候选值,避免把 unknown、主机名等非法值传给安全服务。
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func normalizeValidIP(value string) string {
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normalized := normalizeIP(value)
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parsed := net.ParseIP(normalized)
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if parsed == nil {
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return ""
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}
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return parsed.String()
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}
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// privateNets contains the private/loopback ranges skipped while selecting a
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// public address from a legacy X-Forwarded-For chain.
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var privateNets []*net.IPNet
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func init() {
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for _, cidr := range []string{
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"10.0.0.0/8",
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"172.16.0.0/12",
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"127.0.0.0/8",
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"::1/128",
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"fc00::/7",
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} {
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_, block, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
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if err != nil {
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panic("invalid CIDR: " + cidr)
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}
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privateNets = append(privateNets, block)
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}
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}
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// CompiledIPRules 表示预编译的 IP 匹配规则。
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// PatternCount 记录原始规则数量,用于保留“规则存在但全无效”时的行为语义。
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type CompiledIPRules struct {
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CIDRs []*net.IPNet
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IPs []net.IP
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PatternCount int
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}
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// CompileIPRules 将 IP/CIDR 字符串规则预编译为可复用结构。
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// 非法规则会被忽略,但 PatternCount 会保留原始规则条数。
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func CompileIPRules(patterns []string) *CompiledIPRules {
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compiled := &CompiledIPRules{
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CIDRs: make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(patterns)),
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IPs: make([]net.IP, 0, len(patterns)),
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PatternCount: len(patterns),
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}
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for _, pattern := range patterns {
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normalized := strings.TrimSpace(pattern)
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if normalized == "" {
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continue
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}
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if strings.Contains(normalized, "/") {
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_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(normalized)
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if err != nil || cidr == nil {
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continue
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}
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compiled.CIDRs = append(compiled.CIDRs, cidr)
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continue
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}
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parsedIP := net.ParseIP(normalized)
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if parsedIP == nil {
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continue
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}
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compiled.IPs = append(compiled.IPs, parsedIP)
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}
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return compiled
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}
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func matchesCompiledRules(parsedIP net.IP, rules *CompiledIPRules) bool {
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if parsedIP == nil || rules == nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, cidr := range rules.CIDRs {
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if cidr.Contains(parsedIP) {
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return true
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}
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}
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for _, ruleIP := range rules.IPs {
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if parsedIP.Equal(ruleIP) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func isPrivateIP(ipStr string) bool {
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ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
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if ip == nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, block := range privateNets {
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if block.Contains(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// MatchesPattern 检查 IP 是否匹配指定的模式(支持单个 IP 或 CIDR)。
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// pattern 可以是:
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// - 单个 IP: "192.168.1.100"
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// - CIDR 范围: "192.168.1.0/24"
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func MatchesPattern(clientIP, pattern string) bool {
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ip := net.ParseIP(clientIP)
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if ip == nil {
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return false
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}
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// 尝试解析为 CIDR
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if strings.Contains(pattern, "/") {
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_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(pattern)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return cidr.Contains(ip)
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}
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// 作为单个 IP 处理
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patternIP := net.ParseIP(pattern)
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if patternIP == nil {
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return false
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}
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return ip.Equal(patternIP)
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}
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// MatchesAnyPattern 检查 IP 是否匹配任意一个模式。
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func MatchesAnyPattern(clientIP string, patterns []string) bool {
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for _, pattern := range patterns {
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if MatchesPattern(clientIP, pattern) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// CheckIPRestriction 检查 IP 是否被 API Key 的 IP 限制允许。
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// 返回值:(是否允许, 拒绝原因)
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// 逻辑:
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// 1. 先检查黑名单,如果在黑名单中则直接拒绝
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// 2. 如果白名单不为空,IP 必须在白名单中
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// 3. 如果白名单为空,允许访问(除非被黑名单拒绝)
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func CheckIPRestriction(clientIP string, whitelist, blacklist []string) (bool, string) {
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return CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules(
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clientIP,
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CompileIPRules(whitelist),
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CompileIPRules(blacklist),
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)
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}
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// CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules 使用预编译规则检查 IP 是否允许访问。
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func CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules(clientIP string, whitelist, blacklist *CompiledIPRules) (bool, string) {
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// 规范化 IP
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clientIP = normalizeIP(clientIP)
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if clientIP == "" {
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return false, "access denied"
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}
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parsedIP := net.ParseIP(clientIP)
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if parsedIP == nil {
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return false, "access denied"
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}
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// 1. 检查黑名单
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if blacklist != nil && blacklist.PatternCount > 0 && matchesCompiledRules(parsedIP, blacklist) {
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return false, "access denied"
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}
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// 2. 检查白名单(如果设置了白名单,IP 必须在其中)
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if whitelist != nil && whitelist.PatternCount > 0 && !matchesCompiledRules(parsedIP, whitelist) {
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return false, "access denied"
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}
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return true, ""
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}
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// ValidateIPPattern 验证 IP 或 CIDR 格式是否有效。
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func ValidateIPPattern(pattern string) bool {
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if strings.Contains(pattern, "/") {
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_, _, err := net.ParseCIDR(pattern)
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return err == nil
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}
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return net.ParseIP(pattern) != nil
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}
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// ValidateIPPatterns 验证多个 IP 或 CIDR 格式。
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// 返回无效的模式列表。
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func ValidateIPPatterns(patterns []string) []string {
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var invalid []string
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for _, p := range patterns {
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if !ValidateIPPattern(p) {
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invalid = append(invalid, p)
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}
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}
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return invalid
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}
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