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sub2api/backend/internal/pkg/ip/ip.go
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李建琦 6d655c9903
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Sub2API v1.0 - AI API 网关(二开初始版本,基于上游 Wei-Shaw/sub2api)
2026-08-21 18:30:13 +08:00

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// Package ip 提供客户端 IP 地址提取工具。
package ip
import (
"net"
"strings"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
const forwardedIPSettingsKey = "sub2api.forwarded_ip_settings"
type forwardedIPSettings struct {
trustForwarded bool
headers []string
}
// SetForwardedIPSettings snapshots the forwarded-IP mode and custom header list
// for this request.
func SetForwardedIPSettings(c *gin.Context, enabled bool, headers []string) {
if c == nil {
return
}
c.Set(forwardedIPSettingsKey, forwardedIPSettings{
trustForwarded: enabled,
headers: append([]string(nil), headers...),
})
}
// SetLegacyForwardedIPTrust records whether raw forwarding headers override
// Gin's server.trusted_proxies chain for this request.
func SetLegacyForwardedIPTrust(c *gin.Context, enabled bool) {
SetForwardedIPSettings(c, enabled, nil)
}
func requestForwardedIPSettings(c *gin.Context) (forwardedIPSettings, bool) {
if c == nil {
return forwardedIPSettings{}, false
}
value, ok := c.Get(forwardedIPSettingsKey)
if !ok {
return forwardedIPSettings{}, false
}
settings, ok := value.(forwardedIPSettings)
return settings, ok
}
func requestUsesLegacyForwardedIPTrust(c *gin.Context) bool {
settings, ok := requestForwardedIPSettings(c)
return !ok || settings.trustForwarded
}
// GetClientIP resolves the client address using the legacy forwarding-header
// precedence used before the trusted-proxy hardening. It remains the
// compatibility path for request metadata and usage/error logs; security-
// sensitive callers must use GetTrustedClientIP or GetSecurityClientIP.
func GetClientIP(c *gin.Context) string {
if c == nil {
return ""
}
if !requestUsesLegacyForwardedIPTrust(c) {
return GetTrustedClientIP(c)
}
settings, _ := requestForwardedIPSettings(c)
customIP, customFallback := resolveCustomForwardedClientIP(c, settings.headers)
if customIP != "" {
return customIP
}
// Preserve the historical precedence used by existing reverse-proxy
// deployments, while skipping an internal proxy address when a public XFF
// value is available. This covers Docker/Nginx setups that accidentally
// write the bridge address into X-Real-IP.
legacyIP, legacyFallback := resolveLegacyForwardedHeaderIP(c)
if legacyIP != "" {
return legacyIP
}
if customFallback != "" {
return customFallback
}
if legacyFallback != "" {
return legacyFallback
}
return normalizeIP(c.ClientIP())
}
func resolveCustomForwardedClientIP(c *gin.Context, headers []string) (string, string) {
if c == nil {
return "", ""
}
var fallback string
for _, header := range headers {
for _, value := range c.Request.Header.Values(header) {
for _, candidate := range strings.Split(value, ",") {
parsed := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(candidate))
if parsed == nil {
continue
}
normalized := parsed.String()
if isPrivateIP(normalized) {
if fallback == "" {
fallback = normalized
}
continue
}
return normalized, fallback
}
}
}
return "", fallback
}
func resolveLegacyForwardedHeaderIP(c *gin.Context) (string, string) {
var fallback string
if forwarded := normalizeValidIP(c.GetHeader("CF-Connecting-IP")); forwarded != "" {
fallback = forwarded
if !isPrivateIP(forwarded) {
return forwarded, fallback
}
}
if realIP := normalizeValidIP(c.GetHeader("X-Real-IP")); realIP != "" {
if fallback == "" {
fallback = realIP
}
if !isPrivateIP(realIP) {
return realIP, fallback
}
}
if xff := c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
for _, candidate := range ips {
candidate = normalizeValidIP(candidate)
if candidate != "" && !isPrivateIP(candidate) {
return candidate, fallback
}
}
if fallback == "" {
for _, candidate := range ips {
if candidate = normalizeValidIP(candidate); candidate != "" {
fallback = candidate
break
}
}
}
}
return "", fallback
}
// GetTrustedClientIP 从 Gin 的可信代理解析链提取客户端 IP。
// 该方法依赖 gin.Engine.SetTrustedProxies 配置,不会优先直接信任原始转发头值。
// 适用于 ACL / 风控等安全敏感场景。
func GetTrustedClientIP(c *gin.Context) string {
if c == nil {
return ""
}
return normalizeIP(c.ClientIP())
}
// GetSecurityClientIP returns the address used by security-sensitive paths.
// When legacy forwarded-IP trust is enabled, raw forwarding headers take over
// client-IP resolution. When disabled, Gin's server.trusted_proxies chain is
// authoritative.
func GetSecurityClientIP(c *gin.Context, trustForwarded bool) string {
if requestSettings, ok := requestForwardedIPSettings(c); ok {
trustForwarded = requestSettings.trustForwarded
}
if trustForwarded {
return GetClientIP(c)
}
return GetTrustedClientIP(c)
}
// normalizeIP 规范化 IP 地址,去除端口号和空格。
func normalizeIP(ip string) string {
ip = strings.TrimSpace(ip)
// 移除端口号(如 "192.168.1.1:8080" -> "192.168.1.1"
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(ip); err == nil {
return host
}
return ip
}
// normalizeValidIP 规范化并验证代理头中的候选值,避免把 unknown、主机名等非法值传给安全服务。
func normalizeValidIP(value string) string {
normalized := normalizeIP(value)
parsed := net.ParseIP(normalized)
if parsed == nil {
return ""
}
return parsed.String()
}
// privateNets contains the private/loopback ranges skipped while selecting a
// public address from a legacy X-Forwarded-For chain.
var privateNets []*net.IPNet
func init() {
for _, cidr := range []string{
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"127.0.0.0/8",
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
} {
_, block, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
panic("invalid CIDR: " + cidr)
}
privateNets = append(privateNets, block)
}
}
// CompiledIPRules 表示预编译的 IP 匹配规则。
// PatternCount 记录原始规则数量,用于保留“规则存在但全无效”时的行为语义。
type CompiledIPRules struct {
CIDRs []*net.IPNet
IPs []net.IP
PatternCount int
}
// CompileIPRules 将 IP/CIDR 字符串规则预编译为可复用结构。
// 非法规则会被忽略,但 PatternCount 会保留原始规则条数。
func CompileIPRules(patterns []string) *CompiledIPRules {
compiled := &CompiledIPRules{
CIDRs: make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(patterns)),
IPs: make([]net.IP, 0, len(patterns)),
PatternCount: len(patterns),
}
for _, pattern := range patterns {
normalized := strings.TrimSpace(pattern)
if normalized == "" {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(normalized, "/") {
_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(normalized)
if err != nil || cidr == nil {
continue
}
compiled.CIDRs = append(compiled.CIDRs, cidr)
continue
}
parsedIP := net.ParseIP(normalized)
if parsedIP == nil {
continue
}
compiled.IPs = append(compiled.IPs, parsedIP)
}
return compiled
}
func matchesCompiledRules(parsedIP net.IP, rules *CompiledIPRules) bool {
if parsedIP == nil || rules == nil {
return false
}
for _, cidr := range rules.CIDRs {
if cidr.Contains(parsedIP) {
return true
}
}
for _, ruleIP := range rules.IPs {
if parsedIP.Equal(ruleIP) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func isPrivateIP(ipStr string) bool {
ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if ip == nil {
return false
}
for _, block := range privateNets {
if block.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// MatchesPattern 检查 IP 是否匹配指定的模式(支持单个 IP 或 CIDR)。
// pattern 可以是:
// - 单个 IP: "192.168.1.100"
// - CIDR 范围: "192.168.1.0/24"
func MatchesPattern(clientIP, pattern string) bool {
ip := net.ParseIP(clientIP)
if ip == nil {
return false
}
// 尝试解析为 CIDR
if strings.Contains(pattern, "/") {
_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(pattern)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return cidr.Contains(ip)
}
// 作为单个 IP 处理
patternIP := net.ParseIP(pattern)
if patternIP == nil {
return false
}
return ip.Equal(patternIP)
}
// MatchesAnyPattern 检查 IP 是否匹配任意一个模式。
func MatchesAnyPattern(clientIP string, patterns []string) bool {
for _, pattern := range patterns {
if MatchesPattern(clientIP, pattern) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// CheckIPRestriction 检查 IP 是否被 API Key 的 IP 限制允许。
// 返回值:(是否允许, 拒绝原因)
// 逻辑:
// 1. 先检查黑名单,如果在黑名单中则直接拒绝
// 2. 如果白名单不为空,IP 必须在白名单中
// 3. 如果白名单为空,允许访问(除非被黑名单拒绝)
func CheckIPRestriction(clientIP string, whitelist, blacklist []string) (bool, string) {
return CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules(
clientIP,
CompileIPRules(whitelist),
CompileIPRules(blacklist),
)
}
// CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules 使用预编译规则检查 IP 是否允许访问。
func CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules(clientIP string, whitelist, blacklist *CompiledIPRules) (bool, string) {
// 规范化 IP
clientIP = normalizeIP(clientIP)
if clientIP == "" {
return false, "access denied"
}
parsedIP := net.ParseIP(clientIP)
if parsedIP == nil {
return false, "access denied"
}
// 1. 检查黑名单
if blacklist != nil && blacklist.PatternCount > 0 && matchesCompiledRules(parsedIP, blacklist) {
return false, "access denied"
}
// 2. 检查白名单(如果设置了白名单,IP 必须在其中)
if whitelist != nil && whitelist.PatternCount > 0 && !matchesCompiledRules(parsedIP, whitelist) {
return false, "access denied"
}
return true, ""
}
// ValidateIPPattern 验证 IP 或 CIDR 格式是否有效。
func ValidateIPPattern(pattern string) bool {
if strings.Contains(pattern, "/") {
_, _, err := net.ParseCIDR(pattern)
return err == nil
}
return net.ParseIP(pattern) != nil
}
// ValidateIPPatterns 验证多个 IP 或 CIDR 格式。
// 返回无效的模式列表。
func ValidateIPPatterns(patterns []string) []string {
var invalid []string
for _, p := range patterns {
if !ValidateIPPattern(p) {
invalid = append(invalid, p)
}
}
return invalid
}